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This dissertation proposes a new cross-national theory of judicial decision-making.
The judicial politicization theory posits that judges on a highly politicized high court will be
more likely to decide cases using ideological and attitudinal factors, while judges at less
politicized high courts will be more likely to decide cases using legal factors.  A new method
for calculating judicial politicization is provided, and the theory is tested using generalized-
estimating-equation logistic-regression analyses in newly collected data from the supreme
courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia.  The results show that the American and
Australian cases strongly support the theory.  That is, the attitudinal model is dominant in the
U.S. while the legal model is more influential in Australia.  In Canada, both legal and
attitudinal factors are significant.  In addition, the theory proposes that judicial activism is
more likely to occur in highly politicized high courts, and the data also support this
hypothesis. 
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1Chapter One:  Introduction
This dissertation examines two related and highly salient issues: judicial decision-
making and judicial activism.  Judicial decision-making refers to the processes and factors
that influence judges to decide cases as they do.  In other words, why does a judge vote for
one litigant over the other in a particular case?  Does the judge base his or her decision on
the legal principles governing the dispute, or is he or she affected by ideological, policy, or
strategic  considerations?  For over fifty years, public law scholars have attempted to unravel
the mysteries of judicial decision-making, and a variety of theories and models have been
propounded and tested.  Clearly, understanding the process of judicial decision-making is
important for both scholarly and practical considerations.  A more comprehensive account
of the process of judicial behavior can assist both social scientists and policy analysts. 
The other, related topic that is examined in this project is the concept of judicial
activism.  Judicial activism occurs when a court strikes down or invalidates an act of the
legislature or the executive.  This simple definition, though, excludes the deeper issues and
disagreements surrounding the concept.  Critics of judicial activism assert that judges should
seldom invalidate legislation or executive actions, while supporters hold that the ability of
judges to overturn unconstitutional and unjust laws is a necessary check in any political
system.  Judicial activism remains controversial, both in the trenches of academia and the
battlefields of politics.  Nearly every election cycle in the United States finds conservative
2politicians decrying “activist judges” who “write laws from the bench,” while defenders
point out that it is these same judges who protect unpopular minorities from oppression
through judicial rulings.  Not surprisingly, judges themselves disagree on the topic:  J.
Clifford Wallace of the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals notes that, “If left
entirely unchecked, periodic activist inroads over the years could emasculate fundamental
doctrines and undermine the separation of powers” (Wallace 1997, 172-73), while William
Wayne Justice of the United States District Court asserts that, “jurisprudential activism is
constitutionally mandated and, in and of itself, quite proper” (Justice 1997, 303).  
In academe, normative commentators variously describe judicial activism as a form
of “creative constitutional development” (Lewis 1999, 3) or as an “unfortunate phenomenon”
(Wolfe 1997, x).  The issue of judicial activism was elegantly framed by Alexander Bickel,
who noted that judicial activism is potentially undemocratic and thus presents a “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” in the American political system:  “when the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf
of the prevailing majority, but against it” (Bickel 1962, 16-17).  
In the years since Bickel penned his prescient remarks, judicial activism has been
recognized as not an exclusively American phenomenon, but, indeed, present in many
democracies worldwide, to a greater or lesser degree (Holland 1991, 2000; Tushnet 2003c).
The influence of high courts throughout the world of modern democracies increased
dramatically in the latter half of the twentieth century.  Scholars have noted that there has
3been a “global expansion of judicial power” (Tate and Vallinder 1995) as supreme courts
have expanded their role beyond dispute resolution to the creation of public policy.  Some
European and Canadian commentators, much like their American counterparts, have also
criticized judicial activism as being fundamentally antithetical to democratic principles
(Holland 2000; Knopff 2001; Martin 2003).  But, despite evidence that judicial activism has
been increasing in many industrialized democracies, there have been few empirical, cross-
national studies of the phenomenon, and few scholars have proposed theoretical frameworks
to explain and predict judicial activism.  Similarly, there has been very little cross-national
research into the dynamics of judicial decision-making in comparative perspective.  
This dissertation will attempt to remedy that deficiency, at least in part, by examining
judicial decision-making and judicial activism in the 1990s in the high courts of the United
States, Canada, and Australia.  Clearly, the process of judicial decision-making influences
the practice of judicial activism, thus these related phenomenon are examined in tandem.
However, this project will eschew analysis of the normative dimensions of judicial decision-
making and judicial activism, and instead approach these issues from an empirical and
positive perspective.  By examining judicial activism and judicial behavior in comparative
perspective, it is hoped that the relationship between courts and legislatures can be better
understood,  not only in the U.S., but worldwide.  In short, this dissertation hopes to answer
the overarching question:  Do judicial decision-making and judicial activism vary at the high
courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia, and, if so, why?  
4Competing Theories of Judicial Decision-Making
In Chapter Three, the existing scholarly literature on judicial decision-making and
judicial activism is extensively reviewed, with the aim of identifying the questions yet to be
answered by empirical research.  To briefly review, the dominant theory of judicial decision-
making is the attitudinal model, which posits that high court judges make decisions in cases
based upon their own ideological preferences or attitudes.  The attitudinal model can be
contrasted with the opposing theory, the legal model, which holds that judges are most
influenced by legal doctrine and precedent in judicial decision-making.  The attitudinal and
legal models have been extensively tested in the United States, and several recent studies
have also tested the attitudinal model in Canada in certain types of cases.  However, there
has been no study which measures the effects of the attitudinal and legal models cross-
nationally, and across a wide variety of case issue areas.  Furthermore, there has been
virtually no theoretical work conducted on the question of why the attitudinal and legal
models may vary in different nations’ highest courts.  Finally, there has been no research
analyzing judicial decision-making in unanimous cases in comparative context. 
Based on the review of the empirical literature in Chapter Three, there are at least
seven  specific questions that previous studies have not answered: 
1. Of the United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Canada, and High Court of
Australia, which is the most activist?  Put another way, which of these high courts is most
likely to defer to the legislature and which high court is least deferential?  Which high court
5is most likely to invalidate ideologically incongruent statutes?
2. Prior research (Solberg and Lindquist 2006) into federalism issues and judicial behavior
has indicated that, at the U.S. Supreme Court, conservative judges will be more likely to
strike down national laws while liberal justices are more likely to invalidate state and local
laws.  Do high court judges in Canada and Australia exhibit the same ideological voting
tendencies as American judges when reviewing national and state/local laws?  
3. Prior studies have found that attitudinal voting exists at the U.S. Supreme Court in certain
issue areas, such as civil liberties cases.  However, will the influence of attitudinal voting be
observed across issue areas?  In other words, can ideological/attitudinal judicial voting be
observed at the Supreme Court when different types of cases are aggregated?
4. Related to this, comparative judicial researchers have found that some attitudinal voting
occurs at the high court of Canada in certain case issue areas.  However, will ideological
voting be observed at the Supreme Court of Canada when different types of cases are
aggregated?
5. At the High Court of Australia, there has not previously been an analysis of attitudinal
voting based upon judicial ideology scores.  Previous researchers have only used political
party as a crude indicator of judicial ideology.  Will attitudinal voting be observed at the
6High Court of Australia when these ideological values are utilized?  
6. If attitudinal voting is observed  at the U.S. Supreme Court, Canadian Supreme Court, and
Australian High Court, does the extent of attitudinal judicial voting vary by high court? What
explains the difference, if any, in attitudinal voting? 
7. Are legal variables influential in judicial decision-making for high court judges in the
U.S., Canada and Australia?  In other words, does the legal model predict judicial behavior
for judges in these courts?  If legal variables do influence judicial decision-making at the
high courts of the U.S., Australia and Canada, what explains the difference in degree in legal
voting?
Methodology of this Study
The methodology for this study required the creation of a set of original databases for
each of the three countries in this study.  For the time period 1990 to 1999, each case decided
by the high courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia was reviewed to see if the
court decided the constitutionality of a federal or state/province statute, local ordinance, or
state constitutional provision.  Those cases were then numerically coded with over 40
separate variables per observation; over 3000 total observations were coded.  Two databases
for each country were created:  one database with the case as the unit of analysis, and one
database with the individual judge vote as the unit of analysis. The data were analyzed in
7Stata using a generalized estimating equation model and logistic regression analyses, as well
as various descriptive analytical techniques. 
The Judicial Politicization Theory
This project proposes a new theory for cross-national judicial decision-making:  the
judicial politicization theory.  Briefly, this theory posits that judges at a highly politicized
high court in an established democracy are more likely to decide cases according to
ideological/attitudinal factors, and will correspondingly be more likely to engage in judicial
activism and strike down acts of the legislature.  Conversely, judges at a high court that is
less politicized will be more likely to decide cases based upon legal factors, and will be less
likely to invalidate laws enacted by the political branch.  In other words, the attitudinal model
of judicial decision-making will predominate in politicized judiciaries, while the legal model
will be more likely to prevail in less politicized courts.  
The degree of judicial politicization in a high court is determined by the informal
norms regarding judicial selection, not the formal processes used for judicial appointments.
While there appears to be no question that judicial appointment systems are a highly
significant influence on American state court judges, this dissertation argues that, in
comparative context, formal selection mechanisms are less important than the “selection
culture” inherent in a modern democratic political system.  The selection culture refers to
whether the appointing executive typically relies upon ideological and partisan factors to
choose judges, or whether other factors such as qualifications and merit are the most
8important criteria.  Stated differently, a country’s judiciary is highly politicized if the judges
are chosen by the executive based upon partisan grounds, while another nation’s judiciary
is less politicized if the magistrates are selected on nonpartisan factors.  Of the three high
courts in this study, the most highly politicized is the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by the
High Court of Australia, followed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Brief Summary of the Results
The results of the analyses herein show that judges at the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1990s were more likely to engage in judicial activism than were judges at the high courts of
Canada or Australia.  Also, American high court justices were more likely to nullify
ideologically incongruent statutes. 
Also, judges at the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1990s were much more likely to
exhibit voting patterns that are consistent with their attitudes and ideology:  conservative
judges were more likely to strike down national laws and liberal justices were more likely
to nullify state and local laws.   The judges at the less politicized high courts of Canada and
Australia did not exhibit the same ideological voting tendencies, suggesting that non-
ideological factors predominated in federalism issues for judges at the high courts of Canada
and Australia. 
Next, the influence of judicial attitudes/ideology was found to be significant in each
of the high courts and had the greatest effect in the more highly politicized courts.
Examining the estimated marginal effect change in probability in the dependent variable
9(vote to strike down a law), judicial attitudes had an effect size of  -.31 or -31% (standard
error of .07) at the U.S. Supreme Court, -.18 or -18% (standard error of .09) at the High
Court of Australia, and -.13 or -13% (standard error of .07) at the Supreme Court of Canada.
Also, the legal variables were most significant for the less politicized high courts of
Canada and Australia, as predicted, although one coefficient was in the opposite direction
than expected for each of these two courts.  This suggests that legal variables are relevant in
the supreme courts of Canada and Australia, but that additional jurisprudential variables
could be added to the model in future studies. 
Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation makes several original theoretical and methodological contributions
to the existing research on comparative judicial behavior and judicial activism.  
First, a new theory of cross-national judicial decision-making in established
democratic societies-- the judicial politicization thesis--is proposed.  This is the first general
theory propounded to explain variations in judicial decision-making in comparative and
cross-national perspective.  
Second, substantial new data in judicial review cases from the high courts of Canada
and Australia in the 1990s are collected and analyzed (and existing U.S. Supreme Court data
was substantially extended).  Previously, data only existed for the U.S. Supreme Court
(Spaeth 2001); these new databases significantly extend the ability of the comparative
judicial scholar to analyze judicial behavior cross-nationally. 
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Third, judicial activism in the 1990s in the high courts of the U.S., Canada and
Australia is analyzed for the first time, including the influence of ideology in federalism
cases.  While judicial activism has been analyzed in the American case (see, e.g., Keck 2004)
and, to a lesser extent, the Canadian case (see, e.g., Kelly 2005), this is the first study to
empirically examine judicial activism at the High Court of Australia and is also the first
study to do so cross-nationally. 
Fourth, new judicial ideology scores for Australian high court judges, derived from
content analysis of Australian newspaper editorials, are presented for the first time.  Judicial
ideology scores have been available for American high court judges since 1989 (Segal and
Cover 1989) and for Canadian justices since 1999 (Ostberg and Wetstein 1999), but this
project represents the first compilation of these values for justices at the High Court of
Australia.  
Fifth, attitudinal voting in the High Court of Australia, Supreme Court of Canada, and
United States Supreme Court is examined across multiple issue areas  to provide the most
rigorous test of the theory.  That is, unlike virtually all previous studies (see, e.g., Segal
1986) which only examine the attitudinal model in one particular issue area (such as search-
and-seizure cases), this study aggregates all types of cases to provide the most stringent
possible test of the theory.
Sixth, the influence of legal and jurisprudential factors in judicial decision-making
at the High Court of Australia, Supreme Court of Canada, and U.S. Supreme Court is
analyzed.  That is, this is the first project to empirically analyze the influence of the legal
11
model in cross-national perspective, and one of the first to do so at the high courts of Canada
and Australia.  
Finally, judicial decision-making in unanimous cases–which can present a very
different dynamic than nonunanimous cases--is analyzed to test judicial behavior in
comparative context.  Almost all previous empirical research on judicial decision-making
(but see Kritzer, Pickerill, and Richards 1998) has used only nonunanimous court cases for
the analyses, on the assumption that unanimous cases do not present an actual legal or factual
controversy.  This dissertation disaggregates and analyzes unanimous and nonunanimous
cases, and is the first study to do so cross-nationally.  In other words, no previous  research
has examined judicial decision-making in solely unanimous cases at the supreme courts of
Canada and Australia.  
Preview of Chapters
Chapter Two of this dissertation examines in detail the data and methodology of this
project, as well as describing more fully the judicial politicization theory.  In Chapter Three,
the existing literature on judicial decision-making and judicial activism in the United States,
Canada, and Australia is examined in depth.  Chapter Four tests the judicial politicization
theory by examining the phenomenon of judicial activism at the high courts of the United
States, Canada and Australia.  The chapter analyzes trends in the rate of judicial activism in
the U.S., Canada, and Australia in the 1990s, and also examines which topical case issues
tend to provoke activism in each nation.  Also, judicial activism at the individual judge level
12
is analyzed in Chapter Four.  In Chapter Five, judicial activism and federalism in Canada,
Australia, and the United States are examined by analyzing the individual judges’ votes to
invalidate federal, state/province, and local laws.  In Chapter Six,  the central premise of the
judicial politicization theory–that judicial attitudes tend to strongly influence judicial
decision-making in politicized courts while legal factors are more likely to shape decision-
making in non-politicized courts–is analyzed by the use of a multivariate logistic regression
model, using generalized estimating equations. 
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Chapter Two:  Theory, Data, and Methods
In this chapter, the theory proposed in this project–the judicial politicization thesis–is
reviewed and discussed.  Also, the research design for the project, data collection procedures,
and analytical methods are discussed.  In addition, the coding for the dependent and
independent variables is described in detail, along with reliability testing. 
The Judicial Politicization Theory
The conventional wisdom on judicial selection systems among American public law
scholars is that the process used to choose the judges will significantly affect the judicial
decision-making by those judges (see, e.g., Brace and Hall 1997; Dubois 1980; Hall 2001;
Hanssen 1999; Kritzer 2006; Sheldon and Lovrich 1991).  For example, Gates and Johnson
(1991, 159) state, “the systems themselves may influence the decision making of judges and
their relationship to the political system.”  Much research has been conducted in the
American states to determine whether appointive systems  (wherein the executive chooses
the judge, sometimes after a commission has produced a short list of names), or elective
systems (where the legislature or voters directly choose the judges) have the greatest impact
on judicial decision-making (see generally Baum 1998b; Hanssen 2004).  In other words, the
scholarly consensus suggests that formal selection mechanisms are a predominant influence
upon judicial behavior.  
However, the theory proposed in this dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom
 Sheldon and Lovrich (1991; see also Miller 1998; Richardson and Vines 1970) discuss informal1
judicial selection norms through their “articulation” model, which posits that there are three crucial stages to
judicial appointment in the American states: initiation, screening, and affirmation. 
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and asserts that, in cross-national context, informal norms are the dominant factor.   While1
there appears to be no question that judicial appointment systems are a highly significant
influence on American state court judges, this dissertation argues that formal selection
mechanisms are less important than the “selection culture” inherent in a modern democratic
political system.  The selection culture refers to whether the appointing executive typically
relies upon ideological and partisan factors to choose judges, or whether other factors such
as qualifications and merit are the most important criteria.  Stated differently, a country’s
judiciary is highly politicized if the judges are chosen by the executive based upon partisan
grounds, while another nation’s judiciary is less politicized if the magistrates are selected on
nonpartisan factors.  The logical extension of this observation is that judges in a highly
politicized judiciary will tend to engage in a greater degree of ideological decision-making,
and judges in a less politicized judiciary will be less likely to decide cases on ideological or
attitudinal grounds.  Thus, the judicial selection culture of a country is the critical factor in
determining whether its supreme court is highly politicized, and whether its judges will tend
to be driven by political and ideological concerns.  
Specifically, the core of the judicial politicization theory is the contention that judges
on a highly politicized high court in an established democracy are more likely to decide cases
according to ideological/attitudinal factors, and will correspondingly be more likely to
engage in judicial activism and strike down acts of the legislature.  Conversely, judges on a
 It is consistent with the theory to speculate that a highly politicized high court will be more likely2
to engage in strategic behavior.  However, that question is beyond the scope of this project, but does
provide an interesting avenue for future research. 
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high court that is less politicized will be more likely to decide cases based upon legal factors,
and will be less likely to invalidate laws enacted by the political branch.  In other words, the
attitudinal model of judicial decision-making will predominate in politicized judiciaries,
while the legal model will be more likely to prevail in less politicized courts.  2
Before moving on, a brief word regarding judicial selection systems is necessary.
There is no question that, under certain circumstances, the formal judicial selection process
could moderate the degree of judicial politicization.  For example, transparency (through
open hearings) can moderate, to a greater or lesser degree, the influence of ideology in
judicial selection.  In other words, an open system, with multiple actors/veto points and open
hearings, could  moderate (though not eliminate) the tendency of the executive to select high
court judges based in ideological congruence.  The U.S. has a much more open process than
Australia or Canada, as Supreme Court nominees receive  intense scrutiny by interest groups
and the oppositional political party, followed by confirmation hearings in the Senate
Judiciary Committee and a full floor vote in the Senate.  By contrast, high court judicial
selection in Canada and Australia involves little or no scrutiny by interest groups and
virtually no transparency.  This example, though, serves to illustrate the basic contention of
the judicial politicization theory.  There are virtually no checks on the executive in high court
judicial selection in Canada and Australia, yet the process there is consistently less
politicized than in the United States.  However, if the selection culture in Canada or Australia
16
should change, then the prime minister would be able to make highly ideological judicial
appointments without difficulty.  
Quantifying Judicial Politicization
It is difficult to ascertain whether a country’s judiciary is politicized or not, because
there has been no empirical or quantitative method proposed to measure this concept.  So,
one method to determine the degree of judicial politicization is to conduct a review of the
existing qualitative literature and the thick descriptions that often exist in those studies.  This
is of course a crucial introductory step (indeed, such a review is found in Chapter Three of
this dissertation), but the lack of an empirical measure does not allow a researcher to make
definitive conclusions about the level of judicial politicization.  Thus, this project proposes
and conducts an empirical test of the degree of judicial politicization. 
The judicial politicization indicator is operationalized by analyzing partisan and
nonpartisan appointments to the high court and simply calculating the percentage of
nonpartisan judicial assignments.  A nonpartisan appointment is defined as a judicial
appointment where the political ideology of the justice differs from that of the executive.  To
illustrate, imagine that current President Bush had nominated current ACLU legal director
Steven Shapiro to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court.   This admittedly extreme example
would provide an illustration of a nonpartisan appointment to the U.S. high court.  Clearly,
the highly conservative Bush would not have nominated Shapiro to the Court based on
ideological congruence; rather, the appointment would have presumably been made on the
17
basis of other factors, such as experience, qualifications, merit, or some other nonideological
basis.  
To quantify nonpartisan appointments, I compared the ideology of the judge with the
ideology of the appointing executive.  If the two ideological values did not match, this was
coded as a nonpartisan appointment.  For the judicial ideology scores of the American
Supreme Court justices, I used the well-known Segal and Cover (1989) scores.  These values
were derived through a content analysis of editorials regarding judicial appointments in
leading American newspapers.  The Segal and Cover scores, updated in 2005 by Epstein and
Segal (2005), exist on a scale from most conservative (scores closer to 0) to most liberal
(scores closer to 1).  
For the Supreme Court of Canada ideology scores, another set of researchers (Songer
and Johnson 2002; Ostberg et al. 2004) previously conducted a content analysis of Canadian
newspapers to derive individual ideology scores for members of the Canadian Supreme
Court.  I used these values, with one modification: the original paper containing the scores
(Ostberg et al. 2004) separated Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s scores into two
categories–criminal and civil rights.  In order to obtain a single score representing
L’Heureux-Dube, these two values were combined.  The Ostberg scores were then
transformed to match the Segal and Cover scale, which is a scale from 0 to 1. 
   For the High Court of Australia, I conducted a content analysis of Australian
newspaper editorials using the Segal and Cover (1989) procedures and developed an
ideology scale for each judge sitting on the High Court in the 1990s.  These scores are the
 Admittedly, using party as a proxy for ideology is a fairly crude measure.  However, this is a very3
common practice among social scientists when no better measures are available (see, e.g., Smyth 2005).  In
the United States, the NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 1998) are an excellent
indicator of ideology; however, no comparable measures exist for Canada or Australia.  Thus, the decision
was made to be consistent and use party for all three cases.
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first ideology values to date for the members of the High Court of Australia, and utilize the
same scale as the Segal and Cover values.   The initial ideology values for the judges on each
high court are shown in Table 2.4 below. 
Thus, I compared judicial ideology with executive ideology.  I inferred executive
ideology from party identification.  Thus, if the executive was a member of the Republican
in the United States, a member of the Liberal party in Australia, or a member of the
Progressive Conservatives in Canada, they were coded as having a conservative ideology
(value of 0 to .499).  Conversely, if the executive was a member of the Democratic party in
the United States, Australian Labor Party in Australia, or Liberal party in Canada, he was
coded as having a liberal ideology (value of .500 to 1.00).   So, if the ideology of the3
executive and the ideology of the judge did not correspond, this was coded as a nonpartisan
appointment.  The mean for nonpartisan appointments was calculated, and then subtracted
from 1 in order to provide an intuitive measure of judicial politicization. 
Note that both associate justice appointments (associate justices are called puisne
justices in Australia and Canada) and chief justice appointments or promotions are included.
However, if only initial appointments to the high court (excluding chief justice promotions)
are used  in the calculations, the overall judicial politicization scores do not vary
 If only initial high court appointments are used, the judicial politicization scores would be: U.S. =4
.917; Australia = .727; Canada = .571. 
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significantly.   4
The details for the U.S. Supreme Court are found in Table 2.1, Australian results are
shown in Table 2.2, and Canadian data are shown in Table 2.3.  The judicial politicization
index for each court is graphically displayed in Figure 2.1.  Note that the higher the value for
each high court shown in Figure 2.1, the higher the degree of judicial politicization.  
Figure  2.1 shows that the U.S. has the most politicized judicial system with an index
score of .923, followed by Australia with a score of .714 and Canada with an index score of
.529.  These scores comport with the scholarly consensus regarding the supreme courts of
the U.S., Canada, and Australia.  As discussed at length in Chapter Three, researchers have
found that the judiciary in the United States has become exceptionally politicized in the last
25 years, while the high courts of Canada and Australia have remained relatively
nonpoliticized. 
Thus, judicial selection in the U.S. is most likely to be based on ideological
congruence, while the selection of judges in Canada and Australia is less likely to be based
on this factor.  In other words, in the United States, there is a very strong correlation between
the ideological preferences of the nominating president and the ideology of the judge, as
measured by Segal and Cover (1989) judicial ideology scores, whereas high court judges
selected in Canada and Australia in the 1990s sometimes did not share the ideology of the
appointing executive.  Thus, it appears that these Canadian and Australian judges were 
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Table 2.1
Partisan and Nonpartisan Appointments to the Supreme Court of the United States,
All Justices Serving in the 1990s 
Sworn in Justice Judge Executive Nonpartisan
Ideology Ideology Appointment
4/16/62 White   .500 Democrat No
10/2/67 Marshall  1.00 Democrat No
9/09/70 Blackmun  .115 Republican No
1/07/72 Rehnquist (assoc.)  .045 Republican No
9/26/86 Rehnquist (CJ)  .045 Republican No
12/19/75 Stevens  .250 Republican No
9/25/81 O’Connor   .415 Republican No
9/26/86 Scalia  .000 Republican No
2/18/88 Kennedy   .365 Republican No
10/09/90 Souter  .325 Republican No
10/23/91 Thomas  .160 Republican No
8/10/93 Ginsburg  .680 Democrat No
8/03/94 Breyer  .475 Democrat Yes
Judicial ideology scores exist on a 0 to 1 scale.  Lower scores indicate conservative ideology,
higher scores indicate liberal ideology.
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Table 2.2
Partisan and Nonpartisan Appointments to the High Court of Australia,  All
Justices Serving in the 1990s
Sworn in Justice Judge Executive Nonpartisan
Ideology Ideology Appointment
8/07/72 Mason (puisne) .500 Liberal Yes
2/06/87 Mason (CJ) .500 ALP No
2/12/81 Brennan (puisne) .250 Liberal No
4/21/95 Brennan (CJ) .250 ALP Yes
6/25/82 Deane .500 Liberal Yes
7/30/82 Dawson .250 Liberal No
2/06/87 Toohey 1.00 ALP No
2/06/87 Gaudron 1.00 ALP No
2/14/89 McHugh .500 ALP No
4/21/95 Gummow .300 ALP Yes
2/06/96 Kirby .800 ALP No
9/22/97 Hayne .275 Liberal/Coalition No
5/22/98 Gleeson (CJ) .225 Liberal/Coalition No
2/03/98 Callinan .000 Liberal/Coalition No
Note that Gleeson’s initial appointment to the High Court was as Chief Justice.
Judicial ideology scores exist on a 0 to 1 scale.  Lower scores indicate conservative ideology,
higher scores indicate liberal ideology.
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Table 2.3
Partisan and Nonpartisan Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, All
Justices Serving in the 1990s
Sworn in Justice Judge Executive Nonpartisan
Ideology Ideology Appointment
3/26/73 Dickson (puisne) .500 Liberals No
4/18/84 Dickson (CJ) .500 PC Yes
3/28/80 Lamer (puisne) .855 Liberals No
7/01/90 Lamer (CJ) .855 PC Yes
3/04/82 Wilson .905 Liberals No
1/16/85 La Forest .875 PC Yes
4/15/87 L’Heureux-Dube .330 PC No
5/24/88 Sopinka .538 PC Yes
2/01/89 Cory .743 PC Yes
2/01/89 Gonthier .455 PC No
3/30/89 McLachlin (puisne) .668 PC Yes
1/07/00 McLachlin (CJ) .668 Liberals No
9/17/90 Stevenson .625 PC Yes
1/07/91 Iacobucci .500 PC No
11/13/92 Major .170 PC Yes
9/30/97 Bastarache .833 Liberals No
1/08/98 Binnie  .553 Liberals No
Judicial ideology scores exist on a 0 to 1 scale.  Lower scores indicate conservative ideology,
higher scores indicate liberal ideology.
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 It should be acknowledged that, although these countries are primarily situated in the common5
law legal tradition, there are significant elements of the civil law tradition in Canada (in the province of
Quebec) and the United States (in the state of Louisiana).  
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selected less on ideology and more on other factors, such as qualifications and experience.
The analysis and quantification of judicial politicization is just the first part of the
theory.  The theory also posits that a highly politicized court will tend to decide cases based
on attitudinal/ideological factors, while legal factors should be more influential in less
politicized courts.  That proposition is fully analyzed in Chapter Six.  
Research Design
Using a most-similar-systems research design, the high courts of the United States,
Canada, and Australia were chosen as the primary cases for this study.  Each of these courts
exist in Anglo-American modern democracies that are based on a common law legal system.5
Also, the high courts in this dissertation exhibit varying levels of judicial activism, the
dependent variable.  Thus, the selection of these nations’ supreme courts–as most similar
systems–allows for generalizations to be made regarding the phenomenon of judicial
activism in industrialized Western democracies. 
The time period that is examined is 1990 to 1999.  This time period is theoretically
justified by Tate and Vallinder’s (1995) assertion that “judicialization” increased markedly
in the world in the 1990s.  Indeed, each of the countries in this project experienced
significant changes in the 1990s that justify the selection of this time period.  In Canada, the
adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 caused a fundamental transformation
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of the role of the Supreme Court after the court cases invoking the Charter began reaching
the high court in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Kelly 2005).  In Australia, the High Court
issued a series of landmark cases in the early 1990s which recognized a form of native title
for aboriginal peoples and signaled a fundamental shift in the Court’s jurisprudence (see
generally Pierce 2006).  In the United States, the Supreme Court dramatically changed the
course of its jurisprudence in a number of cases, including U.S. v. Lopez (1995).  Some
commentators suggested that a significant shift in the Court’s jurisprudence occurred in the
1990s (see, e.g., Tushnet 1996).  
A set of original databases was created for each of the three countries in this study.
For the time period 1990 to 1999, each case decided by the high courts of the United States,
Canada, and Australia was reviewed to see if the court decided the constitutionality of a
federal or state/province statute, local ordinance, or state constitutional provision.  Those
cases were then numerically coded with over 40 separate variables per observation; over
3000 total observations were coded.  Two databases for each country were created: one
database with the case as the unit of analysis, and one database with the individual judge vote
as the unit of analysis.  The case selection and coding procedures are described in detail
below.
Data Collection
The data used in this study consists of selected cases from the United States Supreme
Court, Supreme Court of Canada, and High Court of Australia, decided in the period from
 Because some justices did not participate in certain cases, there are less than the expected 13506
observations in the justice-centered database. 
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1990 to 1999, and coded into numerical format to facilitate statistical analysis.  The cases for
the U.S. datasets utilized the existing United States Supreme Court Database:  1953-2000
Terms (Spaeth 2001) and the Supreme Court Justice-Centered Judicial Databases:  The
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts (1953-2000 Terms) (Benesh and Spaeth 2003) as the
starting points for the data collection in this project.  The Spaeth databases have been used
by many scholars in the past, have been subject to various reliability tests and are widely
considered to be exceptionally accurate and reliable.  Thus, once the individual cases for the
U.S. databases were chosen, they were obtained from the Spaeth and Benesh and Spaeth
databases.  However, I added dozens of new variables to the databases and also changed the
coding in several instances (described below).  Thus, the American data in this project are
derived largely from the Spaeth (2001a) and Benesh and Spaeth (2003) databases, but are not
identical to them because of the extensive modifications and additions that were made to the
data.  The first U.S. database, the case database, contains exactly 150 court cases while the
second database, the justice-centered database, contains 1343 observations, which is
comprised of the individual judge votes from the 150 cases in the case database.6
The Canadian and Australian datasets required original data collection, and the data
used in this dissertation are presented and analyzed for the first time.  For the Canadian
Supreme Court, the data was obtained from the Web site maintained by the University of
Montreal.  The site contains the full text of all Canadian high court decisions since 1985; the
 The site’s address is http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/. 7
 The data from the U.S. Supreme Court were not included in this reliability check, because the8
Spaeth data have already been subjected to reliability and accuracy testing. 
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site’s address is http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca.  The Canadian case database contains 166
cases, and the Canadian judge-centered database contains 1306 observations. 
For the Australian supreme court data, the site maintained by the Australasian Legal
Information Institute was used.  That site contains the full text of reported and unreported
decisions from the High Court since 1903.   The Australian High Court case database7
contains 68 cases, and the judge-centered database contains 419 observations.  Occasionally,
the Lexis/Nexis computerized legal research service was used to obtain and verify Canadian
and Australian cases.  
After the data was collected and coded, a test for reliability and coding accuracy was
conducted.  A random sample of ten percent of the cases from the Canadian and Australian
databases was selected; these cases and the codebook were given to an outside coder.   Then,8
the coding in the random sample of cases was compared with the coding in the databases.
The coding in the random sample was found to have a 93.55% accuracy score.  That is, the
coding in the random sample matched the coding in the databases at a 93.55% rate.  This
reliability level indicates that the data used in the project can be regarded with a high degree
of confidence.
However, further procedures were implemented to ensure the accuracy of the data.
An examination was conducted of those values that differed between the sample and original
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datasets.  I discovered that the variable most likely to coded inaccurately was Issue Area,
because the codebook did not give enough guidance on how to choose an issue area if there
were several possibilities.  Following the reliability testing, I reviewed the data once again
to ensure that the issue area for each case was accurate.  
Case Selection
Turning to the topic of how individual cases were selected, the first selection rule
concerned the timing of cases.  As noted above, it was determined that this project would
examine judicial review cases in the time period 1990 to 1999.  In order to conform to this
time period, the decision was made to use the court term, rather than the date the opinion was
released, as the method to determine which cases in include in the database.  In other words,
all cases from the 1990 through 1999 terms, inclusive, were examined for possible inclusion
in the databases, even though the cases may not have been released to the public until the
following year.  For the U.S. Supreme Court, there are a number of cases from the Court’s
1999 term that were not released until 2000 that were included in the databases. 
The next issue involved which types of  proceedings to include.  For the Australian
and Canadian high courts, this was not problematic, as only decisions on the merits are
available at the web sites containing the cases.  Both reported and unreported decisions were
included, in order to avoid selection bias.  Also, all judicial review cases from the High Court
of Australia were included, regardless of the number of judges participating in the case.   
However, the U.S. Supreme Court renders various types of decisions and documents,
 Decrees were granted inclusion in the databases, but no such cases appeared in the time frame of9
this study. 
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requiring that the researcher decide which of the following should be included in a data set:
-signed opinions that were accompanied by full oral argument;
-signed opinions that were not accompanied by oral argument; 
-per curiam decisions: these are opinions that are not signed by an individual member of the
Court but are instead attributed to the Court as a whole; 
-memorandum cases: these are decisions regarding tangential issues, such as requests to
participate as amicus curiae;
-decrees: these rare decisions involve matters involving the Court’s original jurisdiction;
-plurality opinions: these are opinions which announce the judgment of the Court but where
less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion (Spaeth 2001b;
Wiecek 1992).
For the U.S. Supreme Court, signed opinions (whether accompanied by oral argument
or not), per curiam decisions, and plurality opinions were included in the databases.   All9
other types of Court decisions were excluded.  Also, judicial review cases were included
even if a justice had recused himself or herself.  Thus, there are a handful of American cases
which only comprised a panel of eight judges. 
The next selection criterion involved the content of the cases.  Only cases involving
the exercise of judicial review over the constitutionality of an legislative enactment, broadly
defined, were included in each data set.  More specifically, to be included in the databases,
 For example, in U.S. v. Fordice (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court opined that the state’s college10
diversity plans were “constitutionally suspect,” but only remanded the case to a lower court and did not
strike down the plan.
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the case must have involved judicial review by the high court of a state/province or federal
statute, local ordinance or regulation, state/province or federal agency rule, or state
constitutional provision (in the U.S. only).  If a case did not meet one of the above criteria,
it was not included for analysis. 
It is important to note which cases were not included in the databases for each
country’s high court.  First, any case that did not involve statutory review was excluded.
Thus, cases involving review of police actions in criminal procedure cases were not included.
Also, cases that involved the reversal of a lower court precedent (without a statutory basis
in the case) were not included..  Also, if the case contained justiciability issues (standing,
mootness, ripeness), and the high court did not reach the statutory issue, it was excluded.
Finally, if the high court did not take a firm position on the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a statute and remanded the case back to a lower court, the case was not
included.   10
Variable Coding
In this section, the coding procedures for the dependent and independent variables
are reviewed. 
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Dependent Variable
In both the case database and justice-centered database for each high court, the
dependent variable is whether the statute/regulation in question was ruled to be
unconstitutional and overturned.  In the case database, the dependent variable is whether or
not the majority of the high court overturned the law in question.  In the justice-centered
databases, the dependent variable is whether the individual judge voted to overturn the
disputed statute.  Usually, there is no question when a declaration of unconstitutionality has
been made by the high court or individual justice.  However, it should be noted that if any
portion of the statute/regulation was struck down (but not the entire statute/regulation), this
was coded as a declaration of unconstitutionality.  Therefore, “judicial activism” in this
project is defined as the act of striking down, in whole or in part, a statute, regulation,
ordinance, or state constitutional provision.  
Independent Variables
In this section, the independent variables in both the case and justice-centered
databases are briefly described.  
Judicial ideology:  This variable initially assigns a value to indicate the ideological position
of the individual judge in each high court.  Then, the individual judge score is multiplied by
the value for the direction of the statute in order to adjust for liberal and conservative
statutes.  The coding procedure is described in detail below. 
The first step is to assign a value to represent the ideological position of each high
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court judge.  The standard practice is to derive these ideological scores by conducting a
content analysis of newspaper editorials regarding the individual judge at the time of his or
her appointment.  Content analysis is used to furnish an independent measure of judicial
ideology that is separate from voting records.  In other words, it would be a simple matter
to analyze each judge’s voting record to ascertain how liberal or conservative the judge is
(and indeed, judicial researchers have conducted this analysis), but using these measures in
this study would present endogeneity problems, because judicial votes would be used to
predict judicial votes.  Thus, the content analysis scores are used to measure judicial
ideology.
As discussed above, the ideology scores used in the model come from several
different sources.  The American values use the well-known Segal and Cover scores (Segal
and Cover 1989; Epstein and Segal 2005).  The Canadian scores are largely derived from
Ostberg et. al (2004) but have been somewhat modified with regard to Justice L’Heureux-
Dube.  The Australian scores are the result of original content analysis and are the first
attitudinal scores to date for these judges.  All of the ideology scores are on a continuum
from most conservative (scores closer to 0) to most liberal (scores closer to 1).  The initial
ideology values for the judges on each high court are shown in Table 2.4. 
After the initial judicial ideology scores were obtained, they were again transformed
to a scale containing positive and negative integers.  In other words, the original scores,
which were on a scale from 0 to 1, were transformed to a scale from -.5 to .5.  The relative
values remained constant, in that the higher negative values indicated a conservative ideology
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and high positive values indicated a liberal ideology.  
After the ideology scores were transformed to a positive and negative scale, each
value was then multiplied (following Lindquist and Klein 2006) by the variable Statute
Direction.  Statute Direction measures whether the law in question was liberal or
conservative, with a value of -1 given for a conservative statute and 1 for a liberal statute.
The Spaeth (2001a) coding rules were used to measure whether the law was conservative or
liberal.  Thus, by multiplying the judicial ideology scores by the direction of the statute, a
new variable was created:  Adjusted Judicial Ideology.  These adjusted judicial ideology
scores are constructed so that higher positive values indicate agreement with the law, while
higher negative values indicate that there is ideological inconsistency with the challenged
statute.  Thus, each judicial ideology score reflects the degree of agreement with the law
(positive value) or disagreement (negative value).  For example, in the American case,
Justice Scalia  (who is a strong conservative) has a rescaled ideology score of -.501; thus, for
a conservative law (-1), his value would be .501, indicating ideological congruity.  To
summarize, this coding scheme allows both liberal and conservative laws to be analyzed in
light of judicial ideology, rather than only focusing on liberal or conservative laws. 
Lower court dissent: This independent variable indicates whether there was a split decision
in the lower court that reviewed the case under consideration.  The variable is given a value
of 1 if there was a dissenting opinion, and 0 if there was no dissent and the lower court
decision was unanimous.
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Table 2.4
Judges’ Ideology Scores in the United States, Canada, and Australia
United States Canada Australia
Judge Score Judge Score Judge Score
Marshall 1.00 Wilson .905 Gaudron 1.00
Ginsburg .680 La Forest .875 Toohey 1.00
White .500 Lamer .855 Kirby .800
Breyer .475 Bastarache .833 McHugh .500
O’Connor .415 Cory .743 Mason .500
Kennedy .365 McLachlin .668 Deane .500
Souter .325 Stevenson .625 Gummow .300
Stevens .250 Binnie .553 Hayne .275
Thomas .160 Sopinka .538 Brennan .250
Blackmun .115 Iacobucci .500 Dawson .250
Rehnquist .045 Dickson .500 Gleeson .225
Scalia .000 Gonthier .455 Callinan .000
L’Heureux .330
Major .170
Judicial ideology scores exist on a 0 to 1 scale.  Lower scores indicate conservative ideology,
higher scores indicate liberal ideology.
 This refers to the appellate court immediately below, not the lower trial court.11
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Lower court invalidation: This variable measures whether the lower court overturned the
challenged law.   The variable is given a value of 1 if the lower court struck down the law,11
0 if the law was upheld, and 8 if there is no lower court record.
State/local law:  This variable indicates if the challenged law was either a state (or province
law, in Canada) or local statute.  This is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if a
state/province or  law was present, and 0 otherwise.
Solicitor General/Attorney General support for invalidation:  This variable measures whether
the United States Solicitor General, Attorney General of Canada, or Solicitor General of
Australia supported the challenged law or regulation.  The variable is coded 1 if the Solicitor
General/Attorney General supported striking law, 0 if the Solicitor General/Attorney General
was not present in the case or took no position, and -1 if the Solicitor General/Attorney
General did not support overturning the law in question.
Saliency of case:  This independent variable seeks to measure the salience of the case to the
judges by providing an indicator of the degree of societal interest in the case’s outcome.
Thus, a high degree of interest from interveners and amici curiae (groups that volunteer to
submit a brief or testimony in a particular case) will signal to the justices that the case in
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question is highly relevant to the community.  The variable was operationalized by counting
the total number of interveners or amici in each case and multiplying that number by the total
number of nongovernmental interveners/amici.  Thus, the variable provided an index of the
interest in the case from both governmental groups and private associations.  A larger
number indicates a greater degree of salience. 
Government is party in case:  This dummy variable denotes whether the national government
of the U.S., Canada or Australia was a direct party in the case.  The national government was
coded as a party if it appeared as a one of the primary litigants, or (in Canada and Australia)
if a Minister was a litigant.  Note that the government’s presence as an amicus curiae did not
qualify as being a party, nor did a state or province’s status as a party in the case.  A value
of 1 was assigned if the government was a party, 0 otherwise. 
Party Resource Disparity: This variable measures the differential in resources among the
litigants in a case.  The coding of this variable involved a two-step process.  First, the status
of each litigant (such as individual in a civil case, business, state or provincial government,
etc.) was assessed and a value was assigned to that status.  Higher values indicate parties
with more resources at their disposal.  The following scale was used to code litigant status:
1 =  individual in a civil case
2 = criminal defendant
3 = group; association; churches; Indian tribes; political parties
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4 = unions
5 = business; bankruptcy trustee
6 = local or municipal government; school district
7 = state or provincial government
8 = national government or agency
The second step was to subtracting the party (either Petitioner or Respondent) with
the lower score from the party with the higher score.  For example, a case might involve a
petitioner who is an individual in a civil case (value of 1) versus a state government
respondent (score of 7).  The party resource disparity in this example is 6.   Thus, this value
indicated the degree of litigant resource differential. 
Issue area of the case:  This variable indicated the subject matter of the case.  The variable
was operationalized as a series of dummy variables (1 if the case involved the issue, 0
otherwise) so that the influence, if any, of a particular topic could be assessed comparatively.
The Spaeth (2001b) coding was used to classify the cases.  The categories are:  criminal
procedure, civil rights, speech or religion, due process, privacy, attorneys, unions, economic
activity, judicial power, federalism, interstate/interprovince relations, taxation, and
miscellaneous.   Not all of these issues were included in the model because of collinearity
issues.  
38
Analytical Techniques
In Chapter Six, inferential statistical techniques are used to analyze the data and test
the theory.  Because the data is longitudinal, time-series cross-sectional data analysis (also
known as panel data or longitudinal data) is appropriate (Beck 2001; Beck et al. 1998; Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2005; Wawro 2006).  The generalized estimating equations (GEEs)
class of models is used to better account for correlated data.  Generalized estimating
equations were formulated to extend generalized linear models to correlated binary data (see
generally Liang and Zeger 1986; Zeger et al. 1988; Zorn 1998; 2000; 2001).  Wawro (2006,
115) notes that “GEEs relax assumptions about the independence of observations,” and allow
the researcher to “account for unobserved correlation among observations, without including
unit-specific effects.”  Zorn (1998, 12, 14) notes that GEE models are well-suited to the
analysis of individual-level judicial behavior, because these models are robust to the
misspecification of “interdependencies across cases and justices;” thus, the GEE model can
“account for within-case correlation among the justices.”  
GEE models were designed to allow for analysis of binary outcomes, and thus are
suitable for the analysis of the data in this project.  Because the dependent variable (vote to
strike or uphold) is dichotomous, a GEE logit estimator is used (see generally Aldrich and
Nelson 1984; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Menard 2002; Pampel 2000), with the results
clustered on each judge and using an exchangeable correlation structure within each cluster.
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Chapter Three:  Literature Review
In this chapter, the existing social scientific literature regarding judicial decision-
making and judicial activism in the United States, Canada, and Australia is critically
examined.  The goal of this chapter is to indicate where the lacunae or gaps in the
comparative courts research exist.  First, a brief overview of the supreme courts of the United
States, Canada, and Australia is provided.  The primary similarities and differences between
the high courts of these countries are displayed in Table 3.1.  Then, an examination of the
two major opposing theories of judicial decision-making--the legal model and the attitudinal
model–is furnished, followed by a review of the extant scholarship regarding the attitudinal
model in the U.S., Canada and Australia.  Next, the phenomenon of judicial activism is
discussed, followed by an assessment of the judicial activism literature in comparative
perspective.  Finally, some of the existing gaps in the comparative courts literature are
identified. 
Overview of the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court is the highest court in the judicial hierarchy, and
thus possesses the ability to overrule any lower federal court and any state court if a
constitutional issue is present.  Indeed, through the doctrine of judicial supremacy, the Court
has the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution of the United States and overturn any
 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) for the Court’s statement on judicial supremacy.12
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legislation, executive action, or popular vote if it is determined that the act of the political
or executive branches is unconstitutional.   Because of judicial supremacy, the Court12
possesses tremendous power to shape the legal and political landscape of the American
system (see generally Baum 1998; Cooper and Ball 1996; Jacob 1996; McCloskey and
Levinson 1994; O’Brien 2000; Pacelle 2002; Perry 1991).  
The Supreme Court consists of nine justices–one chief justice and eight associate
justices.  The justices are supported by assistants known as law clerks, young lawyers who
serve for one year at the Court and work closely with an individual justice (Ward and Weiden
2006).  The justices possess life tenure and leave the bench at their own discretion (although
they can be impeached under extraordinary circumstances).  Each justice is nominated by the
President and approved by the Senate, in what has become a highly politicized process
(Abraham 1999; Comiskey 2004; Epstein and Segal 2005; Silverstein 1994; Yalof 1999; see
generally Gerhardt 2000).  Because of their life tenure, judges on the Supreme Court (and
indeed, all federal judges) possess a very high degree of judicial independence.  Thus,
Supreme Court justices do not fear any retribution from the political branches of government
for case outcomes and may thus decide cases without outside interference.  
The jurisdiction of the Court derives almost totally from its appellate jurisdiction; in
a few rare instances, the Court has original jurisdiction in a matter and the legal action can
commence at the Supreme Court rather than be heard first in a lower court.  In its appellate
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jurisdiction, the Court hears cases from the lower federal power courts and cases from the
state supreme courts if they involve a federal issue.  Congress defines the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court and can change it at any time.  
Appellate jurisdiction cases come to the Court in three ways.  The first and most
common method is through the granting of a writ of certiorari.  The certiorari process
involves a request by a party for the Court to hear the case; the Court may grant or deny the
request. The second method is by mandatory appeal, where the Court is required to grant an
appeal in a few special cases.  Those rare cases are first heard by a special three-judge federal
district court.  Finally and most uncommonly, a case can come to the Court through
certification.   A congressional statute provides that an appellate judge may request that the
Court clarify a point of federal law, but this is rarely granted.  In general, almost all cases
arrive at the Court through the certiorari process, but it must be noted that it is quite rare for
a writ of certiorari to be granted.  In recent years, the Court has received about 9,000 or more
requests for certiorari but only grants around 80 or so.  Thus, case selection through the
certiorari procedure is a very important part of the Court’s process (see Perry 1991).
The Court decides cases after oral arguments and written briefs are submitted by the
litigants.  After the justices vote during conference, one justice is selected to author the
majority opinion (which is the opinion of the Court and has the force of law).  Selection of
the majority opinion author is made by the chief justice, if he is in the winning coalition.  If
the chief justice votes with the losing faction, then the justice in the victorious coalition with
the most seniority on the Court makes the selection.  The selecting justice may assign the
 This change occurred in 1949; prior to that date, litigants (theoretically) had the option of13
appealing to the Privy Council in England following a decision by the Court. 
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writing of the Court’s opinion to himself or herself. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court in the 1990s became more conservative in
its rulings although not necessarily less activist than in past decades.  According to several
commentators, the Court became the “regulator of the welfare state” (McCloskey and
Levinson 1994) as well as reexamining settled legal doctrine in a series of controversial
cases.  For example, in the case of United States v. Lopez (1995), the Court overturned
Commerce Clause doctrine that had not been challenged in over seventy years.  Indeed, some
commentators have speculated whether the Court has undergone a “constitutional moment”
on the scale of the New Deal shift of the 1930s (Choudry 2005; see generally Ackerman
1991, 1998; but see Simon 1995).  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court experienced its own quiet
constitutional revolution in the 1990s–one that is not as dramatic as the changes observed
in Canada and Australia, but a revolution that is nonetheless significant. 
Overview of the Supreme Court of Canada
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada is the final court of
appeal in Canada,  and its decisions are binding on all lower courts, because the Court13
possesses judicial supremacy and the power of full judicial review over federal, provincial,
 However, the Court’s judicial supremacy is limited by section 33 of the Charter, the14
“notwithstanding” clause, which allows for legislative override of the Court in certain circumstances. 
Section 33 is discussed further in Chapter Eight.
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and local laws  (see generally Bushnell 1992; Flemming 2002, 2003, 2004; Greene et al.14
1998; Kelly 2005; Martin 2003; McCormick 1994, 2000; Morton 2002; Roach 2001).  The
Court is located in Ottawa, and nine justices serve on the Court:  the Chief Justice and eight
puisne (associate) justices.  Canadian law requires that three of the justices must come from
the province of Quebec, and prime ministers have generally followed the custom of
appointing three justices from Ontario, two from the western provinces, and one judge from
the Atlantic provinces (Flemming 2002, 256).  
The justices are appointed by the Prime Minister of Canada.  At this time, there are
no mandatory parliamentary or confirmation hearings required; thus, the Prime Minister
possesses almost total autonomy in the appoint of high court judges (Miller 1998; Morton
2006; Ziegel 1999).  However, the process of high court judicial appointments has been
criticized (Johnson 2004; LeRoy 2004) and there have been some recent minor changes.  In
2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin created a parliamentary committee to screen high court
nominees and provide a report to Parliament (Morton 2006).  However, members of the
opposition party objected to the process, and the selection process was refined in 2005 by
adding additional members to the committee.  However, it must be noted that the committee
acts only in an advisory capacity and the prime minister retains full control over the choice
of nominee.  In any case, the modest changes to the high court appointment system in Canada
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do not coincide with the time period of this study. 
The justices possess a very high degree of judicial independence, as they have full
judicial tenure until mandatory retirement at age 75.  Additionally, the justices are assisted
by short-term law clerks (Sossin 1996; Weiden 2002) as are American high court justices;
however, each justice uses three clerks, not four, as in the American case.  
The Court has extensive control over its docket, as decisions from lower courts are
typically heard at the Court only if the justices grant leave.  The Court usually receives about
550-650 requests for leaves of appeal, and grants approximately 15-20 percent of those
(Flemming 2002, 256).  Applications for leave to appeal are decided by a three-judge panel
by majority vote (Hausegger and Haynie 2003, 640).  However, the Court is still required to
hear any criminal appeal where the lower appellate court overturned an appeal or was divided
(Epp 1998, 166).  
As in the U.S. and Australia, decisions on the merit of a case need not be
unanimous–a majority vote is sufficient to decide the outcome of a case.  Majority opinions
are written by one judge, but justices in the losing coalition are free to write dissenting
opinions.  Ostberg, Wetstein, and Ducat (2003) report that, in regards to opinion authorship,
individual justices often volunteer to write the majority opinion based upon their interest or
expertise in a certain policy area.  However, if there are no volunteers in a particular case,
the Chief Justice will assign the authorship to a member of the majority coalition.  
It is important to note that, in Canada, the justices of the Court do not always sit en
banc (full court); rather, the judges may sit as a panel of five or seven judges to decide the
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merits of a case, although a full court of all nine justices is also common.   According to
Hausegger and Haynie (2003), the Chief Justice assigns the panels, giving him or her more
power than the U.S. Supreme Court chief justice.  
One unique feature of the Canadian Supreme Court is the ability of the Court to issue
advisory opinions in what are known as reference questions.  In these cases, there is no actual
case or controversy, but the Court is asked to provide advice about a looming legal issue
(Epp 1998; Fleming 2002).  For example, the Court gave an advisory opinion in 1998 on the
issue of whether Quebec could legally secede from the nation.  
Clearly, the most momentous constitutional change in recent Canadian constitutional
history was the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.  The Charter
transformed the Canadian constitution, and guaranteed certain rights, similar to the Bill of
Rights in America (Epp 1998; Howe & Russell 2001; Lebel-Grenier 2001; Morton & Knopff
2000; Smithey 1994).  However, the Charter even goes beyond the Bill of Rights in the rights
that it secures.  For example, the Charter grants fundamental language rights for French
speakers.  Furthermore, the Charter authorizes the judicial review of legislative acts by the
court to ensure that such acts are accordance with it.  
Another unique feature of the Charter is Section 33, the “notwithstanding” clause,
which allows for legislative override of the Charter in certain circumstances.  More
specifically, this section allows either a provincial legislature or the national Parliament by
majority vote to override, for a period no longer than five years, any provision contained in
sections 2, and 7 through 15 of the Charter (Flemming 2002; Goldsworthy 2003; Roach
 Interestingly, at the origination of the High Court, each judge was not only assigned an associate,15
but also a “tipstaff.”  A tipstaff is an assistant who retrieves legal materials as well as helping with the
justice’s personal needs and errands.  The position of the tipstaff has now been largely eliminated at the
High Court (Craske and Jones 2001). 
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2001; Tushnet 2003c).  Essentially, the notwithstanding clause allows a Canadian legislature
to reenact a statute that has been nullified by the Court based upon the law’s inconsistency
with the Charter.  However, this provision has only been invoked several times, and thus the
efficacy of the clause has been called into question (Leeson 2001).  
Overview of the High Court of Australia
The High Court of Australia, located in Canberra, is the highest court in the judicial
hierarchy of Australia, and has full judicial review over laws passed by Parliament and the
state legislatures (see generally Blackshield, Coper, and Williams 2001; Crawford and
Opeskin 2004; Galligan 1987; Gani and Barclay 2002; Patapan 2000; Pierce 2006; Solomon
1992).  Furthermore, after the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, the High Court is
now the final court of appeal for Australia (Gani and Barclay 2002).  
There are seven justices sitting on the Court, including the Chief Justice.  The judges
are appointed by the Governor-General of Australia with the advice of the federal Attorney-
General (Campbell and Lee 2001; Davis and Williams 2003; Donegan 2003; Evans 2001;
Handsley 2006).  The judges have significant judicial independence, based on their judicial
tenure.  Until 1977, the justices held life tenure, but they are now required to retire at age 70.
Each justice is assisted by two law clerks, known in Australia as associates (Leigh 2001).15
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Almost all cases come to the High Court on appeal, although there is original
jurisdiction for a few matters.  There is no automatic right to have a case heard by the High
Court.  Thus, the Court controls its docket almost completely.  As in Canada, the High Court
does not always sit en banc.  Cases which involve interpretation of the Australian
Constitution, or cases that the Court considers to be one of major public importance, are
usually determined by a full bench of all seven justices. Other cases are heard by a panel of
not less than two justices.  Also, there are certain matters which may be heard and
determined by a single Justice (Crawford and Opeskin 2004; Galligan 1987).  
One of the unique features of the High Court (and one of the most frustrating for the
empirical legal researcher) is the presence of seriatim opinions, also known as separate
judgments (Coper 2001).  Rather than issuing a consolidated, majority opinion as does the
high courts of America and Canada, the Australian High Court utilizes the practice of joint
and separate judgments.  So, for many if not most cases, each justice on the Court will issue
his or her own statement on the case, thus requiring the reader to carefully read each opinion
in order to determine the ruling of the Court.  
Another difference between the Australian, Canadian, and American constitutional
systems is the lack of a formal bill of rights in the Australian constitution.  However, the
Constitution itself does guarantee some civil rights and liberties, including free exercise of
religion and protection against unjust actions by the Parliament and executive (Gani and
Barclay 2002). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the High Court also underwent significant changes  (Galligan
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1987; Pierce 2006).  While there was no structural constitutional change as significant as the
adoption of Canada’s Charter, the High Court did develop into a different body than it had
been in the past.  First, in 1987, appeals to the Privy Council were ended, and thus the High
Court became the sole judge of all legal controversies (Galligan 1987).  In addition, the High
Court adopted more of a policy-making role and began developing a rights-based
jurisprudence (Galligan 1991; see generally Pierce 2006).  While it is unclear if this
transformation has grown or abated in the 2000s, it seems clear that the High Court’s
decisions and impact began to resemble the supreme courts of Canada and the United States,
starting in the 1990s.  
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Table 3.1
Comparison of the High Courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia
United States Supreme Court High Court
Supreme Court of Canada of Australia
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Number of 9 9 7
Justices
Appointment By president; By prime minister; By governor-general on
confirmation by Senate no legislative approval necessary advice of Executive
Council
Judicial Lifetime Mandatory retirement Mandatory retirement
Tenure at age 75 at age 70
Judicial Review Full Full Full
Powers
Docket Discretionary jurisdiction Discretionary jurisdiction Discretionary jurisdiction
Control with certain exceptions with certain exceptions with certain exceptions
Dissenting Yes Yes Yes
Opinions
Advisory No Yes (reference questions) No
Opinions
Protection of Bill of Rights Charter of Rights and Freedoms Few explicit constitutional 
human rights provisions
Panels No Yes Yes
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The Great Debate:  Law Professors Versus Political Scientists
Discussions of the causes of judicial behavior have traditionally been the domain of
legal academics while social scientists have been comparative latecomers to the debate.  Law
professors have traditionally espoused the legal model of judicial decision-making, while
behavioral political scientists have challenged this view by positing an contrary theory: the
attitudinal model (see generally Clayton 1999).  Indeed, Feldman (2005, 91) observes that
legal academics and political scientists each have a vested interest in defending these
antithetical models, because the legal model of judicial behavior comports with the doctrinal
training that law professors receive, while the attitudinal model reflects the empirical and
analytical education that social scientists undergo.  In this section, these opposing theories
of judicial decision-making are examined and the leading scholarship incorporating these
frameworks is examined. 
The Legal Model
The legal model of judicial decision-making is the traditional understanding of how
judges in common law legal systems decide cases.  Feldman (2005) notes that the legal
model, which he terms the “internal view,” is the view espoused by almost all law professors
and dates back to the first Dean of Harvard Law School, Christopher Columbus Langdell.
In its simplest form, the legal model holds that judges make decisions on the merits of a
particular case by interpreting the facts of a case by referring to the plain meaning of the
relevant statute or constitutional provision, precedent in prior cases, and the legislative and
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Framers’ intent of those who drafted the law or Constitution (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  That
is, the legal model posits that judges will not utilize personal political or partisan values
when deciding cases, only legal factors.  In other words, according to the theory, judges in
common law systems will carefully weigh and balance prior precedents (known as stare
decisis), statutes, and constitutional provisions when deciding the outcomes of cases.  When
there is no clearly determinative precedent or statute, judges are expected to defer to the
legislative branch and use neutral principles of interpretation (Wechsler 1959).  Again, the
individual political philosophy of a particular judge is not expected to influence the decision
on a case, because judges will focus exclusively upon the legal factors of a case.  It is
important to note that judges themselves also maintain that they only decide cases according
to legal factors, and almost always deny allowing personal policy preferences to drive their
voting (Spaeth 1995, 306).  
To be sure, the legal model is not monolithic in the legal academy.  The legal realist
school has been influential in opposition to the conventional wisdom; it holds that law is
indeterminate and that judges are more influenced by the facts in a particular case than
established precedent.  See, e.g., Frank (1930); Green (2005); Llewellyn (1930).  However,
Feldman (2005, 90) notes that legal realism had fallen out of favor among legal scholars by
the end of World War II.  It is clear that, notwithstanding the legal realists, the conventional
wisdom regarding judicial decision-making among legal scholars is that legal, not
ideological, factors are the determinative elements in the calculus of judicial behavior–a view
that most political scientists reject. 
 Of course, the Framers of the United States Constitution also left various provisions vague as16
well. 
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In their influential book, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited,
Segal and Spaeth (2002; see also Segal and Spaeth 1993) deconstruct the simple form of the
legal model and argue that it does not accurately portray the reality of judicial decision-
making.  First, Segal and Spaeth contend that the “plain meaning” of statutes and
constitutions cannot control judicial behavior because of the inherent imprecision of the
English language.  Indeed, Segal and Spaeth note that legislators often purposely leave
statutes vague, in order to win legislative approval.   Furthermore, one particular statutory16
provision may conflict with another provision in the same statute, thus rendering the plain
meaning of a law impossible to decipher (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  
Next, Segal and Spaeth contend that legislative intent also does not act as a
significant influence upon judicial decision-making.  This is because the intent of politicians
engaged in the legislative process may be difficult to find in some cases, and, even if the
legislative record can be found, there is no guarantee that the remarks found therein
accurately reflect the nature of the actual proceedings.  The authors note that, for decades,
members of Congress were allowed to edit any and all remarks that they made on the floor
of the House or Senate, thus casting doubt on the veracity of the Congressional Record
(Segal and Spaeth 2002, 71).  Segal and Spaeth further note that discerning the intent of the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution is the most problematic of all, because there is no way to
calculate a single viewpoint on any particular constitutional provision from the collectivity
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that drafted the document.  The authors observe that there is no commonly accepted
definition of “Framers”:  the alternatives are the 55 men who attended the Constitutional
Convention, the 39 who signed it, or the delegates who attended the state ratification
conventions.  (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 68).  And of course, problems with linguistic precision
exist with legislative or Framers’ intent as well. 
Finally, Segal and Spaeth (2002) argue that legal precedent does not act to constrain
the voting behavior of judges in any way.  To review, the common law legal tradition
provides that judges must follow any prior legal decision in the same area of law.  While this
is a long-held practice in the United Kingdom, America, Canada and Australia, Segal and
Spaeth maintain that it is a fiction.  The reason this practice is an illusion, according to the
authors, is that, in modern law, judges can always find a case precedent to support either
party in a case and any conclusion that they wish to make.  That is, with the large number of
prior cases and legal precedents existing in every area of law, a judge is not bound by
precedent, because there is never one single controlling precedent.  Furthermore, in the rare
case that there is a truly controlling precedent, judges have the option of “distinguishing” the
legal precedent, which means that judges can avoid adhering to a precedent by proclaiming
that the facts in the precedential case are too different from the extant case, and therefore the
precedent need not be followed (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 82; see also Brenner and Spaeth
1995; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Spaeth and Segal 1999).  Finally, judges (especially
judges in high courts) have the option of limiting the range of a precedent or outright
overruling the precedential case.  That is, judges in common law systems have the option of
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striking down a prior case, even if it came from the same court.  Segal and Spaeth (2002, 83)
note that the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its own precedents 128 times from 1953 to 2000.
Thus, Segal and Spaeth provide a compelling argument detailing why the model of
judicial decision-making adopted by legal academics–the legal model–is not an accurate
depiction of reality.  However, the Segal and Spaeth critique has been criticized by some
(Feldman 2005; Gillman 2001; Rosenberg 1994; Smith 1994).  These critics maintain that
Segal and Spaeth’s depiction of the legal model is far too simplistic, and that law does play
an important role in judicial decision-making.  These scholars have sought to incorporate
both attitudinal and legal variables in models of judicial decision-making, and have asserted
that judges usually consider legal factors as well as personal ideological values when
deciding the outcome of a case.  However, these integrated studies (which are discussed
below) remain the minority in social science research on judicial decision-making.  By far
the dominant model of judicial decision-making among political scientists is known as the
attitudinal model. 
The Attitudinal Model
Perhaps not surprisingly, most political scientists have rejected the legal model of
judicial decision-making and instead embraced an alternative explanation:  the attitudinal
model.  The attitudinal model received its most thorough exposition in Segal and Spaeth’s
1993 book, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, and their follow-up volume, The
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002).  Earlier versions of the attitudinal
 Of course, the earliest precursor to the modern theory of judicial attitudinalism is Herman17
Pritchett’s (1948) landmark book, The Roosevelt Court.
 Although Segal and Spaeth (2002) only consider the U.S. Supreme Court, their criteria for18
maximum attitudinal voting also apply to the high courts of Canada and Australia, as discussed below.
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model are found in Ulmer (1960), Schubert (1963); Schubert (1965), Rohde and Spaeth
(1976), Kobylka (1989), Segal (1984, 1986), Segal and Cover (1989), and Spaeth (1972).17
Segal and Spaeth assert that the attitudinal model “represents a melding together of key
concepts from legal realism, political science, psychology, and economics” (2002, 86).  
Stated most simply, the theory posits that judges tend to vote according to their
political preferences, attitudes, and ideologies, and not according to the relevant doctrine,
legislative intent, or legal precedent of a particular case.  Spaeth contends that, “the justices
vote as they do because they want their decisions to reflect their individual policy
preferences” (Spaeth 1995, 305).  Segal and Spaeth note that a number of factors present at
the U.S. Supreme Court encourage attitudinal voting by judges.  18
First, Supreme Court justices have no ambition for higher judicial office, so the
judges do not have to consider the consequences of their decisions on the merits of a case
(Segal and Spaeth 2002).  In other words, because the U.S. Supreme Court is the highest
tribunal in the system, the judges do not have to worry about having their record scrutinized
and possibly being denied a promotion to a higher court in the future.  Nor do Supreme Court
judges typically seek political office, so there is no fear of political accountability there
 The last Supreme Court justice to seek higher political office was Charles Evans Hughes, who19
left the Court in 1916 in order to attempt to be elected President (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 96). 
 Of course, it is possible that Congress will enact legislation to attempt to overrule the Court after20
a decision. While this has happened in the past, it is fairly rare.  Even rarer is the possibility that the
Constitution will be amended to overturn a Supreme Court decision.  Segal and Spaeth (2002, 95) state that
there have been only five constitutional amendments that overrule a Court ruling in American history. 
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either.   Segal and Spaeth also note that Supreme Court justices are immune from electoral19
accountability.  Although many states employ periodic judicial elections, federal judges enjoy
life tenure, and thus there is no fear of losing their office in an election due to the justice’s
voting record.
Finally, Segal and Spaeth (2002) observe that the U.S. Supreme Court is a court of
last resort that has complete control of its docket.  That is, the members of the Court have
total discretion as to which cases will be accepted for judicial review.  This ensures that cases
which are completely without merit or are totally one-sided will be screened out.  Thus, only
those cases which present a genuine dispute between two (more or less) legally defensible
positions will be accepted by the Court.  So, the fact that the Court controls its caseload
ensures that only cases with solid legal justification for both litigants will usually be
accepted, which encourages attitudinal voting.  Furthermore, because the Supreme Court is
at the top of the judicial pyramid in the United States, there is no possibility of a higher court
reversing the Court’s decision on a particular case.   20
Because of all of these institutional arrangements–life tenure for high court judges,
control of the Court’s caseload, lack of political or electoral sanctions, court of last resort–the
judges at the United States Supreme Court are completely free to decide cases based upon
 A recent variant of the attitudinal model is the strategic model.  The strategic model borrows21
some of its central assumptions from rational choice theory.  Stated most simply, the strategic model accepts
that judges will vote according to their attitudes and policy preferences, but, in order to maximize those
preferences, judges will take into account the voting of the other members of the court (see generally
Epstein and Knight 1998; Maltzmann, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Murphy 1964; Segal and Spaeth 2002;
Spriggs 2003).  In other words, strategic judges are not unconstrained actors, but must weigh the
preferences of other actors when making decisions.  Most attempts (see, e.g., Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and
Maltzmann 1998) to model strategic decision-making on the Supreme Court rely upon game-theoretical
accounts and equilibrium models to demonstrate that some element of judicial decision-making was
“sophisticated” (taking into account the preferences of other judges) rather than “sincere” (a pure example
of voting for a judge’s policy preferences, without regard for other judges’ actions).  But, Segal (1997)
found that judges almost always in engage in sincere behavior, thus casting doubt on the strategic model.
The debate over the utility of the strategic model in public law and rational choice theory overall
(see generally Green and Shapiro 1996) continues unabated.  An examination of the strategic model in
comparative perspective is beyond the scope of this project, but it seems reasonable to assume that, if
indeed strategic behavior exists for American high court judges, judges in Canada and Australia may also
act strategically at times.  
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personal attitudes, values and ideologies, not the law.  Segal and Spaeth (2002) note that
while attitudinal factors may play a role in Court decisions such as voting on certiorari, it is
the decision on the merits of the case where the attitudinal model is likely to be strongest.21
Spaeth (1995) does note that there are some potential limitations on the attitudinal
model.  First, it is unclear if the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making will apply to
lower appellate courts, because of the restrictions that these judges operate under.
Specifically, the possibility for judicial (or political) promotion could limit the tendency of
these judges to vote their true preferences, as could the possibility for reversal by a higher
court.  Furthermore, most lower appellate courts do not have complete control over their
docket, which means that many cases lacking a true legal conflict must be accepted in these
courts.  Although these considerations may limit the effect of attitudinal voting in lower
appellate courts, some research has indeed found that attitudinal voting is present in lower
courts (see, e.g., Segal et al. 1995).  In any case, this limitation does not apply to this study,
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because only high courts are utilized herein.  
The attitudinal model has been criticized by some commentators, who assert that
more attention to the institutional arrangements should be incorporated into models of
judicial decision-making (Gillman and Clayton 1999; Clayton 1999; Gillman 2001, 2003;
see also Kritzer 2003; Spriggs 2003; Wilson 2006).  Specifically, Gillman and Clayton
(1999, 5) argue that “justices’ behavior might be motivated not only by a calculation about
prevailing opportunities and risks but also by a sense of duty or obligation about their
responsibilities to the law and the Constitution and by a commitment to act as judges rather
than as legislators or executives.”  In other words, Gillman and Clayton contend that
institutional arrangements and relationships structure and constitute the goals and values that
judges bring to the decisional calculus.  Thus, according to this analysis, one institutional
value present among high court judges may be a self-imposed obligation to consider legal
factors when making a decision on the merits of a case. 
Other critics (Brisbin 1996; Rosenburg 1994; Smith 1994) have criticized Segal and
Spaeth’s (1993) characterization of the legal model as being too simplistic and a straw man.
Rather, these critics assert, the law and legal factors operate in a sophisticated manner (along
with political factors) to shape the interpretive philosophies of Supreme Court justices.  This
understanding of the legal model accepts that politics will play a large role in judicial
decision-making, but in a more indirect manner than Segal and Spaeth (1993) acknowledge.
Clayton (1999, 26) states, “the distinction is between a ‘principled’ rather than a ‘result-
based’ process of judicial decision-making, not between political and apolitical models.”  Put
 It should be noted that George and Epstein (1992) do not include an ideological variable which22
measures judicial preferences, but they do include a variable which measures the political environment.  
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another way, these critics of the attitudinal model assert that legal factors still play a large
role–albeit a more complex and nuanced one than usually acknowledged–in judicial
decision-making at the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Integrating Law and Politics in Judicial Decision-Making
A number of political scientists have sought to incorporate both attitudinal and legal
variables in models of judicial decision-making in the American case and have asserted that
judges usually consider legal factors as well as personal ideological values when deciding
the outcome of a case. 
George and Epstein (1992) examined death penalty cases and found that an integrated
model of judicial decision-making–which incorporated legal, political, and environmental
factors–offered the most accurate explanation of judicial outcomes.   Brace and Hall (1997)22
also analyzed death penalty cases, not at the federal level, but in eight state courts, and used
an integrated model which incorporated social background, institutional, contextual, and
legal variables.  They also found that an integrated model was effective in predicting judicial
behavior.  Epstein and Kobylka (1992) in their book, The Supreme Court and Legal Change,
sought to explain doctrinal change and examined the areas of abortion and the death penalty.
They found that the law and the way litigants framed legal arguments has at least as much
impact on judicial decision-making as did public opinion, personnel change or judicial
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attitudes.  Also, H.W. Perry (1991) in Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United
States Supreme Court found that Supreme Court justices do utilize jurisprudential
considerations when deciding which cases to accept for review.  
There is also a series of studies by political scientists that tests the influence of
precedent and stare decisis on judicial decision-making.  Segal and Spaeth (1996) and
Brenner and Spaeth (1995) found that, according to their analysis, precedent plays virtually
no role in judicial behavior and justices’ decisions on the merits of cases.  In contrast, Songer
and Lindquist (1996) found that, by using a slightly different methodology, precedent does
appear to play a significant role in judicial behavior at the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Other recent studies (see, e.g., Bartels 2006; Benesh and Czarnezki 2006; Collins
2006; Pacelle et al. 2006; Wahlbeck 1997) have examined the influence of legal and
attitudinal factors on judicial decision-making.  In a related series of articles, Kritzer et al.
(1998); Richards and Kritzer (2002); and Kritzer and Richards (2003; 2003b; 2005) found
that Supreme Court decisions can be separated into “judicial regimes,” defined as a landmark
case or precedent that dramatically changes the way that the justices view subsequent cases
in that area of the law.  Kritzer and Richards (2005; see also Kritzer 2003) found that, in the
area of search and seizure cases, the judicial regime framework predicted how the justices
would vote in these cases, thus providing some evidence that landmark legal precedents–in
the form of judicial regimes--do play a part in judicial decision-making.  Most recently,
Lindquist and Klein (2006) examined attitudinal and jurisprudential factors in cases
involving intercircuit conflicts at the U.S. Supreme Court.  They found that both legal and
 See Robertson (1998) for a suggestive analysis of ideological voting at the English House of23
Lords.
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attitudinal variables affected the justices’ decision-making in these cases.  
To summarize, the legal model represents the traditional understanding of judicial
decision-making by law professors; while it is not the dominant framework among social
scientists, some political scientists have incorporated law and legal variables into their
analyses.  However, the attitudinal model of judicial behavior remains the generally accepted
theory among behavioral political scientists.  The debate between these competing models
is far from resolved.  
Judicial Decision-Making in Australia and Canada
In this section, the existing research on judicial decision-making at the High Court
of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada is discussed.  23
Australia
The empirical literature on judicial decision-making and the attitudinal model in
Australia is, in a word, scant.  There are several books on the High Court (Blackshield,
Cooper, and Williams 2001; Crawford and Opeskin 2004; Galligan 1987; Patapan 2000;
Solomon 1992; see also Campbell and Lee 2001; Gani and Barclay 2002) that provide a
historical and doctrinal overview, but research on judicial behavior is rare.  The Australian
economist Russell Smyth has been the most prolific scholar in this area, producing a number
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of articles generally related to judicial behavior on the High Court of Australia (Smyth 2003,
2004, 2005; Smyth and Narayan 2004).  Smyth (2003, 2004, 2005) and Smyth and Narayan
(2004) all deal with explaining variations in the rate of dissenting opinions issued at the High
Court.  Smyth (2003) uses demographic and social background factors of High Court judges
to predict these dissent rates at the High Court between 1903 and 1975, and finds that certain
social background characteristics predict a greater likelihood to dissent from the majority.
Smyth (2004) uses different independent variables--institutional and external political
factors--to predict the dissent rate at the High Court, and finds that the caseload of the court
in a particular year was most influential in predicting dissent rates, as well as the enactment
of the Australia Acts, which removed all appeals from the High Court to the British Privy
Council.  Smyth and Narayan (2004) found that leadership on the High Court was an
important factor in predicting consensus and dissensus.  
Most relevant for the purposes of this project is Smyth (2005), “The Role of
Attitudinal, Institutional and Environmental Factors in Explaining Variations in the Dissent
Rate on the High Court of Australia.”  In this study, Smyth uses an integrated model and
combines the independent variables used in the earlier articles–caseload, leadership, social
background–and adds an attitudinal variable.  Judicial attitudes are measured by using a
proxy measure: whether the judge was a Conservative or Labour appointee.  Smyth (2005)
finds that a combination of attitudinal and institutional variables are most significant in
predicting variations in the dissent rate of the High Court.  This is an important finding, but
it must be noted that the method used to measure judicial attitudes–political party of
 Wood (2001) uses the number of Liberal-appointed judges minus the number of Labour-24
appointed justices to assign the level of ideological disparity.
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appointing executive used as a proxy of attitudes–is a fairly crude measure.  Thus, Smyth
(2005) is an important starting point for judicial behavior research on the High Court, but
further refinement may be necessary to adequately assess the role of judicial attitudes at the
High Court.  
Wood (2001) also examines dissenting votes on the High Court, and examines legal
and attitudinal models of decision-making for cases in the period 1996 to 1998.  Wood
(2001) suggests that judicial attitudes do influence judicial behavior on the High Court, but
her analysis also uses, as does Smyth, a party-proxy method of assigning judicial attitudes.24
Wood (2001) and Smyth’s (2005) papers are both important first steps to a full examination
of judicial decision-making at the High Court of Australia, but they both lack an external
measure of judicial ideology that would allow better confidence in their results. 
A recent analysis of legal change at the High Court in the last fifteen years is Pierce
(2006).  This volume examines the jurisprudential evolution of the High Court during the
leadership of Chief Justice Anthony Mason and the period immediately thereafter.  Pierce
utilizes judicial interviews and doctrinal analysis to examine the controversial decisions
regarding indigenous peoples’ rights--Mabo v. Queensland (1992); Wik Peoples v.
Queensland (1996)--issued by the High Court during this period.  Pierce (2006) does not
empirically test attitudinal, legal, or political variables in his analysis, but does consider the
impact of these factors in the volume.  Pierce (2006) asserts that the “Mason Court
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Revolution” can be explained by a combination of factors: the election of a Labor
Government, the elevation of Mason to Chief Justice by the Labor government as well as the
appointment of other justices, and the change in the High Court’s agenda-setting function
caused by the removal of Privy Council appeals.  Pierce’s volume is an important study of
the Mason Court, in that the book skillfully examines historical, political and legal change
at the High Court during the 1980s and 1990s.  Although Pierce somewhat discounts the role
of judicial attitudes as an explanation for judicial change at the High Court, his analysis
suggests that judicial ideology may have played an important role in judicial decision-making
during the Mason Court. 
Canada
Compared to Australia, the literature on the Supreme Court of Canada is considerably
more extensive.  There are a number of books that provide a general overview of the Court
and also the role of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Bushnell 1992; Greene et al. 1998;
Hiebert 2002; Howe and Russsell 2001; James, Abelson, and Lusztig 2002; Kelly 2005;
Knopff and Morton 2002; Manfredi 2001; Martin 2003; McCormick 1994, 2000; Morton and
Knopff 2000; Roach 2001; see also Cardinal and Headon 2002; Flemming 2002, 2003, 2004;
Morton 2002; Newman 2004; Peacock 1996).  The literature on judicial decision-making at
the Supreme Court is less sizable, but some important advancements have been made.
One of the earliest studies of judicial decision-making in Canada is Tate and
Sittiwong (1989).  Tate and Sittiwong (1989) utilize a social background model to analyze
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decision-making at the Court in economics and civil rights and liberties cases in the period
from 1949 to 1985.  They find that these personal attributes predicted a liberal vote:  being
Catholic, non-Quebec origin, judicial and political experience; also, Liberal party affiliation
also was significant.  Thus, while this study did not explicitly test judicial attitudes by using
an ideological scale, the results do suggest that certain background characteristics associated
with ideology predicted a liberal vote in economics and civil rights and liberties cases.
Songer and Johnson (2002) sought to update the Tate and Sittiwong (1989) study and
replicated their research design but extended the time period being studied to 2000.  They
find that not all of the significant variables in the Tate and Sittiwong (1989) article are
significant in the updated research, and they suggest that attitudinal voting may be present
at the Supreme Court, although Songer and Johnson (2002) do not use an external attitudinal
scale to measure individual justice ideology.  
The most extensive work on judicial decision-making in Canada has been conducted
by Ostberg and Wetstein, both in tandem and in conjunction with other authors.  Ostberg and
Wetstein (1998) was the first study to develop an external scale of attitudinal values for
individual justices, derived from content analysis of newspaper editorials, of the Canadian
Supreme Court.  The study used factor analysis and logistic regression to analyze the judges’
votes in search and seizure cases, and found that judicial attitudes are significant for
predicting outcomes in these cases.  Wetstein and Ostberg (1999) also examined search and
seizure cases at the Canadian high court, and explicitly replicated Segal’s (1984; 1986)
studies of attitudinal voting in search and seizure cases.  Wetstein and Ostberg (1999, 771)
66
utilize logistic regression analysis and again find judicial ideology plays a significant role in
judicial behavior for search and seizure cases in Canada: “ideology proved to be a
statistically significant variable in the search and seizure model.  Since ideology is not
critical to the nomination process in Canada, and the Court is not divided by ideological
extremists, we were surprised that this variable proved to be an important factor in the
study.”  Thus, the critical finding in this work is that attitudinal voting is also found in
Canada judicial politics, and is not limited to the American case.  Ostberg, Wetstein and
Ducat (2002) used factor analysis to analyze nonunanimous decisions at the Canadian
Supreme Court in the period 1991-1995, and suggested that three attitudinal conflicts divide
the Court: communitarianism versus libertarianism, criminal procedure disputes, and judicial
activism versus judicial restraint.  Ostberg and Wetstein (2004) examined attitudinal voting
in nonunanimous economic cases, and found that judicial ideology is a strong predictor in
tax cases, but not in union cases.  Ostberg and Wetstein (2004b) similarly analyzed
attitudinal voting at the Court in nonunanimous equality cases; they found that judicial
ideology is also a significant variable in these cases.  Finally, Ostberg and Wetstein (2005)
examined judicial behavior in criminal, economic, and civil rights and liberties cases to
determine if post-Charter judges displayed consistency in their voting patterns. The authors
find that a majority of the justices do indeed demonstrate ideologically consistent voting
behavior in these issue areas.  Thus, a high degree of attitudinal and ideological stability
exists at the Supreme Court of Canada after the adoption of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.  
 The Globe & Mail, Ottawa Citizen, and six regional newspaper are used to derive the ideology scores25
(Ostberg et al. 2004, 45). 
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The most significant work on attitudinal voting at the Canadian Supreme Court to
date is Ostberg et al. (2004).  This study examines criminal, economic, and civil rights and
liberties in nonunanimous cases in the period from 1984 to 2002, and utilizes factor analysis
and logistic regression to analyze the data.  Most interestingly, the ideology scores--which
are derived from content analysis of newspaper editorial, following Segal and Cover
(1989)–are expanded to include additional newspaper editorials and then a cumulative score
is derived.   As discussed in Chapter Two, these ideology scores are used (with one25
modification) to analyze the data in this project.  The results in Ostberg et al. (2004) show
that judicial attitudes are a highly significant predictor of judicial behavior in these types of
cases.  Ostberg et al. (2004) provides the strongest evidence yet that judicial ideology is an
important factor in judicial decision-making at the Supreme Court of Canada.  The
limitations of the study are that only nonunanimous cases are used, and only criminal,
economic, and civil rights and liberties decisions are analyzed.  It remains to be seen if
attitudinal voting will remain significant when other types of cases are included in the
analysis, and when both unanimous and nonunanimous cases are used.  Nonetheless, Ostberg
et al. (2004) is clearly the most important work yet on judicial decision-making at the
Canadian high court.  
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Party Capability Theory and Judicial Decision-Making
A continuing debate in public law scholarship has been whether litigants with more
resources (the “haves”) will be more likely to prevail than those that do not possess such
resources (the “have-nots”).  This debate was first framed by Galanter’s (1974) classic article
which examined this question in American appellate courts and found that parties that are
“repeat-players” (as opposed to “one-shotters”) and have greater resources are more likely
to prevail in appellate litigation.  See also Kritzer and Silbey 2003; Songer and Sheehan
(1992); Songer et al. (1999); Wheeler et al. (1987). 
In comparative context, McCormick (1993) extended Galanter’s (1974) thesis into
the Canadian context.  McCormick (1993; see also Brodie 2002) examined whether
governmental litigants are more successful than private litigants in litigation, and found that
“repeat players”  are more likely to experience success at the Supreme Court of Canada.  In
Australia, Smyth (2000) finds that there is little evidence to support the conclusion that
litigants with greater resources are more successful at the High Court of Australia.  The most
comprehensive comparative examination of Galanter’s (1974) thesis, though, is Haynie et
al. (2001).  These authors examined party capability theory in the high courts of Australia,
Canada, England, India, Philippines, South Africa, and Tanzania.  They find that the party
capability thesis was strongly supported in the high courts of Canada, Great Britain and
Tanzania, but less so in the other cases in the study.  Thus, the question as to whether the
party capability thesis is generalizable across nations and courts remains open.  
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Overview of Judicial Activism
In this section, the concept of judicial activism is examined, followed by a discussion
of the existing empirical research on judicial activism at the high courts of the United States,
Canada, and Australia.  First, an overview of the phenomenon is helpful to place the debate
over judicial activism in context.   
One of the difficulties in examining the concept of judicial activism is that there are
competing definitions of the concept.  Indeed, some of the debates over judicial activism,
especially among political actors and commentators, have stemmed from a misunderstanding
or misuse of the term.  Politicians of all ideological stripes frequently denounce judges as
“activist” whenever there is disagreement with a particular court decision, thus creating
considerable confusion among the public as to the nature of the term.  This confusion extends
to scholars, some of whom have had difficulty in assessing judicial activism because of the
lack of a generally accepted definition (see, e.g., Kerr 2003).  
This section of the chapter will remedy this confusion by defining the different
understandings of judicial activism.  I would suggest that there are two basic conceptions of
judicial activism:  strict and political.  
Strict Judicial Activism
What I have termed “strict judicial activism” refers to the most limited sense of the
concept.  Strict activism refers to the frequency that a court strikes down or invalidates
decisions made by the other political branches.  For example, the classic example occurs
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when the Supreme Court rules that a congressional statute is unconstitutional, and therefore
a nullity.  Other examples include a court striking down an act of the President or a state
governor, or the invalidation by a court of a state law or municipal ordinance.  Yet another
example of strict judicial activism is when the Supreme Court strikes down a provision of
a state’s constitution (illustrated by the 1996 U.S. Supreme Court case of Romer v. Evans).
All of these example illustrate strict judicial activism because they involve judicial review
(and invalidation) of the actions of democratically elected political actors.  Typically, if a
judge strikes down a statute, that behavior is termed “activist,” while the action of upholding
a statute is termed “restraintist” (see, e.g., Wallace 1997).   
Thus, this conception of judicial activism is completely descriptive and mechanical,
and avoids the value judgments inherent in “political judicial activism,” described below.
In other words, this definition of activism is essentially neutral, because it looks only to the
incidence of political acts struck down by a court, and does not seek to condone or condemn
those judicial invalidations.  For example, using this definition, one can tabulate the number
of times that the Supreme Court struck down acts of Congress in a given year to generate a
sense of strict judicial activism--while the Court may have been justified in striking down
some of those laws, this conception of judicial activism does not implement those judgments.
Of course, this definition of activism can be criticized because of the fact that it does
not make a judgment on the merits of the judicial action.  For example, Sowell (1989) asserts
that no judicial activism occurs when a court strikes down a statute that was passed by a
legislature that failed to abide by the original intention of the Framers.  However, making a
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judgment as to the constitutional propriety or impropriety of a particular statute necessarily
involves making a value assessment, and strict judicial activism eschews these types of
determinations.  Again, strict judicial activism looks only to the sheer frequency of a court
invalidating the decisions of legislative or executive branches.  Because this conception of
judicial activism does not require the analyst to determine the “correctness” of a statute or
executive action, it is the best suited for scholarly analysis, and, indeed, most social scientific
researchers utilize this understanding (see, e.g., Caldeira and McCrone 1982; Keck 2004).
Political Judicial Activism
The alternative to strict judicial activism is “political judicial activism.”  Political
judicial activism refers to the action of a court improperly invalidating a law based upon
ideological or policy reasons.   Thus, if a judge strikes down a law for “proper” reasons (most
conservative critics hold that a law can be struck down if it exceeds the proper boundaries
of constitutional interpretation), then that nullification would not be considered to be an
exercise of judicial activism.  But, if a judge strikes down a statute that was “properly”
enacted, then that invalidation would be considered to be judicial activism.  Obviously, the
difficulty with political judicial activism is that liberals and conservatives will frequently
have diametrically opposed definitions as to what constitutes a validly enacted law, and
whether or not the invalidation of that law was appropriate or inappropriate.  
Political judicial activism is almost always portrayed in a negative light; for example,
conservative commentators frequently make the charge that liberal judges have overstepped
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their appropriate duties as interpreters of the law by engaging in judicial activism (see, e.g.,
Berger 1977; Bork 2003).  Indeed, the well-known case of Roe v. Wade (1973) typifies the
form of political judicial activism found to be most objectionable by some commentators.
In that case, the Court struck down state laws forbidding the practice of abortion based upon
a “right of privacy” thought to be implied in several sections of the Constitution.  The critics
of Roe charged that these laws were best left to the discretion of elected state legislators and
not judges.  However, it is important to note that political judicial activism is practiced by
both conservative and liberal judges (Keck 2004; Marshall 2002; McDowell 1992; Shane
2000; Schwartz 2002).  That is, judges of all ideological stripes have (and will continue to)
strike down laws based on policy reasons.  
Clearly, the very ambiguity of political judicial activism renders it difficult to
operationalize and therefore unsuitable for empirical analysis.  Thus, virtually all empirical
studies of judicial activism (including this project) have used the more objective strict
judicial activism standard. 
The Literature on Judicial Activism
There is a fairly large literature which examines judicial activism normatively and
descriptively (Barber 1997; Bork 2003; Canon 1982; Carrese 2003; Devins 2004; Franck
1996; Graglia 2003; Justice 1997; Kerr 2003; Kozlowski 2003; Lamb 1982; Leishman 2006;
Lewis 1999; McDowell 1992; McKeever 1995; Miller 1982; Powers and Rothman 2002;
Provine 2005; Raskin 2003; Roach 2001; Roosevelt 2006; Schick 1982; Sowell 1989;
 A very useful article summarizing judicial review in comparative context is Tushnet (2003c). 26
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Wallace 1997; Wolfe 1997).   However, this section will seek to summarize the empirical26
research on judicial activism in comparative perspective, with special emphasis on studies
in the United States, Canada, and Australia.
Cross-National Studies of Judicial Activism
A relevant volume on judicial activism in comparative perspective is Holland (1991;
see also Holland 2000; Waltman and Holland 1988).  Although somewhat dated, this book
contains a series of essays, each containing a descriptive analysis of judicial activism in a
different country, including the U.S., Australia and Canada.  The “Introduction” (Holland
1991b) in that volume is quite useful, as it suggests several conditions which may encourage
judicial activism, although these conditions are not subjected to any empirical testing.  These
conditions are: a federal system, a written constitution including a bill of rights, an
independent judiciary, differing party affiliations between judiciary and legislators, easy and
cheap access to the courts, the common law legal tradition, public confidence in the courts,
and collective societal consensus on fundamental political values.  
Although not a study focusing on judicial activism, Ginsburg (2003) provides an
excellent cross-national study of the formation of constitutional review in new democracies,
and how judicial review serves the interests of political actors during regime change.
Similarly, Hirschl (2004) offers a cross-national theory of constitutionalization that he calls
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“hegemonic preservation.”  That is, the growth of judicial power is explained by interplay
of the self-interest of threatened political actors, economic elites, and judicial notables–all
of whom work to create constitutional reform in a manner that serves their own agenda. 
A more recent study of judicial activism in comparative perspective is Herron and
Randazzo (2003), who study seven post-communist countries’ high courts and rates of
judicial activism.  They find that formal declarations of judicial power expressed in
constitutions do not predict invalidations of legislation; rather, it is economic conditions,
executive power, litigant characteristics and case issue type that predicts judicial activism.
A similar cross-national study is conducted by Smithey and Ishiyama (2002), who studied
judicial activism in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Russia, and Slovakia for a three-year period.  They found that rates of activism varied widely,
with Latvia and Estonia having the highest percentage of laws invalidated.  The authors used
the following independent variables to predict their dependent variable, rate of activism:
judicial power/independence, degree of party competition, popular attitudes towards the
court, presence of Bills of Rights, and presence of federal political system.  Using logistic
regression analysis, Smithey and Ishiyaman (2002) found that the number of effective
political parties and popular trust in the courts were statistically significant variables, and
thus these factors predicted the rate of judicial activism in these countries.  So, the degree of
formal judicial power did not predict judicial activism, nor did the presence of a federal
system.  Smithey and Ishiyama (2002, 738) note, “Our findings support an understanding of
judicial activism based more on political behavior than on institutional design.”  
75
Empirical Studies of Judicial Activism in the U.S. 
An early normative argument against judicial activism in the American case was
made by Bickel (1962).  He  asserts that the Court is a “countermajoritarian force” in our
system of government--one that acts against the will of the majority.  Dahl (1957), in contrast
to Bickel (1962), contends that the countermajoritarian problem is illusory by empirically
demonstrating that the Court is largely unwilling to invalidate the laws enacted by the ruling
coalition.  Dahl came to his conclusion by analyzing those Court cases where acts of
Congress were held to be unconstitutional.  Only 86 provisions of federal law had been
struck down by the Court in 167 years and in only 10 of 40 cases did the Court declare
legislation invalid based on the Bill of Rights.  Thus, rather than a countermajoritarian
institution, the Court is strongly majoritarian and its role is to confer legitimacy on the
policies of the successful regime.  The Court will only rarely take a leading role in
policymaking during situations of instability, according to Dahl (1957). 
However, other scholars have disagreed with Dahl’s (1957) conclusion and asserted
that the Supreme Court is both more activist than Dahl claimed and that the Court’s influence
is far greater than Dahl found.  Casper (1976) criticized Dahl’s methodology because cases
in which state statutes were invalidated by the Court were left out of the analysis.  Casper
argues that state laws often involve important national issues, and not just narrow regional
ones.  For example, Casper cites Miranda v. Arizona (1966) and Gideon v. Wainwright
(1963) as examples of state cases that had national implications.  Certainly, it is difficult to
think of any cases, state or federal, that had greater national impact than these--Casper’s
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criticism appears to be justified on this point.  Perhaps equally importantly, Casper contends
that Dahl (1957) overlooks the importance of the Court's policymaking role by ignoring the
component of statutory interpretation and also by portraying the judicial process as a simple
zero-sum game.  Casper (1976) also found that the Court had become more activist in the
period 1958-1974.  In sum, Casper’s analysis showed that the Court is more activist and
influential in policymaking than Dahl found.  
Gates (1992) continued the work analyzing Dahl’s (1957) thesis.  In The Supreme
Court and Partisan Realignment:  A Macro- and Microlevel Perspective, Gates examines
743 cases, both state and federal, in which national and state laws were struck down as
unconstitutional between 1837 and 1964.  Gates finds that the state cases analyzed provide
support for Casper’s critique of Dahl’s findings.  Gates (1992) finds that many of the cases
invalidating state policies raised salient political and legal issues that disrupted the party
system at the time, thus disconfirming Dahl’s hypothesis.  It appears that Dahl’s (1957) thesis
that the Court merely upholds the prevailing party’s policies and is rarely activist cannot
withstand the results of the above analysis. 
Caldeira and McCrone (1982) operationalized the concept of judicial activism by
examining the number of state or federal laws that the Supreme Court invalidated from 1800-
1973.  They used a time-series analysis and found that the Court’s activism seemed to run
in irregular cycles. Interestingly, they concluded that the Court’s activism in regard to state
legislatures and the national legislature was independent–that is, there was no correlation
between the two (Caldeira and McCrone 1982, 122).  
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There is a line of studies which approach judicial activism in the American state
supreme courts.  Wenzel et al. (1997; see also Scheb et al. 1989; Scheb et al. 1991) analyzed
judicial activism in state high courts and found that the greatest degree of judicial activism
occurred in states where the judges achieved their office through district-based electoral
systems.  Lopeman (1999) examines judicial activism and policy-making in six state supreme
courts and concludes that the highest degree of judicial activism and policy-making can be
explained the presence on the bench of what he terms an “activist advocate.”  This is a judge
who has been trained at a nationally-ranked law school and a role conception as an ambitious
and entrepreneurial jurist.  While the generalizability of Lopeman’s (1999) conclusions is
uncertain, the findings are intriguing.  
Judicial activism has also been examined through the lens of the attitudinal model.
Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002; see also Spaeth and Teger 1982) analyzed U.S. Supreme
Court justices’ tendency to invalidate statutes at the federal, state and local level, and
concluded that, almost without exception, these judges tend to nullify or uphold laws based
upon their ideological preferences.  Howard and Segal (2004) examined the briefs filed by
petitioners and respondents in constitutional cases before the Supreme Court from 1985 to
1994 to determine how often these litigants make a request to strike litigation.  They found
that, in those cases where a request to invalidate legislation was made, the legislation was
struck down at a 21% frequency.  Also, Howard and Segal (2004) found strong evidence that
judicial attitudes were highly significant in the decision to strike legislation, and also that the
influence of the Solicitor General varied according to whether the Solicitor General was
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appointed by a Republican or Democratic president.  That is, the conservative justices
showed considerable deference to requests to strike by Republican Solicitors General, but
only the more liberal justices were likely to grant a request to invalidate a law made by a
Clinton-appointed Solicitor General.  Solberg and Lindquist (2006) analyzed judicial review
cases at the Court from 1986 to 2000, and using a slightly different methodology than
Howard and Segal (2004), found that there was a 46% rate of judicial activism–in other
words, the Court nullified a law at a 46% rate.  Also, Solberg and Lindquist (2006)
discovered that the liberal justices were more activist in general than the conservative
justices, and that the liberal judges (Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, Souter) were more likely
to strike down state legislation than the Court as a whole.  Overall, the authors found that the
ideological direction of the statute interacted with the individual justices’ ideological
preferences in the predicted manner: “Conservative justices may be less likely to strike down
state laws in general, but they are perfectly willing to do so when the underlying state statute
fails to conform to their policy preferences.  So much for the notion that a principled
federalism always guides their decision making” (Solberg and Lindquist 2006, 258-59).
Thus, the above-noted studies provide strong empirical support for the proposition that
judicial attitudes play a significant role in judicial behavior in judicial activism cases. 
Finally, a recent volume on judicial activism at the Court is Keck (2004).   This book
uses a descriptive approach to trace the historical development of judicial activism as well
as the use of judicial activism by the members of the Rehnquist Court.  Keck’s (2004) main
points are that, first, the Rehnquist Court has nullified more federal statutes than any other
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natural court, and, second, that many of these judicial invalidations have been in a
conservative direction.  So, the critique of judicial activism by conservative critics is
misguided.  While these observations are not novel, Keck does an excellent job of
delineating the areas of law where conservative judicial activism is most likely to occur, and
discussing the relevant doctrinal and political developments at the Court.
Empirical Studies of Judicial Activism in Canada
There is a surprisingly substantial literature on judicial activism at the Canadian
Supreme Court.  Many of these studies (Bazowski 2004; Hiebert 2002; Hogg and Bushell
1997; Kelly 2005; Lebel-Grenier 2001; L’Heureux-Dube 2002; Leishman 2006; Manfredi
2001; Martin 2003; Morton 2001; Morton and Knopff 2000; Roach 2001; Weinrib 2001)
take a normative approach to judicial activism in Canada.  Nearly all of these studies point
out that, after the adoption of the Charter in 1982, the political and judicial environment has
changed radically, encouraging the development of judicial activism.  However, these
normative scholars debate whether this increase in judicial power is beneficial or detrimental
for the Canadian society as a whole.  
A good starting point for the empirical literature is Baar (1991; see also Miller 1998,
1999; Russell 1995), who provides an excellent historical overview of judicial activism in
Canada before the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, as well as a
description of the first wave of judicial review cases arising under the Charter.  A much-cited
and influential descriptive analysis of the first ten years of cases arising under the Charter is
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Morton, Russell and Riddell (1994).  The authors found that, from 1982 to 1992, 41 statutes
were overturned by the Court based upon the Charter out of 119 total cases (Morton, Russell,
and Riddell 1994, 19).  The work done by Morton, Russell, and Riddell (1994) is an
excellent overview of the early work of the Court after the adoption of the Charter.  Epp
(1998; see also Epp 1996) does not examine judicial activism specifically, but his influential
“support structure” thesis holds that creation of new civil rights occurs when there is a
structure in place for rights advocates to engage in legal mobilization.  Epp (1998) examines
the creation of new civil rights at the Supreme Court of Canada and concludes that the
support structure for civil rights advocates contributed to the increasing number of rights
cases on the Court’s docket.
The early empirical characterization of judicial activism at the high court of Canada
has been significantly revised, though, by the preeminent scholar of judicial activism in
Canada,  James B. Kelly.  Throughout a series of articles (Kelly 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004;
Kelly and Murphy 2001), a book chapter (Kelly 2002), and a book (Kelly 2005), Kelly has
mixed empirical, interpretive, and normative analyses to provide a more nuanced
characterization of judicial activism at the Supreme Court.  
Kelly (2002) contends that the adoption of the Charter and the growing number of
Charter cases at the Court have not led to unbounded judicial supremacy.  Kelly (2002) finds
through empirical analysis that the impact of judicial activism varies according to the state
actor involved in the case.  For example, judicial review of police conduct actually
strengthens liberal constitutionalism, because of the check upon these unelected actors,
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according to Kelly (2002).  Another observation made by Kelly is that the impact of judicial
activism has been tempered by the emergence of “Charter dialogue,” or the tendency of
legislators to enact revised laws after Charter-based statutes have been overturned.  The
concept of Charter dialogue between legislators and judges is not new (see Hogg and Bushell
1997), but Kelly references the concept to make the important point that judicial activism is
considerably more complicated than is usually asserted. 
In his magisterial book, Governing with the Charter:  Legislative and Judicial
Activism and Framers’ Intent (2005), Kelly’s primary thesis is that normative criticisms of
judicial activism of the Canadian high court are misplaced, because the Court is not the
dominant actor in Canada’s post-Charter political system. Indeed, Kelly contends that
coordinate constitutionalism, wherein each political branch interprets the Charter on its own,
has become the principal model of Canadian constitutional politics.  According to Kelly
(2005), coordinate constitutionalism serves to strengthen, not weaken, Canadian democracy,
as multiple forms of rights protection exist.  Thus, the judiciary, executive and parliament
each  govern with the Charter by exercising scrutiny of legislation and ensuring that the
Framers’ intentions are protected.  So, judicial activism coexists with legislative activism and
bureaucratic activism in the modern Canadian political system. 
In addition to the interpretive arguments advanced in the book, Kelly (2005) also
engages in some empirical analysis of judicial activism at the Canadian Supreme Court. 
Regarding civil cases, Kelly (2005) contends that the Court’s activism is not problematic
because the statutes invalidated were primarily those that were enacted or amended before
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the adoption of the Charter.  Kelly’s argument rests upon the claim that the Court generally
only strikes down statutes that were enacted or last amended before the introduction of the
Charter; thus, the Court is not making a discretionary policy decision but only nullifying
legislation that was introduced during a different constitutional regime.  The difficulty with
this argument is that Kelly (2005) does not provide enough information to fully evaluate the
claim.  Kelly notes that 64 statutes have been invalidated by the Court in the period from
1982 to 2003, and that 31% of those statutes were enacted between 1970 and 1982.
Furthermore, Kelly states that only 12 statutes enacted after 1990 have been struck down by
the Court.  However, Kelly (2005) only provides a table which lists the 64 activist cases and
another table showing simple percentages for statutes ruled constitutional and
unconstitutional in the period 1982-2003.  A table disaggregating the constitutional and
unconstitutional statutes into two time periods–1982 to 1990 and 1991 to 2003–and
providing percentages for each of those periods would have allowed readers to evaluate the
argument.  In addition, the use of inferential, rather than descriptive, statistical techniques
would have allowed greater confidence in the claim that the Court generally invalidates only
statutes enacted in the pre-Charter regime. 
The final set of empirical articles regarding judicial activism in Canada contains, once
again, a debate between law professors and political scientists.  Choudhry and Hunter (2003)
criticize the empirical work on judicial activism that has been conducted by Canadian
political scientists as containing insufficient evidence to confirm the findings that have been
offered.  Specifically, they deny that the rate of judicial activism at the Court is high, and also
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deny that it has been increasing over time.  To support their claims, they collect their own
data and conduct their own analyses.  They operationalize judicial activism as the
governmental win rate in a judicial review case; also, they exclude non-Charter cases from
the data set.  Put another way, Choudhry and Hunter define judicial activism not as whether
a law was explicitly overturned, but rather as when the Court rules that there has been no
violation of civil rights.  Thus, Choudhry and Hunter (2003) find that the governmental win
rate in the period from 1982 to 2002 was 62.4%–conversely, the governmental loss rate (or
activism rate) was 37.6%.   They  state that this rate of activism “does not seem as high as
some would lead us to believe”  (Choudhry and Hunter 2003, 556).  In addition, based on
this data, the authors dispute that judicial activism at the Canadian Supreme Court is
increasing over time.  Thus, Choudhry and Hunter (2003, 557) dispute the empirical claims
regarding judicial activism by political scientists.  
In response, Manfredi and Kelly (2003) question Choudhry and Hunter’s (2003)
definition and operationalization of judicial activism, and also assert that Choudhry and
Hunter  have misrepresented the relevant political science literature.  Specifically, Manfredi
and Kelly (2003) assert that by excluding non-Charter cases, Choudhry and Hunter are
omitting a significant source of judicial review cases, and thus their analyses are flawed.  In
rebuttal to Manfredi and Kelly (2003), Choudhry and Hunter (2004) defend their
methodological choices and presentation of the previous literature.  They conclude,
“Unfortunately, we clearly have a long way to go before [law professors and political
scientists] engage each other directly” (Choudhry and Hunter 2004, 778).  
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Empirical Studies of Judicial Activism in Australia
Empirical research on judicial activism in Australia is virtually nonexistent.  Galligan
(1991) provides a descriptive account of judicial review in Australia as well as a discussion
of  several cases wherein the High Court struck down legislation.  However, because the
article was published in 1991, it does not discuss the dramatic changes at the High Court that
occurred in the mid-1990s.  Williams (2000; see also Sackville 2001) supplies a much more
current descriptive and interpretive account of the changes at the High Court; he notes that
the High Court has, in a relatively short period of time and despite lacking a Bill of Rights,
developed several areas of constitutional protections, including aboriginal rights and freedom
of political communication.  Kirby (2004) offers a sitting High Court judge’s point of view
on judicial activism and offers a defense of the practice.  Opposing arguments are found in
Heydon (2003), Craven (1999), and Campbell (2003).  
Thus, this short review of the empirical literature on judicial activism in Australia
shows that much work remains to be done.  Almost all of the work that has been conducted
is normative or descriptive.  Only Pierce (2006) empirically examines the changes at the
High Court in the 1990s, and that work does not exclusively focus on judicial activism, but
rather is an institutional analysis.  
The Gaps in the Literature
The above review of the existing literature reveals that, while large advances in
comparative judicial research have been made, many questions remain to be answered.  This
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section will delineate some of those gaps. 
1. Prior research has shown that attitudinal voting exists at the U.S. Supreme Court in certain
issue areas, such as civil liberties cases.  However, does attitudinal voting exist across issue
areas?  In other words, can ideological voting be observed when different types of cases are
aggregated?
2. Similarly, comparative judicial researchers have found that some attitudinal voting occurs
in Canada in certain case issue areas.  However, will ideological voting be observed at the
Supreme Court of Canada when different types of cases are aggregated?
3. In Australia, there has not previously been an analysis of attitudinal voting based upon
judicial ideology scores derived from content analysis of newspaper editorials.  Previous
research has only used political party as a crude indicator of judicial ideology.  Will
attitudinal voting be evident at the High Court of Australia when more sophisticated
measures of judicial ideology are utilized?  
4. If attitudinal voting exists at the U.S. Supreme Court, Canadian Supreme Court, and
Australian High Court, does the extent of attitudinal judicial voting vary by high court? What
explains the difference, if any, in attitudinal voting? 
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5. Are legal variables influential for high court judges in the U.S., Canada and Australia?
In other words, does the legal model explain judicial behavior for judges in these courts?  
6. If legal variables do influence judicial decision-making at the high courts of the U.S.,
Australia and Canada, what explains the difference in degree in legal voting, if any?
7. Virtually all research in judicial decision-making has excluded unanimous cases from the
analyses, based upon the premise that unanimous cases present no significant legal or factual
conflict.  Does judicial decision-making differ in the high courts of the U.S., Canada and
Australia when only unanimous cases are analyzed?  
8. Of the United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Canada, and High Court of
Australia, which is the most activist?  Stated another way, which of these high courts is most
likely to defer to the legislature and which high court is least deferential?  Which high court
is most likely to invalidate ideologically incongruent statutes?
9. Past research into federalism issues and judicial behavior has indicated that, at the U.S.
Supreme Court, conservative judges will be more likely to strike down national laws while
liberal justices are more likely to invalidate state and local laws.  Do high court judges in
Canada and Australia exhibit the same ideological voting tendencies as American judges
when reviewing national and state/local laws? 
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Chapter Four:  Judicial Activism and Judicial Politicization
In this chapter, the judicial politicization theory is tested by examining the
phenomenon of judicial activism in the United States, Canada and Australia in the 1990s.
The theory predicts that judges on a highly politicized high court will be less likely to defer
to the political branches and instead have a greater tendency to strike down statutes and
regulations.  Conversely, judges on a less politicized court–such as the high court of Canada
or Australia–should be less likely to engage in judicial activism.  A corollary to the theory
posits that judges in highly politicized high courts are more likely to strike down
ideologically incongruent laws.  Additionally, this chapter will examine the trends in judicial
activism in the U.S., Canada, and Australia in the 1990s, as well as examine which topical
case issues tend to provoke activism in each nation.  Finally, judicial activism at the
individual judge level is analyzed to better explore the theory.  Thus, this chapter deals with
the judicial politicization thesis and how it relates to judicial activism.  In Chapter Six, the
second aspect of the judicial politicization theory is examined:  the contention that a highly
politicized judiciary will tend to decide cases based on attitudinal factors, while legal factors
will be influential in nonpoliticized high courts.  First, a review of the general theory of this
project is provided.
Review of the Judicial Politicization Theory
The judicial politicization theory posits that judges at a highly politicized high court
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in an established democracy are more likely to decide cases according to
ideological/attitudinal factors, and will correspondingly be more likely to engage in judicial
activism and strike down acts of the legislature.  Conversely, judges at a high court that is
less politicized will be more likely to decide cases based upon legal factors, and will be less
likely to invalidate laws enacted by the political branch.  In other words, the attitudinal model
of judicial decision-making will predominate in politicized judiciaries, while the legal model
will be more likely to prevail in less politicized courts.  
The degree of judicial politicization in a high court is determined by the informal
norms regarding judicial selection, not the formal processes used for judicial appointments.
While there appears to be no question that judicial appointment systems are a highly
significant influence on American state court judges, this dissertation argues that, in
comparative context, formal selection mechanisms are less important than the “selection
culture” inherent in a modern democratic political system.  The selection culture refers to
whether the appointing executive typically relies upon ideological and partisan factors to
choose judges, or whether other factors such as qualifications and merit are the most
important criteria.  Stated differently, a country’s judiciary is highly politicized if the judges
are chosen by the executive based upon partisan grounds, while another nation’s judiciary
is less politicized if the magistrates are selected on nonpartisan factors.  Of the three high
courts in this study, the most highly politicized is the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by the
High Court of Australia, followed by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
In this chapter, a corollary to the main theory is examined:  that highly politicized
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courts will be more likely to engage in judicial activism and strike down acts of the
legislature.  Having established that the United States Supreme Court is highly politicized
while the high courts of Canada and Australia are much less so, the theory posits that a
highly politicized supreme court will be more likely to strike down acts of the legislature.
So, the theory predicts that the U.S. Supreme Court will be more likely to engage in activism,
both in terms of raw numbers of invalidated laws and percentage of activist cases.  Thus, the
first hypothesis can be stated: 
1H :  The rate of judicial activism will tend to be greater in highly politicized
judicial systems.  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court will be more likely to
invalidate laws than the high courts of Canada or Australia.
Related to this, the theory predicts that judges on a highly politicized high court will
be more likely to support laws that are ideologically congruent with their own political
preferences and strike down laws that are not congruent with their own ideology.  In other
words, on a highly politicized court, conservative judges will be more likely to strike down
liberal laws, and liberal judges will be more likely to strike down laws that are conservative
in direction. On less politicized high courts, this tendency should be less evident or
nonexistent.  Thus, at the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1990s, there should be a greater
tendency for judges to strike down ideologically incongruent laws, while this phenomenon
should be far less pronounced in Canada and Australia.  So, the second hypothesis states:
2H : Judges on a highly politicized high court will be more likely to strike
down ideologically incongruent laws.  Thus, conservative judges on the U.S.
Supreme Court will be more likely to invalidate liberal laws while liberal
judges will be more likely to nullify conservative laws, but judges at the high
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courts of Canada and Australia will be less likely to nullify incongruent
statutes.  
In the following sections, these hypotheses are tested.  
Examining Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective
Again, the theory of judicial politicization predicts that highly politicized courts will
be more likely to engage in judicial activism.  Thus, the rate of invalidated laws should be
higher at the U.S. Supreme Court then at the Canadian or Australian high courts.  As
discussed in Chapter Two, this project measures judicial activism both in terms of raw
numbers and percentages.  To create the data set, all cases in the U.S., Canada, and Australia
in the 1990s were read, and those cases that involved a challenge to a national, state/province
or local law or regulation, state constitutional provision,  or state referendum were coded. 
Rates of Judicial Activism
In this section, the rates of judicial activism in the supreme courts of the United
States, Canada, and Australia will be examined, thus allowing for the first hypothesis to be
tested.  Again, Hypothesis One states: 
1H :  The rate of judicial activism will tend to be greater in politicized judicial
systems.  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court will be more likely to invalidate laws
than the high courts of Canada or Australia.
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In Figure 4.1, the raw numbers for the rate of judicial activism in the 1990s for the
U.S., Canada, and Australia are presented.  For this figure, the number of activist cases refers
to the action of the high courts as a whole to overturn an act of the national, state or local
legislature, administrative agency, or state constitutional provision.  In other words, Figure
4.1 does not use the individual judge vote as the unit of analysis; rather, the case is used and
indicates how many laws were invalidated by each country’s high court from 1990 to 1999.
The chart shows that 80 laws were invalidated by the United Supreme Court, 56 by the
Canadian Supreme Court, and 24 by the High Court of Australia.  Again, this includes all
national, state, and local laws that were challenged from 1990 to 1999.  As predicted, the
U.S. Supreme Court nullified many more laws than the high courts of Australia and Canada.
However, it should be noted that these are raw, not percentage, numbers and do not control
for the differences in case load between the different systems.  In other words, without
examining percentages, it is difficult to make a definitive statement and confirm the first
hypothesis that the U.S. Supreme Court is more likely to strike down laws and thus engage
in activist behavior. 
Figure 4.2 presents the same data in percentage form.  That is, the data in Figure 4.2
represent the number of cases where the high court invalidated a law divided by the total
number of judicial review cases.  Thus, the data in Figure 4.2 allow for a true comparison of
the degree of judicial activism between the United States, Canada and Australia.  The data
reveal that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a challenged law in 53.33% of judicial
review cases, whereas the Canadian Supreme Court nullified a challenged law in 33.73% of
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judicial review cases, and the High Court of Australia invalidated laws in 35.29% of judicial
review cases.  Analysis of the activism means for each country using a t-test (equal variances
not assumed) reveals a highly significant difference in means between the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of Canada (p = .0002) as well as between the U.S. and
Australian high courts (p = .0063).  The difference in means for activism between the
Canadian and Australian high courts was not significant (p = .5892). 
Based upon the percentage data and the analysis of means, it is clear that the U.S.
Supreme Court is substantially more likely to engage in judicial activism than are the high
courts of Canada and Australia, and the first hypothesis can be confirmed.  So, in the 1990s,
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a challenged law or regulation in more than half of the
cases where a constitutional challenge was raised, whereas the supreme courts of Canada and
Australia invalidated the law in question in slightly more than a third of judicial review
cases. 
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 Another minor reason why the percentage of activism for the U.S. high court is higher in this27
study than in other works is because I did not follow the coding used in the Spaeth (2001a) and Benesh and
Spaeth (2003) databases in several instances.  As discussed in Chapter Two, if any portion of the
statute/regulation was struck down by the Court (but not the entire statute/regulation), this was coded as a
declaration of unconstitutionality.  Also, a vote to reverse an agency decision was coded as an activist
decision, even though the Spaeth databases do not code in this manner. 
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It should be noted that the judicial activism percentage for the U.S. Supreme Court
is considerably higher than is usually reported.  For example, Keck (2004) reports that the
average for invalidated federal statutes in the period 1995-2003 is 3.67%, while the
percentage for nullified state and local laws in the same period is 4.78%.  The primary reason
that the percentages reported in this project are so much higher is because Keck and others
calculate judicial activism by dividing the number of cases where the Court has struck down
a law by the total number of cases for the year at the Court.   This project uses a different27
formula: dividing the number of activist cases by the number of cases where a constitutional
challenge was made.  I submit that this measure is a more accurate representation of the rate
of judicial activism in each high court.  By using the standard measurement reported by Keck
and others, a reader would conclude that judicial activism was not especially prevalent at the
U.S. Supreme Court, in terms of overall percentage.  However, this is clearly not the case,
as the Court was highly activist during the 1990s. 
Judicial Activism by Year
Next, it is instructive to examine the trends in judicial activism in the 1990s for the
high courts in this study.  Figure 4.3 graphically illustrates the trend in judicial activism in
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the 1990s for the high courts of the U.S., Canada, and Australia using raw numbers.  The
chart shows that the American high court had a higher number of activist cases in six of the
ten years during the 1990s.  The only year where another country’s high court invalidated
more laws was in 1990, where the Canadian Supreme Court struck down eight laws,
compared to three invalidations by the American and Australian courts.  Again, these data
demonstrate the tendency for the U.S. Supreme Court to be more likely to invalidate laws in
judicial review cases than the high courts of Australia and Canada. 
However, a comparison of rates of activism using percentages rather than raw
numbers may allow for a more accurate comparison between these nations.  Figure 4.4
presents that comparison.  The chart reveals that the U.S. Supreme Court usually, but not
always, had a higher percentage rate of striking down laws in judicial review cases.  In the
early years of the decade, the High Court of Australia had an very high activism rate of 50%
in 1990, 66.67% in 1992, and 80% in 1993.  However, Australia’s percentage of activism
declined in the later years of the decade; this result comports with the conclusions of Pierce
(2006) and others who have noted that there were some substantial changes in the High
Court’s jurisprudence in the early 1990s.  Indeed, the High Court of Australia had the largest
fluctuations in activism rates; the supreme courts of the U.S. and Canada did not display the
variance shown by the Australian court.   
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Judicial Activism by Issue of Case
In this section, judicial activism in Canada, Australia, and the U.S. is descriptively
analyzed by examining the subject matter of the cases where a high court has struck down
a challenged law.  This project follows the Spaeth database (2001a) coding for case issue
area.  The Spaeth coding divides legal topics into the following areas: criminal, civil rights,
First Amendment (here renamed speech and religion), due process, privacy, attorneys,
unions, economic, judicial power, federalism, tax, and miscellaneous.  While there are
certainly other ways in which legal topics could be divided, the Spaeth format is the standard
and is easily adapted to Canada and Australia.  Figure 4.5 shows the total number of cases
where the high court of the U.S., Canada, and Australia nullified a law.  Again, because this
chart shows raw numbers only, a true comparison between countries cannot be made.  The
chart shows that the greatest number of activist cases involved a speech or religion issue in
the United States, with 25 laws invalidated in the 1990s in this issue area.  Somewhat
surprisingly, the second highest issue area was civil rights (19 total invalidations), at the
Canadian Supreme Court, followed by Canadian criminal cases (14 total).  For the United
States, the areas of speech and religion, civil rights, and economic cases involved the most
nullifications.  In Canada, civil rights, criminal, and speech and religion cases were the most
prevalent issue areas.  At the High Court of Australia, economic, federalism, and civil rights
cases invoked the most invalidations.  Thus, Figure 4.5 provides a snapshot of the issues that
evoked an activist response from the respective high courts. 
Figure 4.6 provides the percentage rate of activist cases in each of the three countries
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by case issue area.  That is, the chart shows the number of cases where the court struck down
the challenged law divided by the total number of cases in that issue area.  Again, by
reporting percentages, a better comparison of the tendency for each court to invalidate a law
in a particular subject area can be made.  Figure 4.6 shows that, in nearly every issue area,
the U.S. Supreme Court had the highest percentage activism rate.  The most striking result
is that the American court struck down 90% of all federalism cases, compared with 50% for
Canada and 45.45% for Australia.  (Canada struck down 100% of all cases involving a
privacy statute.  However, there were only two of these cases, so these results should be
viewed with caution.)  The exceptionally high activism rate for federalism cases at the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1990s comports with other scholarly research, which has noted that the
Rehnquist Court has made federalism an area of particular concern (see, e.g., Keck 2004).
Also striking is the American court’s willingness to nullify cases involving economic
and taxation issues.  For tax and economic issues, the High Court of Australia nearly
matched the activism percentage rate of the United States.  This suggests that, in high courts
dominated by conservatives (as are both the U.S. and Australian high courts), economic
issues may be particularly salient.  Also somewhat surprising is the low salience of criminal
procedure cases in terms of activism percentage.  No country had an activism rate above
29%.  Put another way, each of the high courts in this study was fairly reluctant to overturn
a criminal statute.  Contrast this with federalism and civil rights, where each court had an
activism rate of at least 40%.  Overall, Figure 4.6 allows for an interesting comparison of the
issues that are most likely to invoke an activist response from the high courts of the U.S., 
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 The miscellaneous category is not included because there were only three cases in this issue area. 28
 Naturally, not every statute can easily be categorized according to a liberal/conservative29
dichotomy.  To resolve any ambiguity, the coding system for statute direction found in Spaeth (2001b) was
used.
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Canada and Australia.  
Except for privacy and judicial power, the U.S. high court is more likely to strike
down laws in every issue area.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court is most likely to invalidate
laws in the areas of federalism, taxation, speech and religion, and civil rights.   Of course,28
it should be noted that Figures 4.5 and 4.6 do not denote the ideological direction of the
statutes in question, so it is not possible to determine if each high court voted in a liberal or
conservative direction.  This analysis is provided in the following section. 
Judicial Activism and Statute Direction 
In this section, the tendency of each high court to overturn liberal or conservative
laws is analyzed.   Figure 4.7 presents the raw numbers of liberal and conservative laws that29
were invalidated by the high courts of the U.S., Canada and Australia.  Note that the unit of
analysis here is the case, not the individual judge vote.  Somewhat surprisingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court nullified 41 conservative statutes and 39 liberal laws–a fairly equivalent
number.  The High Court of Australia achieved an exact balance: 12 conservative and 12
liberal laws struck down.  However, the most startling result is seen for the Supreme Court
of Canada.  There, the Court invalidated 49 conservative laws but only 7 liberal statutes.
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While these are raw numbers, not percentages, it appears that the Canadian Supreme Court
operated in a significant liberal direction during the 1990s.
Figure 4.8 presents the percentages for liberal and conservative laws and judicial
activism; that is, the number of liberal/conservative laws invalidated divided by the number
of judicial review cases in each country.  Once again, the unit of analysis is the case, not the
individual judge vote.  Here, the U.S. Supreme Court is shown to have invalidated a far
greater percentage of liberal, rather than conservative, laws.  The American high court
nullified 68.42% of all liberal laws that were considered by the Court, but only 44.09% of
conservative laws.  
The results for the Canadian Supreme Court still exhibit a greater tendency to
invalidate conservative laws, as 37.98% of conservative statutes were struck down, but only
18.92% of liberal laws.  The smallest disparity is seen for the Australian high court, which
nullified 42.86% of liberal laws and 30% of conservative laws.  Thus, the greatest disparity
between liberal and conservative statutory invalidations occurs at the U.S. Supreme Court,
which struck down 24.33% more liberal than conservative laws.  While the total number of
invalidated conservative statutes may have been higher than the total number of nullified
liberal laws, these data show that there was a significantly greater tendency for the Court as
a whole to strike down liberal statutes. 
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However, Figures 4.7 and 4.8 utilize the court case as the unit of analysis, which does
not measure the likelihood of invalidating a liberal or conservative law at the individual
justice level.  Put another way, a 5-4 decision at the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down a
liberal statute is coded as an activist case in Figure 4.8, even though there were four votes
to sustain the liberal law.  Thus, an examination of the data with the individual judge vote
as the unit of analysis gives a better analysis of judicial activism and statute direction.  Figure
4.9 presents this data. The trends for the United States and Canada remain largely the same,
with liberal statutes receiving a greater percentage of votes to strike in the U.S., and
conservative laws receiving a higher percentage of votes to strike in Canada.  In Australia,
however, the percentages are nearly identical for conservative (40.43%) and liberal (39.15%)
laws.  To get an even better sense of the likelihood of striking down a statute based on
ideological direction, an analysis of activism by individual justice is helpful. 
Judicial Activism at the Individual Judge Level at the U.S. Supreme Court
In this section, judicial activism at the individual judge level at the U.S. high court
is examined,  in order to get a sense of the judges most and least likely to engage in activism.
Figure 4.10 presents the percentage of activism by individual judge at the U.S. Supreme
Court.  Note that the justices are arrayed from most conservative to most liberal, according
to the Martin and Quinn (2002) ideal point scores.  The data in this figure show that the three
justices with the highest activism percentage were Marshall (54.5%), Blackmun (52.4%) and
Stevens (52%).  However, the results for Justice Marshall should be viewed with caution, 
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because they are based on only 11 total cases.  The justices with the lowest activism
percentage were White (27.5%), Rehnquist (30.7%) and Scalia (38%).  White’s percentage
should also be viewed with some degree of caution as it is based on 51 cases only. The
results in Figure 4.10 show that the conservative judges–Thomas, Scalia, Rehnquist, White,
O’Connor, and Kennedy–have lower overall rates of activism than the liberal justices
(Marshall, Stevens, Breyer, Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg).  However, this data does not
control for statute direction or other factors.  
Table 4.1 shows the differences in activism rates between the liberal and conservative
judges for specific case issue areas.  The largest disparity occurs in criminal cases, where the
conservative justices were quite unlikely to overturn a criminal statute (activism rates ranging
from 10-18.8%), and the liberal judges were much more likely to overturn these laws
(activism rates ranging from 30-66.7%).  For cases involving federalism issues, the liberal
and conservative judges present a mirror image of each other, as the liberal justices were less
likely to overturn laws (activism rates ranging from 0-22.2%) and the conservative judges
presenting a greater tendency to strike down federalism laws (activism rates ranging from 0-
80%).  There was also a marked disparity in activism rates in due process cases between the
liberal and conservative justices. 
The data in Figure 4.11 show that the rate of activism by justice for conservative
statutes varies considerably according to the ideological leaning of the judge.  Justice
Marshall has the highest percentage rate of striking down conservative laws (71.4%),
although that rate is based on just 12 cases.  All of the liberal justices have activism rates for
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Table 4.1
Rate of Activism by Judge for Selected Issue Areas, U.S. Supreme Court 1990-1999
Judge Speech/Rel. Criminal Due Process Federalism Economic
Marshall 100% (3) 66.7% (2) 0% (0) N/A 0% (0)
Stevens 63.4% (26) 52.6% (10) 46.2% (6) 20% (2) 66.7% (16)
Breyer 38.1% (8) 37.5% (3) 50% (5) 22.2% (2) 87.5% (7)
Blackmun 84.2% (16) 50% (5) 60% (3) 0% (0) 25% (4)
Souter 61.5% (24) 30% (6) 50% (7) 20% (2) 52.2% (12)
Ginsburg 54.2% (13) 40% (4) 40% (4) 22.2% (2) 57.1% (8)
Kennedy 58.5% (24) 15.8% (3) 28.6% (4) 80% (8) 50% (12)
O’Connor 53.8% (21) 15% (3) 53.8% (21) 70% (7) 62.5% (15)
White 43.8% (7) 10% (1) 25% (1) 0% (0) 20% (2)
Rehnquist 37.5% (15) 10% (2) 21.4% (3) 70% (7) 20.8% (5)
Scalia 45% (18) 10% (2) 21.4% (3) 70% (7) 50% (12)
Thomas 48.6% (17) 18.8% (3) 21.4% (3) 60% (6) 56.5% (13)
Number of cases where a law was invalidated in parentheses.
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Table 4.1, Continued
Rate of Activism by Judge for Selected Issue Areas, U.S. Supreme Court 1990-1999
Justice Privacy Civil Rights
Marshall N/A 100% (1) 
Stevens 50% (4) 50% (11)
Breyer 42.9% (3) 43.8% (7)
Blackmun 100% (1) 50% (3)
Souter 50% (4) 45.5% (10)
Ginsburg 42.9% (3) 47.1% (8)
Kennedy 50% (4) 61.9% (13)
O’Connor 50% (4) 57.1% (12)
White 0% (0) 40% (2)
Rehnquist 25% (2) 40.9% (9)
Scalia 37.5% (3) 45% (9)
Thomas 37.5% (3) 38.9% (7)
Number of cases where a law was invalidated in parentheses.
113
114
conservative federal and state laws above forty percent, while the conservative judges all
have activism rates below forty percent. 
Unsurprisingly, the two judges considered to be moderate conservatives–O’Connor
and Kennedy–have the highest rates for nullifying conservative laws, while the four justices
thought to be strongly conservative–White, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas–all have activism
rates in the twenty-percent range for conservative laws.  These descriptive data show a
marked reluctance for the most ideologically conservative justices to strike down
conservative laws.  
Examining the activism rates for liberal laws shows that the disparity between the
liberal and conservative judges is not as great as it is for conservative statutes.  Intriguingly,
the highest percentage for striking down liberal laws in the 1990s belongs to Justice
O’Connor, one of moderate conservatives.  Justices White and Rehnquist have activism rates
in the forty percent range, which is comparable to the percentage rate for several of the
liberal judges.  While the general pattern of ideological voting remains for liberal statutes,
there appears to be more variance among the justices.  Overall, the descriptive analyses have
shown that there appears to be distinct patterns of attitudinal voting among the U.S. Supreme
Court justices, depending on whether the challenged law is ideologically liberal or
conservative.  Below, the means for invalidation of incongruent statutes in each country will
be compared, allowing for Hypothesis Two to be tested. 
Judicial Activism at the Individual Judge Level at the Supreme Court of Canada
In this section, judicial activism at the high court of Canada is analyzed at the judge
 In this table, privacy is not included because the Canadian high court only heard two privacy30
cases, and each judge sitting on those cases struck down the statutes.
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level.  Figure 4.12 presents the percentage of activism by individual judge at the Supreme
Court of Canada.  The justices are arrayed from most conservative to most liberal, with the
most conservative on the far left and the most liberal on the far right.  The data show that the
judges with the highest activism percentage are Wilson (48.65%), Binnie (42.11%), and
Lamer (41.01%), while the justices with the lowest percentage are Gonthier (26.85%),
Bastarache (28.57%), and Dickson (30.77%).  What is interesting about this analysis is that
the disparity in activism rates between liberal and conservative judges is not as large as in
the American case.  If the outliers of Gonthier and Wilson are removed, the range is less than
fourteen percent.  So, while the Canadian liberal judges do have a slightly higher rate of
activism than the conservative justices, the difference is not large.  
Table 4.2 shows the differences in activism rates between the liberal and conservative
judges in Canada for specific case issue areas.   What is striking about these data is that30
there are only two issue areas–criminal procedure and speech and religion--where the liberal
and conservative judges differ significantly in activism percentage rates.  In criminal cases,
the three strongest conservative judges (Major, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier) all had activism
rates below twenty percent, while the liberal justices (with the exception of Bastarache, who
did not vote to nullify a criminal law in all six criminal cases he heard) all had a much greater
willingness to strike down criminal statutes.  In speech and religion cases, the liberal judges
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Table 4.2
Rate of Activism by Judge for Selected Issue Areas, Supreme Court of Canada
1990-1999
Judge Speech/Rel. Criminal Due Process Economic Civil Rights
Wilson 55.56% (5) 45% (9) N/A 0% (0) 66.67% (4)
La Forest 40.91% (9) 25% (11) 18.18% (2) 20% (2) 46.15% (12)
Lamer 41.18% (7) 33.33% (17) 25% (3) 36.36% (4) 66.67% (20)
Bastarache 66.67% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 50% (1) 60% (3)
Cory 42.86% (9) 26.09% (12) 20% (2) 18.18% (2) 66.67% (24)
McLachlin 61.90% (13) 25% (11) 15.38% (2) 40% (4) 60.00% (18)
Stevenson 0% (0) 62.50% (5) 100% (2) 0% (0) 33.33% (1)
Binnie 0% (0) 20% (1) 0% (0) 50% (1) 83.33% (5)
Sopinka 45.45% (10) 39.13% (18) 18.18% (2) 30% (3) 44% (11)
Iacobucci 37.50% (6) 26.67% (8) 16.67% (2) 37.5% (3) 65.38% (17)
Dickson 28.57% (2) 33.33% (4) N/A 0% (0) 33.33% (2)
Gonthier 30.43% (7) 19.15% (9) 15.38% (2) 20% (2) 42.90% (15)
L’Heureux 36% (9) 13.73% (7) 0% (0) 9.09% (1) 72.22% (26)
Major 41.67% (5) 17.65 (3) 0% (0) 57.14% (4) 54.55% (12)
Number of cases where a law was invalidated in parentheses.
 Justices Stevenson and Binnie had an activism rate of 0% for speech and religion cases, but31
these judges only heard two and one speech/religion cases, respectively.
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were generally more likely to invalidate these statutes than were the conservative justices.31
Although these two issue areas displayed some differences in voting between the liberal and
conservative judges, in general the data did not show the marked distinctions that were
evident in the American case.  This tendency is even more apparent in Figure 4.13. 
Figure 4.13 presents the percentage activism rates for each judge according to the
direction of the statute.  The results support the judicial politicization theory, which posits
that in a less politicized high court, such as Canada, judges will be less likely to vote
attitudinally.  Recall that in Figure 4.11, the voting pattern for the justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court showed a very strong tendency towards ideological voting:  the liberal
justices were much more likely to strike down conservative laws, while the conservative
judges were more likely to invalidate liberal statutes.  At the Canadian Supreme Court, no
such pattern can be seen.  Indeed, the data show that the most conservative justices–Major,
L’Heureux-Dube, and Gonthier–were the least likely to strike down liberal laws (with the
exception of Justice Binnie, who joined the Court in 1998 and did not strike down a liberal
law in his first two years).  The only tendency towards attitudinal voting is seen in the
activism rate for Major, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, and Dickson, who have the lowest
invalidation rates for conservative laws along with Justice La Forest.  However, this pattern
is not very strong, as the variation is not high for the activism rate for conservative statutes
(again excepting judge Binnie, who invalidated 66.67% of conservative laws in his first two
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years on the Court). 
Thus, from these data, it does not appear that attitudinal voting is strongly seen at the
Supreme Court of Canada.  However, these are descriptive data only.  In the following
chapter, inferential analyses will reveal that, when controlling for other variables, attitudinal
voting is indeed significant at the Canadian high court, contrary to prediction of the judicial
politicization theory. 
Judicial Activism at the Individual Judge Level at the High Court of Australia
Here, judicial activism at the judge level at the High Court of Australia is examined.
Figure 4.14 shows the percentage of activism for each judge at the Australian high court.
The judges are arrayed according to ideology, with the most conservative justices on the left
and the most liberal on the right.  Although the voting blocs are not absolute, the most
consistently liberal judges are Gaudron, Toohey and Kirby, while the most conservative
judges are Callinan, Hayne, and Dawson.  The data in Figure 4.14 reveal that two judges on
the liberal bloc on the Court–Gaudron and Kirby–have a higher activism rate, while two of
the conservatives–Dawson and Callinan–have a lower activism percentage rate than the
remainder of the Court.  Indeed, the highest activism rate is held by Kirby (52.17%) while
the lowest is held by Dawson (28.89%).  So, there is some variance in the activism rate
between the liberal and conservative judges, but that variance is not large or consistent across
judges.  
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Table 4.3
Rate of Activism by Judge for Selected Issue Areas, High Court of Australia 1990-
1999
Judge Speech/Rel. Criminal Due Process Federalism Economic
Gaudron 50% (3) 40% (2) 50% (3) 54.55% (6) 40% (4)
Toohey 33.33% (2) 33.33% (2) 33.33% (1) 40% (2) 22.22% (2)
Kirby 0% (0) 100% (1) 20% (1) 85.71% (6) 50% (1)
McHugh 33.33% (2) 50% (2) 16.67% (1) 45.45% (5) 30% (3)
Mason 100% (3) 16.67% (1) 0% (0) 50% (1) 44.44% (4)
Deane 100% (3) 50% (2) 100% (1) 50% (1) 33.33% (3)
Gummow 0% (0) 0% (0) 40% (2) 50% (4) 33.33% (1)
Brennan 33.33% (2) 33.33% (2) 0% (0) 60% (3) 50% (5)
Gleeson N/A N/A 0% (0) 60% (3) 0% (0)
Dawson 33.33% (2) 20% (1) 0% (0) 40% (2) 22.22% (2)
Hayne N/A 0% (0) 33.33% (1) 60% (3) 50% (1)
Callinan N/A N/A 33.33% (1) 33.33% (2) N/A
Number of cases where a law was invalidated in parentheses.
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Table 4.3, Continued
Rate of Activism by Judge for Selected Issue Areas, High Court of Australia 1990-
1999
Justice Civil Rights
Gaudron 62.50% (5)
Toohey 50% (3)
Kirby 100% (2)
McHugh 25% (2)
Mason 33.33% (1)
Deane 66.67% (2)
Gummow 40% (2)
Brennan 42.86% (3)
Gleeson 100% (1)
Dawson 50% (3)
Hayne 25% (1)
Callinan 0% (0)
Number of cases where a law was invalidated in parentheses.
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 The privacy category is not included because of the low number of cases in this area.32
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Table 4.3 presents the activism percentage rates for the Australian judges across case
issue areas.   Hayne and Callinan did not join the Court until 1997 and 1998, respectively,32
and so did not participate in a large number of cases, which makes comparison of the liberal
and conservative blocs difficult.  However, examining the activism rates for federalism and
civil rights cases (two areas where there are a sufficient number of cases to make a valid
comparison) shows that there is not a significant difference in voting behavior between
liberal and conservative justices.  Again, the judicial politicization thesis posits that
significant ideological voting behavior should be less apparent at the Australian high court,
and so this descriptive data supports the theory.  
Figure 4.15 shows the activism rates for each judge according to the direction of the
law.  The charts reveals that the most conservative judges, Callinan, Hayne, and Dawson, did
have a slightly greater tendency to invalidate liberal rather than conservative laws.  Of the
most liberal judges, Kirby had a far greater likelihood of striking down conservative laws:
69.23% for conservative laws compared to 30% for liberal statutes.  Gaudron also had a
somewhat greater tendency to nullify conservative laws: 52.94% for conservative and
34.62% for liberal laws.  However, Justice Toohey was slightly more likely to invalidate
liberal rather than conservative laws–a pattern that indicates nonideological voting behavior.
Overall, the data in Figure 4.15 do not reveal highly ideological voting based on statutory
direction.  Again, this comports with the prediction of the judicial politicization theory;
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however, further analysis using inferential statistics will allow greater confidence in the
conclusion that attitudinal voting is not significant at the High Court of Australia.  
Examining Ideological Voting and Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective
Having examined the aggregate judicial activism rates, trends in activism, and rate
of activism for each judge by issue area in each country, it is now possible to begin to test
Hypothesis Two, which states:
2H : Judges on a highly politicized high court will be more likely to strike
down ideologically incongruent laws.  Thus, conservative judges on the U.S.
Supreme Court will be more likely to invalidate liberal laws while liberal
judges will be more likely to nullify conservative laws.  
If this hypothesis is correct, then there should be a highly significant difference in the means
for invalidating incongruent laws in the United States, but not in Australia or Canada.  Put
another way, if this hypothesis is correct, the mean for striking down liberal laws should be
significantly higher for the conservative judges at the U.S. Supreme Court than for the
liberals, but the same effect should not be as evident at the Canadian or Australian high
courts.  Conversely, the mean for invalidating conservative laws should be significantly
higher for liberal rather than conservative justices at the U.S. Supreme Court, but this
tendency should not be as apparent in a nonpoliticized court such as the high court of Canada
or Australia.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.  
Table 4.4 aggregates the liberal and conservative judges at each high court and
 It should be noted that the grouping of liberal and conservative judges in each country is based33
on voting records, and not attitudinal scores.  The reason for this is that the Segal & Cover (1989)
attitudinal scores and equivalent scores for Canada and Australia are derived from newspaper commentary
at the time of the judge’s appointment to the high court.  Thus, these attitudinal scores measure the
perceived ideology of the judge at the time of his or her appointment.  However, it is clear that these scores
are not exact and that high court judges may shift in their ideology over time.  For example, in the American
case, Justice Stevens was appointed by a Republican president and has an attitudinal score placing him
among the most conservative judges on the Court.  But, as any observer of the U.S. Supreme Court know,
Stevens is actually one of the most (if not the most) liberal members of the Court.  Thus, the decision was
made to group the judges in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 by voting record, not attitudinal scores.  This allows for a
more accurate analysis to be conducted.  However, voting record is not used in the inferential statistical
analyses found in Chapter Five, because this would be a tautology: using votes to predict votes.  Thus, the
exogenous attitudinal scores are used in the analyses in the following chapter.
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averages the rate of nullifying a liberal statute.   The results in Table 4.4 indicate that, as 33
predicted, conservative judges at the U.S. Supreme Court are far more likely than the liberal
justices to strike down a liberal statute.  Indeed, the mean for invalidating a liberal law for
the conservative magistrates is 55.84%, compared to 39.22% for the liberal judges, for a
difference of 16.62%..  A two-sample t-test reveals that this difference in means is highly
significant.  Thus, at the U.S. Supreme Court, the conservative judges are far more likely to
strike down a liberal law than the liberal justices, as predicted by the judicial politicization
thesis.  
The results for Canada and Australia present a different picture, though.  At the
Canadian Supreme Court, not only was the difference in means not significant,  the liberal
judges were actually more likely to strike down liberal laws than the conservative judges.
This provides suggestive evidence that ideological voting at the Canadian Supreme Court is
restrained.  In Australia, the conservative justices were more likely to nullify a liberal law
than the liberal judges, and the difference in means (7.54%) was moderately significant.
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Thus, when analyzing the invalidation of liberal laws in the United States, Canada, and
Australia, the data support the judicial politicization theory, in that there is a far stronger
tendency for judges in a highly politicized court (such as the U.S.) to strike down
ideologically incongruent laws. 
Similar results appear when examining statutes that are conservative in direction.
Table 4.5 shows that, at the U.S. Supreme Court, the liberal judges are far more likely to
invalidate conservative statutes than the conservative justices.  The mean for invalidating
conservative laws is 54.46% for the liberal justices and 28.73% for the conservatives, a
difference of -25.73%, which is again highly significant at 99% confidence interval.  In
Canada, the liberal judges are in fact more likely to strike down conservative laws than are
the conservative justices, but the difference of -7.22% is only moderately significant at a 95%
confidence interval.  The same result occurs in Australia, where the liberal judges are more
likely to nullify a conservative law than are the conservative justices; the difference in means
of -15.56% is moderately significant only at a 90% confidence interval. 
After examining the activism rates for individual judges by statute direction and also
the aggregated means found in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, it is now possible to confirm Hypothesis
Two.  Judges at the U.S. Supreme Court are far more likely to strike down ideologically
incongruent laws than are high court judges from Australia or Canada.  Although attitudinal
voting is present in the less politicized high court of Canada, the analysis shows that it is
much less significant. 
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Table 4.4  
Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Judges’ Means for Invalidating Liberal
Laws: United States, Canada, Australia 1990-1999
Means-Conservative Judges Means-Liberal Judges Difference
U.S. 55.84 39.22 16.62***
(4.32) (3.18) (5.37)
Canada 17.24 22.13 -4.89
(5.88) (3.59) (6.89)
Australia 43.28 35.74 7.54*
(3.91) (2.45) (4.61)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-sample t-test without equal variances performed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conservative judges:
U.S.:  White, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
Canada:  LaForest, Major, Gonthier, Sopinka, Bastarache
Australia:  Callinan, Hayne, Dawson, Gleeson, Gummow, Brennan
Liberal judges:
U.S.:  Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg
Canada:  L’Heureux-Dube, Wilson, Cory, Dickson, Lamer, McLachlin, Stevenson,
Iacobucci, Binnie
Australia:  Mason, Deane, McHugh, Kirby, Toohey, Gaudron
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Table 4.5  
Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Judges’ Means for Invalidating
Conservative Laws:  United States, Canada, Australia 1990-1999
Means-Conservative Judges Means-Liberal Judges
Difference
U.S. 28.73 54.46 -25.73***
(3.25) (4.41) (5.48)
Canada 37.97 45.19 -7.22**
(2.15) (3.24) (3.89)
Australia 34.06 49.63 -15.56*
(3.71) (7.44)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-sample t-test without equal variances performed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conservative judges:
U.S.:  White, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
Canada:  LaForest, Major, Gonthier, Sopinka, Bastarache
Australia:  Callinan, Hayne, Dawson, Gleeson, Gummow, Brennan
Liberal judges:
U.S.:  Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg
Canada:  L’Heureux-Dube, Wilson, Cory, Dickson, Lamer, McLachlin, Stevenson,
Iacobucci, Binnie
Australia:  Mason, Deane, McHugh, Kirby, Toohey, Gaudron
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Conclusion
As noted above, the results from the analyses herein provided support for the judicial
activism hypotheses: that judges at the U.S. Supreme Court are more likely to engage in
judicial activism than are judges at the high courts of Canada or Australia, and also that
American supreme court justices are more likely to nullify ideologically incongruent statutes.
The confirmation of these hypotheses provides a first step towards assessing the totality of
the judicial politicization theory.
However, an interesting ancillary issue also merits a brief discussion.  The question
is  whether certain subject matter issues will be more salient in different countries.  Phrased
another way, a reasonable prediction would be that the high courts of Canada and Australia
would find the same case issues salient and would approach the adjudication of those issues
in the same manner.  Canada and Australia are both  parliamentary democracies, affiliated
with the United Kingdom, and modern industrial societies.  Thus, it would appear likely that
a “parliamentary judicial model” might appear, when comparing these countries’ high court
records.  Yet, no such model appears to exist.  The Canadian Supreme Court is more
consistently activist than the High Court of Australia, and criminal and civil rights issues are
the most salient at the Canadian court, while economic and taxation issues appear to be most
prominent in Australia.  Indeed, at least in the 1990s, the high courts of Canada and Australia
may be moving in opposite directions:  the Canadian court is establishing itself, after the
adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as a tribunal that is concerned with human
rights issues, broadly defined, while the High Court of Australia is becoming a court more
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concerned with economic and federalism issues.  Of course, the Australian High Court issued
several significant and highly controversial decisions regarding the rights of indigenous
peoples in the mid-1990s (Mabo v. Queensland; Wik Peoples v. Queensland), but these
decisions may have been unusual for the Court, and in any case, it appears that the High
Court has moved away from this exceptional jurisprudence. 
Overall, it is clear from Chapter Four that the United States Supreme Court is
exceptional, in that it is far and away the most activist and ideologically-driven high court
in this study.  But, it remains to be seen if attitudinal or legal factors predominate in judicial
decision-making at the high courts of Canada and Australia.  In Chapter Six, this question
will be addressed, as additional hypotheses testing the judicial politicization theory are
proposed, and the data is tested using multivariate analyses. In the next chapter, judicial
activism and issues of federalism are analyzed. 
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Chapter Five:  Judicial Activism and Federalism in Comparative
Perspective
In this chapter, judicial activism and federalism in Canada, Australia, and the United
States is examined by analyzing the individual judges’ votes to invalidate federal,
state/province, and local laws.  Each of the three countries in this study is organized as a
federation, and significant questions have arisen in each nation regarding the proper role of
the high court in determining the proper balance of national and state/province powers.  In
the United States, one interpretation of federalism, generally espoused by conservatives,
holds that the national government should be limited in its powers, state governments should
be allowed to legislate freely in their domains, and the Supreme Court should strike down
congressional legislation that attempts to limit state authority (see generally Keck 2004;
Scheiber 1992; Whittington 2001).  Canadian commentators have raised similar concerns
about federalism in Canada; for example, one author recently opined, “In other words, while
under the Canadian federal system the primary jurisdiction in social policy-making rests with
the provincial legislatures, federally-appointed judges have used the Charter as the basis for
imposing their own social policy choices on the provinces” (Martin 2003, 73).  In Australia,
there has also been a call among political conservatives for the High Court to defer to the
state legislatures (see, e.g., Craven 2005).  
Given that the modern conception of conservative federalism has gained currency in
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each of these nations, the analysis herein will seek to empirically determine if high court
judges in the U.S., Canada and Australia defer to state/provincial legislatures in accordance
with these ideals.  The judicial politicization theory suggests that more highly politicized
judges will be more likely to vote in judicial review cases according to their political
philosophy.  Thus, at the United States Supreme Court, we would expect to observe
conservative judges voting in a restraintist manner when considering state laws, while liberal
judges should exhibit less deference to state laws, and the converse when the Court considers
national laws.  However, in Canada and Australia, the theory would predict a much less
pronounced dichotomy in regards to the nullification of national and state/province statutes.
In other words, because Canadian and Australian justices are less likely to vote ideologically,
there should be less of a tendency for the conservative judges to strike down national laws
and uphold state/province laws, and less of a tendency for the liberal judges to nullify state
and provincial statutes and uphold national laws.  Stated formally, 
3H . Judges on a highly politicized high court will be more likely to vote in
federalism cases according to ideological factors.  Thus, conservative judges
on the U.S. Supreme Court will be more likely to invalidate federal laws
while liberal judges will be more likely to nullify state laws.  Because judges
at the high courts of Canada and Australia are less likely to vote according
to attitudinal factors, conservative judges will not tend to vote to strike down
federal laws and liberal judges will not tend to vote to invalidate
state/province laws.
Activism and Federalism at the United States Supreme Court
In this section, the votes of the judges at the U.S. Supreme Court are analyzed to
determine if ideology is determinative in regards to federalism issues.  First, descriptive data
 Obviously, Justice Marshall’s results in this chapter should be viewed with caution, given that he34
only decided three cases involving a congressional statute and eight cases involving a state or local law. 
Removing Marshall from Figure 5.1 shows that the predicted relationships are still present, although the
slope of the lines are less steep.  A bivariate regression excluding Marshall for federal cases shows that
ideology is still highly significant (p < .000); the regression for state/local cases excluding Marshall shows
that ideology is highly significant as well (p < .000).
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showing the activism rate for each judge for state/local and federal laws are presented in
Table 5.1.  The judges are arrayed from most liberal at the top to the most conservative at the
bottom of the table; the Martin and Quinn (2002) voting record scores are used to rank the
justices by ideology in this table.  The data in Table 5.1 show that, generally, the liberal
judges are more likely to be deferential to federal laws but more likely to strike state and
local laws, while the conservative judges are more deferential to state/local laws and more
likely to strike national laws.  The highest percentage activism rate for cases involving a
federal law is held by Justice Thomas (44.2%), while the highest activism rate for state/local
cases is held by Justice Marshall (75%).  Interestingly, Justice Breyer, who is considered to
be one of the more liberal members of the Court, had an activism rate for federal laws above
the Court mean and an activism rate for state/local laws slightly below the Court mean.  
Figure 5.1 displays these data and incorporates the Segal and Cover judicial ideology
scores.   The data show that, as predicted, the more conservative the judge, the more likely34
he or she will vote to strike national laws and the less likely that he or she will vote to strike
state and local laws.  Conversely, the more liberal the judge, the greater the tendency to vote
to nullify state laws and vote to uphold federal laws.  These findings comport with the
conclusions made by Solberg and Lindquist (2006), who found an even stronger relationship
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Table 5.1
Percentage of Activism for Federal and State/Local Laws by Judge, U.S. Supreme
Court 1990-1999
Judge Federal State/Local
Marshall 0% (0-3) 75% (6-8)
Stevens 22.7% (10-44) 64.4% (67-104)
Breyer 40.6% (13-32) 45.5% (25-55)
Blackmun 7.7% (1-13) 64% (32-50)
Souter 33.3 % (15-45) 51.9% (54-104)
Ginsburg 35.3% (12-34) 47.7% (31-65)
Kennedy 40% (18-45) 50.5% (53-105)
O’Connor 42.2% (19-45) 51.4% (54-105)
White 0% (0-11) 35% (14-40)
Rehnquist 40% (18-45) 26.7% (28-105)
Scalia 42.2% (19-45) 36.2% (38-105)
Thomas 44.2% (19-43) 39.1% (36-92)
Court mean 35.6% (144-405) 46.7% (438-938)
First number in parentheses is number of votes to strike, second number is total number of
judicial review cases.
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 As discussed in Chapter Two, the Martin and Quinn scores are not used in the models in this35
study due to endogeneity concerns. 
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between judicial attitudes and voting in federalism cases in the period 1986-2000.  This
difference is most likely due to the fact that Solberg and Lindquist use the Martin and Quinn
(2002) scores to represent the judges’ ideology, while this study uses the Segal and Cover
(1989) rankings.   Because the Martin and Quinn scores are derived from the justices’ votes,35
they are certainly a better indicator of the current ideology of the individual judges and thus
likely explain the stronger relationship found in the Solberg and Lindquist (2006) study. 
The data in Figure 5.1 show a moderately strong relationship between the rate of
activism and the ideology of the judge, with the ideological variable accounting for 25.91%
of the variance in state/local cases and 20.26% in federal law cases.  Of course, these are
simple bivariate regressions that do not incorporate other variables; in the full model found
in Chapter Six, ideology is found to have an estimated effect size of 31% at the U.S. high
court.  However, it is clear that the data for American high court judges do support the
judicial politicization theory in that ideology is found to significantly effect voting in judicial
review cases based on the source of the law. 
Activism and Federalism at the Supreme Court of Canada
In Canada, a very different picture emerges in regards to ideology and federalism in
judicial review cases.  Table 5.2 presents the activism rate for each judge for province/local
and federal laws.  The judges are arrayed in the table from most liberal at the top to the most
 The bivariate regression shows that ideology accounts for 12.32% of the variance.36
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conservative at the bottom.  The data show that there is a very slight trend for liberal judges
to have a greater likelihood to strike province and local laws; however, the results for
province/local laws should be viewed with caution as Bastarache, Stevenson and Binnie all
decided less than five province/local cases.  The activism rates for federal laws reveal that,
contrary to the pattern observed in the American case, liberal judges are somewhat more
likely to vote to strike national statutes.  Figure 5.2 presents these data and incorporates
ideology scores to graphically present these relationships.  
Figure 5.2 shows that there is a slight relationship between ideology and votes to
strike national laws; however, this relationship is in the opposite direction of what would be
expected in a highly politicized judiciary.   The trend line is relatively flat, and in the36
opposite direction than the American case.  Thus, the data show that the likelihood of voting
to invalidate a federal law actually increases with the degree of ideological liberalism, which
is contrary to the expectations of a judiciary that is motivated by federalism concerns.  
As for province and local laws, there is very little relationship between ideology and
the tendency to vote to strike these statutes.  The trend line for the bivariate regression
reveals a fairly flat slope, and the r-square statistic indicates that only 1.75% of the variance
is accounted for by ideology.  
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Table 5.2
Percentage of Activism for Federal and Province/Local Laws by Judge, Supreme
Court of Canada 1990-1999
Judge Federal Province/Local
Wilson 48.15% (13-27) 50% (5-10)
La Forest 32.22% (29-90) 30.23% (13-43)
Lamer 37.76% (37-98) 48.78% (20-41)
Bastarache 22.22% (4-18) 66.67% (2-3)
Cory 36.73% (36-98) 42.55% (20-47)
McLachlin 37% (37-100) 48.72% (19-39)
Stevenson 43.75% (7-16) 25% (1-4)
Binnie 33.33% (5-15) 75% (3-4)
Sopinka 40.22% (37-92) 32.5% (13-40)
Iacobucci 35.9% (28-78) 40% (14-35)
Dickson 26.32% (5-19) 42.86% (3-7)
Gonthier 22.55% (23-102) 36.17% (17-47)
L’Heureux-Dube 26.36% (29-110) 48.94% (23-47)
Major 32.65% (16-49) 40.74% (11-27)
Court mean 33.55% (306-912) 41.62% (164-394)
First number in parentheses is number of votes to strike, second number is total number of
judicial review cases.
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 Because Justices Callinan and Gleeson were both appointed to the Court in 1998, they did not37
hear a large number of cases in the 1990s and so their results should accordingly be viewed with caution.
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In summary, the data for the Canadian Supreme Court in the 1990s show that
ideology plays a small role in terms of federalism and judicial activism.  This is consistent
with the judicial politicization theory, which posits that less politicized high courts will be
less likely to diverge in the nullification of state/province and national laws.  Contrasting the
steep trend line for state laws in the American case with the relatively flat line in the
Canadian case demonstrates this.  Furthermore, the invalidation of national laws in the
Canadian high court does not appear to be strongly connected to judicial ideology as
demonstrated by the fact that the trend line for these cases is in the opposite direction of the
American analysis.  Thus, the data provide support for the thesis that judicial attitudes play
a smaller role in federalism cases at the Supreme Court of Canada.  
Activism and Federalism at the High Court of Australia
The data for the High Court of Australia reveal a pattern similar to the Canadian
Supreme Court.  Table 5.3 presents the percentage of votes to strike for each judge during
the 1990s for state/local and federal laws.  Once again, the judges are arrayed in the table
from most liberal at the top to most conservative at the bottom.  Justices Gaudron and
Callinan have the highest rates of activism for federal statutes, while Justices Kirby and
Gleeson have the highest percentage activism rates for state laws.   Figure 5.3 incorporates37
attitudinal scores with federal and state activism rates. 
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Figure 5.3 reveals that there is virtually no relationship between judicial ideology and
activism for federal laws, and only a very small relationship between attitudes and judicial
activism for state statutes in Australia.  The trend line for federal laws possesses almost no
slope, and judicial ideology accounts for only 0.33% of the variance among the voting
patterns of the judges in these cases.  For state and local statutes, there is a very modest
relationship between ideology and activism, as the liberal judges are somewhat more likely
to overturn these laws than are the conservative justices.  However, judicial ideology
explains just 3.16% of the variance in voting in state/local cases.  
Thus, it does not appear that judges at the High Court of Australia are driven by
ideological considerations when considering federalism issues.  This result is consonant with
the judicial politicization theory.  
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Table 5.3
Percentage of Activism for Federal and State /Local Laws by Judge, High Court of
Australia 1990-1999
Judge Federal State/Local
Gaudron 50% (17-34) 38.46% (10-26)
Toohey 34.48% (10-29) 27.78% (5-18)
Kirby 36.36% (4-11) 66.67% (8-12)
McHugh 34.29% (12-35) 41.67% (10-24)
Mason 40.9% (9-22) 45.45% (5-11)
Deane 45.45% (10-22) 55.56% (5-9)
Gummow 42.86% (6-14) 37.5% (6-16)
Brennan 45.16% (14-31) 38.89% (7-18)
Gleeson 25% (1-4) 57.14% (4-7)
Dawson 37.04% (10-27) 16.67% (3-18)
Hayne 27.27% (3-11) 50% (4-8)
Callinan 50% (2-4) 25% (2-8)
Court mean 40.16% (98-244) 39.43% (69-175)
First number in parentheses is number of votes to strike, second number is total number of
judicial review cases.
145
146
Conclusion
The analysis of ideology and judicial activism suggests that ideological
considerations play a far larger role at the United States Supreme Court than at the high
courts of Canada and Australia.  As predicted by the judicial politicization theory, the judges
at the U.S. Supreme Court are much more likely to exhibit voting patterns that are consistent
with their attitudes and ideology:  conservative judges are more likely to strike down national
laws and liberal justices are more likely to nullify state and local laws.  The steep slopes and
r-squared statistics in the scatterplot reveal the degree that ideological considerations play
in judicial decision-making at the highly politicized Supreme Court.  However, the judges
at the far less politicized high courts of Canada and Australia do not exhibit the same
ideological voting tendencies, as predicted by the theory propounded in this project.  The
scatterplots for the Canadian and Australian high courts present relatively flat slopes and r-
squared statistics that are quite low.  Indeed, the slope for invalidation of federal laws in
Canada is in the opposite direction that would be expected by a conventional understanding
of judicial politics.  That is, the likelihood of invalidating national laws increases with
judicial liberalism, which is the reverse of the pattern at the U.S. court.  This suggests that
non-ideological factors predominate at the supreme courts of Canada and Australia.  Thus,
Hypothesis Three can be confirmed. 
So, these simple scatterplots and bivariate linear regressions have provided support
for the main premise of the judicial politicization theory: that highly politicized high courts
will be more likely to vote attitudinally.  In the next chapter, a more sophisticated
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multivariate logistic regression model will be introduced that will allow more finely detailed
analysis of the influence of ideological and legal factors in judicial decision-making in the
United States, Canada, and Australia.  
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Chapter Six:  Judicial Decision-Making in Comparative Perspective
In Chapter Four, the judicial politicization theory was tested in regards to the
likelihood of judicial activism in the high courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia.
The theory predicts that a highly politicized high court, such as the U.S., will be less likely
to defer to the political branches and instead have a greater tendency to strike down statutes
and regulations.  Conversely, a less politicized court–such as the high court of Canada or
Australia–should be less likely to engage in judicial activism.  Related to this, the theory
posits that judges in highly politicized high courts are more likely to strike down
ideologically incongruent laws.  Both of these hypotheses were tested and confirmed.  
In Chapter Five, the theory was tested as it applies to federalism issues:  the rate of
judicial activism was analyzed by disaggregating national and state/province laws and
incorporating judicial attitudes into the analysis.  The results indicated that, as predicted, the
judges at the U.S. Supreme Court are much more likely to exhibit voting patterns that are
consistent with their ideology: conservative judges are more likely to strike down national
laws and liberal justices are more likely to nullify state and local laws.   However, again as
predicted, the justices at the less politicized high courts of Canada and Australia do not
exhibit the same ideological voting tendencies in regards to federalism, as there was no
significant difference between the rate of activism for national and state/province laws in
these courts. 
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In this chapter, the central premise of the judicial politicization theory–that judicial
attitudes tend to strongly influence judicial decision-making in politicized courts while legal
factors are more likely to shape decision-making in non-politicized courts–is analyzed by the
use of a multivariate logistic regression model.  Again, judicial review cases are used to test
the theory because of the inherent significance of these cases:  the decision to overturn an act
of the political branch is an important one, and one that can be assumed to be taken very
seriously by the judges.  The theory is tested by analyzing combined nonunanimous and
unanimous cases, in contrast to most studies of judicial decision-making, which typically
only examine nonunanimous cases.  The decision was made to combine nonunanimous and
unanimous cases so as to provide the most rigorous test of the theory.  For comparison’s
sake, the results for solely nonunanimous cases are also presented.  
However, this study will also examine judicial decision-making in each country by
using unanimous cases exclusively (the “reduced database”).  Examining the theory by using
only unanimous cases will allow consideration of whether judges differ in their decision-
making when no substantial controversy may exist in a case–that is, a unanimous decision.
This facet of judicial behavior is seldom examined in the American case and virtually never
in comparative context.  Before the model is presented and the results are discussed, a brief
overview of the theory is provided. 
Review of the Judicial Politicization Theory
The primary element of the judicial politicization theory is the contention that judges
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on a highly politicized high court in an established democracy are more likely to decide cases
according to ideological/attitudinal factors, and will correspondingly be more likely to
engage in judicial activism and strike down acts of the legislature.  Conversely, judges on a
high court that is less politicized will be more likely to decide cases based upon legal factors,
and will be less likely to invalidate laws enacted by the political branch.  In other words, the
attitudinal model of judicial decision-making will predominate in politicized judiciaries,
while the legal model will be more likely to prevail in less politicized courts.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the degree of judicial politicization in a high court is
determined by the informal judicial selection culture, not the formal processes used for
judicial appointments.  The selection culture refers to whether the appointing executive
typically relies upon ideological and partisan factors to choose judges, or whether other
factors such as qualifications and merit are the most important criteria.  Of the three high
courts in this study, the most highly politicized is the U.S. Supreme Court, with an index
score of .923, followed by Australia with a score of .714 and Canada with an index score of
.529.  
The analysis and quantification of judicial politicization is just the first part of the
theory.  The theory also posits that, in established democracies, judges on a highly politicized
high court will be more likely to decide cases based on attitudinal/ideological factors, while
legal factors should be more influential in less politicized courts.  The theory also proposes
that judges on a highly politicized supreme court will be more likely to strike down acts of
the legislature.  Related to this, the theory predicts that judges on a highly politicized high
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court will be more likely to support laws that are ideologically congruent with their own
political preferences and strike down laws that are not congruent with their own ideology.
In other words, on a highly politicized court, conservative judges will be more likely to strike
down liberal laws, and liberal judges will be more likely to strike down laws that are
conservative in direction.  On less politicized high courts, this tendency should be less
evident.  Finally, the judicial politicization theory posits that ideological voting should be
more pronounced in politicized high courts when examining state/province and national
laws.  That is, on a highly politicized high court, conservative judges (consistent with their
ideology) are more likely to strike down national laws and liberal justices are more likely to
nullify state and local laws, while justices on less politicized supreme courts will be less
likely to follow these patterns. 
Overview of the Model
In this section, the full model incorporating attitudinal, legal, and control variables
for voting in judicial activism cases in the 1990s in the high courts of the United States,
Canada, and Australia is presented.  As discussed in Chapter Two, a GEE logistic regression
is used to estimate the model because the dependent variable–a judge’s vote to strike down
a law–is dichotomous.  The judges’ ideology is measured by using ideological scores derived
from content analysis of newspaper editorials (existing values were used in the American and
Canadian cases; newly derived scores for Australian judges are presented here for the first
 As noted in Chapter Two, the ideology scores used in the model come from several different38
sources.  The American values use the well-known Segal and Cover scores (Segal and Cover 1989; Epstein
and Segal 2005).  The Canadian scores are largely derived from Ostberg et. al (2004) but have been
somewhat modified with regard to Justice L’Heureux-Dube.  The Australian scores are the result of original
content analysis and are the first attitudinal scores to date for these judges.  All of the ideology scores are on
a continuum from most conservative (scores closer to 0) to most liberal (scores closer to 1).
 As discussed in Chapter Two, the judicial attitude variable was constructed as follows.  Liberal39
or conservative statute direction was coded as 1 for liberal laws and -1 for conservative laws.  Then, the
judges’ ideology scores were transformed into a scale with positive and negative values.  Then, the judge’s
score was multiplied by the statute direction.  Thus, each judicial ideology score reflects the degree of
agreement with the law (positive value) or disagreement (negative value). For example, in the American
case, Justice Scalia (who is a strong conservative) has a rescaled score of -.501; thus, for a conservative law
(-1), his value would be .501, indicating ideological congruity.
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time).   These individual judicial ideology scores are then adjusted (following Lindquist and38
Klein 2006) for statute direction so that higher positive values indicate agreement with the
law, while higher negative values indicate that there is ideological inconsistency with the
challenged statute.   Therefore, it is expected that this variable will have a negative39
coefficient, because the greater the degree of ideological disagreement with a statute, the
greater the likelihood of a vote to strike.  The size of the effect for this coefficient will
indicate how strongly judicial ideology influences judicial decision-making. 
The legal variables seek to measure whether individual judges are influenced by the
jurisprudential factors of a lower court dissent, and the nullification of the challenged law
by the immediate lower court.  As discussed more fully in Chapter One, the legal variables
seek to measure non-ideological factors that may influence a judge when considering the
constitutionality of a statute.  The presence of dissenting opinions in the lower court should
signal to the judges that there are multiple interpretations of the constitutionality of a statute,
or, alternatively, that there may be a problem with the majority opinion’s legal reasoning.
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Therefore, in nonpoliticized high courts where legal factors are more influential, it would be
expected that the presence of a lower court dissent would increase the likelihood of a vote
for judicial activism.
The second legal variable deals with a lower court invalidation of the challenged law.
Here, it is expected that, in nonpoliticized supreme courts, the fact of a lower court
nullification should increase the likelihood of a judge to vote to strike down a law, because
of the tendency to agree with the lower court’s legal reasoning supporting the invalidation
of the challenged statute.  In other words, the fact that a lower court has reviewed the
constitutionality of a law and found a basis for nullification should be persuasive for those
judges who are influenced by jurisprudential considerations.
Finally, there are a number of control variables, including the presence of a
state/province or local law, and whether the Solicitor General (in the United States and
Australia) or Attorney General (in Canada) supports striking or retaining the law.  Another
control variable is the saliency of the individual court case to the judges, measured by the
total number of interveners/amici curiae multiplied by the total number of nongovernmental
interveners.  The fourth control variable measures whether the federal government is a direct
party in the case.  The fifth control variable is the amount of disparity in resources between
the litigants–the coding for this variable is discussed in Chapter Two.  The final control
variable is the issue of the case, operationalized as a series of dummy variables.
The full model (using both nonunanimous and unanimous court cases) is estimated
for each country, and presented in Table 6.1.  Table 6.1 shows that each of the models is
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highly significant.  Because the coefficients for logistic regression models are not easily
interpretable, Table 6.2 shows the marginal effect for each independent variable for the
likelihood of a vote in favor of judicial activism.  For the dichotomous independent variables,
the marginal effect indicates the result of changing the variable from 0 to 1.  Thus, the values
shown in Table 6.2 allow the effect size of each independent variable to be seen.  Those
independent variables that were significant at a 90% confidence interval or greater are
indicated by boldface. 
The decision was made to combine all nonunanimous and unanimous cases in the full
database, because this provides a more realistic and rigorous examination of judicial
behavior.  Put another way, a genuine theory of judicial decision-making must be tested
under real-world conditions.  In the real world of judging, the final vote on the merits on a
particular case may be unanimous or divided.  However, the “industry standard” in empirical
legal research is to remove all unanimous cases from the analyses.  I suggest that this practice
can sometimes provide a distorted picture of judicial decision-making because it deletes a
large number of relevant decisions.  By analogy, the practice of excluding unanimous
decisions would be akin to a medical researcher testing a new vaccine only on healthy
people: valuable information can be gained, but the ultimate efficacy of a new vaccine (or
theory of judicial decision-making) can best be tested by including all relevant subjects.
Thus, the analyses in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, containing both nonunanimous and unanimous
 Another common practice in empirical courts research is to disaggregate cases by single issue40
area; i.e., use only search and seizure cases.  While this methodological choice often reveals empirical
patterns in that particular area of law, the generalizability of these results is not always certain. 
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cases from a variety of issue areas, can be viewed with confidence.   40
Results of the Full Model Analyses
Again, the central prediction of the judicial politicization theory is that the more
highly politicized the high court, the more likely the judges will decide judicial review cases
on the basis of their attitudes and ideological preferences.  Hypothesis Four states: 
4H . Attitudinal voting in judicial review cases is likely to be more significant
in politicized judicial systems.  Thus, high court judges in the U.S. are more
likely to vote according to attitudinal preferences in judicial review cases
than are Canadian or Australian judges.
As shown in Chapter One, the United States is by far the most highly politicized high
court, while Australia is the second most politicized, and Canada is the least politicized of
all three courts.  Thus, if the theory is correct, we would expect to see that the independent
variable Judicial Ideology has negative coefficients that are significant for each of the three
high courts, and that the effect size is largest for the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by
smaller effect sizes for the Australian and Canadian high courts.  Again, it is expected that
this variable will have a negative coefficient, because the greater the degree of ideological
disagreement with a statute, the greater the likelihood of a vote to strike. 
Examining Tables 6.1 and 6.2 reveals just that.  For U.S. Supreme Court judges,
judicial ideology is significant at the 99% level.  For Australian high court judges, ideology
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is significant at the 95% level, and ideology is significant at the 90% level for Canadian
justices.  Table 6.2 provides estimates of the marginal effects of the independent variables
on the dependent variable (vote to strike) for each court.  The data in Table 6.2 show that
American high court judges are more influenced by ideology than either Canadian or
Australian justices–just as the theory predicted.  The marginal effect of judicial attitudes for
American judges is -.31 (standard error of .07) or -31%.  For Australian justices, the marginal
effect is -.18 (s.e.:  .09) or -18%.  For judges at the Supreme Court of Canada, the marginal
effect size is -.13 (s.e.: .07) or -13%.  These results show that, in judicial review cases,
judicial ideology is more than twice as influential for American than Canadian judges.
Australian high court judges are situated between the U.S. and Canada:  judicial attitudes
account for an estimated -18% effect size.  Thus, because of the significance of the attitudinal
variables in each case as well as the effect sizes, Hypothesis Four can be confirmed:
attitudinal voting is more likely to be observed in judicial review cases in highly politicized
high courts in modern democracies. 
Having established that attitudinal voting is more likely to be influential in highly
politicized judiciaries, the influence of legal variables can be examined.  Again, the theory
posits that legal factors are more likely to influence judicial decision-making in less
politicized high courts.  The first legal variable is the presence of a lower court dissenting
opinion, which can signal to the high court judges that there are multiple interpretations of
the constitutionality of a statute or that there may be a problem with the majority opinion’s
legal reasoning. So, it is expected that, in less politicized courts such as Canada and
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Australia, the presence of a lower court dissent would increase the likelihood of a vote for
judicial activism and a positive coefficient will be observed.   Hypothesis Five states more
formally, 
5H . In less politicized high courts, the presence of a lower court dissent will
increase the likelihood of a vote for the invalidation of a law.  In highly
politicized high courts, the presence of a lower court dissent will not result
in a greater tendency to vote for the nullification of a statute.
The data from Tables 6.1 and 6.2 partially confirm Hypothesis Five.  As predicted,
a lower court dissent was not significant in the American case, but was highly significant in
both Australia and Canada.  The data from Table 6.2 indicates that, in Australia, the presence
of a lower court dissent accounts for a .34 (s.e.: .10) or 34% marginal effect change in the
dependent variable.  This is a quite large effect size, and suggests that this legal factor is very
influential for judges at the High Court of Australia.  At the Canadian Supreme Court, lower
court dissent is significant, but the coefficient is in the opposite direction than predicted and
the effect size is small:  -.04 (s.e.: .01).  In other words, the presence of a lower court dissent
in Canada slightly decreases the likelihood of a vote to nullify a statute, contrary to the
judicial politicization thesis.  
The second jurisprudential variable is whether the lower court struck down the law
in question.  Again, it is expected that, in nonpoliticized high courts, a lower court
invalidation should increase the tendency to vote to strike down a challenged law, because
the fact that a lower court has reviewed the constitutionality of a statute and found a basis for
nullification should be persuasive for those judges who are influenced by jurisprudential
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considerations. Stated more formally, 
6H . In less politicized high courts, the fact that the lower court struck down
the challenged law will increase the likelihood of a vote for the invalidation
of the law.  In highly politicized high courts, the fact that the lower court
invalidated the challenged law will not result in a greater tendency to vote
to strike the law.
The data in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 partially confirm Hypothesis Six.  As predicted, this
variable is not significant for the U.S. high court but is highly significant for the Canadian
and Australia supreme courts.  In Canada, the presence of a lower court invalidation accounts
for a marginal effect size of .03 (s.e.: .01) or 3% change in the dependent variable.  So, this
is a fairly small effect but is in the predicted direction.  However, in Australia, the coefficient
is in the opposite direction than predicted and the effect size is large.  The presence of a
lower court nullification accounts for a -.27 (s.e.: .06) or -27% change in probability in the
dependent variable at the High Court of Australia. 
Overall, the two legal variables provide mixed support for the proposition that less
politicized high courts will have a greater likelihood to be influenced by legal factors in
judicial decision-making.  As predicted by the theory, neither legal variable was significant
for the U.S. Supreme Court.  Lower court dissent was highly significant in Australia and
lower court invalidation was significant in Canada.  But, lower court dissent had the opposite
effect in Canada (albeit with a small effect size) than predicted, while lower court
invalidation had the opposite effect at the Australian high court (and a large effect size).
Therefore, only qualified support for Hypotheses Five and Six can be given. These data
provide suggestive (but not definitive) evidence that legal factors predominate in judicial 
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Table 6.1
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, All Cases:  High Courts of United States, Canada, Australia
1990-1999
U.S. CANADA AUSTRALIA
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology -1.254*** -0.567* -0.761**
(0.28) (0.31) (0.39)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent -0.0610 -0.173*** 1.419***
(0.08) (0.042) (0.45)
Lower Court Invalidation -0.106 0.145** -1.370***
(0.17) (0.057) (0.39)
Control Variables
State/Province Law 0.803*** 0.252** -1.367***
(0.26) (0.11) (0.25)
SG/AG Supports Invalidation 0.155** -0.0833 0.504***
(0.073) (0.11) (0.16)
Saliency of Case -0.00589** 0.00438 -0.0276
(0.0027) (0.011) (0.034)
Government is Party 0.429** 0.231* -0.460***
(0.18) (0.12) (0.12)
Party Resource Disparity 0.0454  0.261*** -0.206***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.043)
Criminal Case -0.395* -0.903*** 0.834***
(0.24) (0.13) (0.26)
Civil Rights Case 0.529***   0.553*** 1.129***
(0.11) (0.16) (0.32)
Speech or Religion Case 1.032***   -0.0662 0.738**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.34)
Due Process Case 0.177 -1.454*** -0.393
(0.12) (0.25) (0.47)
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Table 6.1, Continued
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, All Cases:  High Courts of United States, Canada, Australia
1990-1999
U.S. CANADA AUSTRALIA
Economic Case 0.260  -0.133** 0.461**
(0.25) (0.057) (0.20)
Federalism Case 0.847*** 0.345 1.041***
(0.28) (0.50) (0.31)
Constant -1.234*** -1.909*** 0.963***
(0.18) (0.16) (0.32)
Predicted probability of activism: .426 .337 .381
Observations: 1343 1306 419
Number of groups: 12 14 12
p < .0000 .0000 .0000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.2
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, All Cases:  High Courts of United States,
Canada, Australia 1990-1999
U.S. CANADA AUSTRALIA
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology  -.31 -.13 -.18
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent -.01 -.04 .34
(0.02) (0.01) (0.10)
Lower Court Invalidation -.03 .03 -.27
(0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Control Variables
State/Province Law .19 .06 -.30
(0.06) (0.02) (0.05)
SG/AG Supports Invalidation .04 -.02 .12
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Saliency of Case -.00  .00 -.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Government is Party .11 .05 -.11
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Party Resource Disparity .01   .06 -.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Criminal Case -.09 -.19 .20
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06)
Civil Rights Case .13 .13 .27
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
Speech or Religion Case .25  -.01 .18
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08)
Due Process Case .04 -.32 -.09
(0.03) (0.05) (0.10)
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Table 6.2, Continued
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, All Cases:  High Courts of United States,
Canada, Australia 1990-1999
U.S. CANADA AUSTRALIA
Economic Case .06  -.03 .11
(0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
Federalism Case .21  .08 .25
(0.06) (0.12) (0.07)
Significant variables in bold
Standard errors in parentheses
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decision-making in the Canadian and Australian high courts. 
Control Variables
The model also includes six control variables; some of these yielded interesting
results.  First, the variable measuring case salience was not significant for the Canadian or
Australian high courts, but was significant at the 95% level for the American court.
However, the marginal effect for this variable was .00 for the U.S. Supreme Court; thus, the
effect of case salience on the decision to strike a law appears to be very low or nonexistent.
To review, case salience was operationalized by counting the total number of
interveners/amici in each case and multiplying that number by the total number of
nongovernmental interveners/amici.  So, this variable sought to measure cases containing
legal and political issues that would attract both governmental interveners (such as a
state/province attorney-general) and also private groups.  The assumption is that individual
cases attracting a significant amount of governmental and nongovernmental
interveners/amici (and corresponding legal briefs or appearances from these parties) will
signal the importance of the case to the justices.  Somewhat surprisingly, highly salient cases
were not influential in the decision to vote to strike down a law in any of the high courts.
Also somewhat surprising were the results for the variable measuring whether the
Solicitor General/Attorney General supports invalidation of the challenged law.  As
discussed in Chapter Three, there is a wealth of research indicating the U.S. Supreme Court
is strongly influenced by the position that the Solicitor General takes in a particular case.  It
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would be expected in all three countries that, when the Solicitor General (or Attorney
General in Canada) takes a position that a law should be overturned, the judges on the high
court would be more likely to vote to strike that statute.  This expectation was confirmed at
the U.S. and Australian high courts, but not the Canadian Supreme Court.  In Australia, the
fact that the Solicitor General supports legal nullification accounts for a marginal effect size
of .12 (s.e.: .04) or 12% increase in the probability of a vote to strike a law.  At the U.S.
Supreme Court, the marginal effect for the influence of the Solicitor General was only .04
(s.e.:  .02), much lower than in Australia.  In Canada, the influence of the Attorney General
was not significant.  Thus, it appears that justices at the High Court of Australia and Supreme
Court of the United States are moderately influenced by the positions taken by the Solicitor
General;  it is less clear why Canadian high court judges are not influenced by their Attorney
General in judicial review cases.
Next, the presence of a state/province or local law was included in each model as a
control variable.  In Chapter Five, the rates of activism for federal and state/province laws
were analyzed by use of a scatterplot and bivariate regression.  Here, the presence of a
state/province or local law is included in the multivariate model.  The data reveal that the
presence of a state/province or local law is highly significant in the United States and
Australia, and moderately significant in Canada.  However, the data show that the direction
for this variable differs for the high courts of Australia and the United States.  At the U.S.
Supreme Court, the presence of a state or local law increases the likelihood of a vote to strike
by an estimated .19 (s.e.: .06) or 19%.  But, at the High Court of Australia, the presence of
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a state or local law decreases the likelihood of a vote in favor of invalidation by an estimated
-.30 (s.e.: .05) or -30%.  Canada sits within these extremes, and a challenge to a province or
local law increases the marginal effect of a likelihood of a vote to strike by .06 (s.e.: .02).
These data indicate that, controlling for other variables, judges at the United States court are
far more likely to nullify state laws than justices at the High Court of Australia.  The results
for the U.S. high court are consistent with prior research, which has indicated that the Court
is far more likely to defer to the Congress than to state legislatures.  However, the data for
the Australian court reveal the opposite:  that the justices of that court are willing to give a
substantial amount of deference to state legislatures.  
 The next control variable is whether the national government is a direct party in the
case.  Across all systems it would be expected that a high court, acting strategically, would
be less likely to strike down a statute when the government is a party.  This variable is highly
significant for Australian court, moderately significant for the U.S. high court, and significant
at the 90% level for the Canadian judges.  However, the coefficients are in opposite
directions for the American and Australian cases.  At the High Court of Australia, the
presence of a governmental party decreases the likelihood of a vote to strike by a marginal
effect of  -.11 or -11% (s.e.: .03).  But, at the U.S. Supreme Court, the presence of a
governmental party increases the tendency for a vote to strike by 11% (.11, s.e.:  .04). 
A related control variable is party resource disparity.  This variable measures the
status of each litigant (such as individual in a civil case, business, state or provincial
government, etc.) and assigns a value to that status.  Higher values indicate parties with more
 Following the Spaeth (2001) coding, there were thirteen different issues areas:  criminal41
procedure, civil rights,  speech or religion, due process, privacy, attorneys, unions, economic activity,
judicial power, federalism, interstate/interprovince relations, taxation, miscellaneous.  However, not all of
these issues were included in the model because of collinearity issues.  
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resources at their disposal.  Then, the lower value is subtracted from the higher value to
indicate the disparity (if one exists) in resources between the parties.  For example, a case
pitting an individual in a civil case (value of 1) versus a state government (value of 7) would
yield a resource disparity score of 6.  So, higher numbers indicate larger litigant resource
disparities. 
The party resource disparity variable is highly significant for the high courts of
Canada and Australia, although the coefficients are in different directions.  In Canada, the
greater the disparity between the parties, the greater the likelihood of a vote to strike a law
(estimated marginal effect of .06, standard error of .01).  In Australia, litigant resource
disparity has the opposite effect:  a change in probability in the dependent variable of -.05
(s.e.: .01) or -05%.  Clearly, there is a different dynamic in the high courts of Canada and
Australia regarding party resource differential. 
Finally, the issue of the individual court case was included as a control variable.  This
variable was operationalized as a series of dummy variables so that the influence, if any, of
a particular case issue could be assessed comparatively.   There was only one issue area41
which was significant for each court and in the same direction:  civil rights.  A challenge to
a civil rights law tended to increase the likelihood of a vote to strike in each high court:  13%
(s.e.: .04) in Canada, 13% in the United States (s.e.: .03), and 27% (s.e.: .07) in Australia.
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This suggests that laws restricting civil rights are particularly salient to judges in each
system, and are particularly likely to be nullified. 
Similarities between the supreme courts of the U.S. and Australia are also present for
federalism and speech/religion cases.  Cases involving federalism issues were highly
significant for the high courts of the U.S. and Australia, and tended to increase the likelihood
of a vote to strike by an estimated 21% (s.e.: .06) and 25% (s.e.: .07), respectively.  Speech
and religion statutes were highly significant at the U.S. Supreme Court, but only moderately
significant at the High Court of Australia.  A speech or religion law tended to increase the
tendency to invalidate by an estimated marginal effect of 25% (s.e.: .03) in the U.S. high
court, and 18% (s.e.:  .08) at the Australian court.  
Economic laws were significant for the Canadian and Australian high court judges,
although in the opposite directions.  The marginal effect of an economic law was -.03 (s.e.:
.01) for the Canadian court, and .11 (s.e.: .05) for the Australian high court.  Due process
statutes were only significant at the Canadian Supreme Court.  Laws restricting due process
rights were highly significant in Canada, and decreased the likelihood of a vote to strike by
32% (s.e.: .05).  This result is surprising, given that the Canadian high court is dominated by
liberal justices.  However, this result is consistent with the criminal law issue variable, which
was  also highly significant in Canada, and resulted in an estimated 19% decrease in the
likelihood of a vote to overturn the challenged law (s.e.: .02).  
Taken together, the due process and criminal law issue variables suggest that the
Supreme Court of Canada, although dominated by liberal judges, is highly deferential to
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legislators when it comes to public order laws.  Conversely, the high courts of the United
States and Australia, both dominated by conservative judges, tend to be particularly
concerned by laws involving speech, religion, or federalism.  For the American case, this
analysis supports the interpretive work of Keck (2004).  
Comparing the Results in the Full and Reduced Datasets
The results in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 utilized the full database:  all nonunanimous and
unanimous judicial review cases are included.  As discussed above, the decision to aggregate
unanimous and nonunanimous decisions was made in order to provide the most rigorous test
of the theory, as well as provide the most accurate representation of real-world judicial
decision-making.  In other words, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, and deleting
unanimous cases from a particular database may distort reality.  However, in order to provide
a basis for comparison, Tables 6.3 through 6.8 analyze the model for each country in both
the full database (which combines all decisions, nonunanimous and unanimous) and the
reduced database (which includes only nonunanimous court cases).  Thus, the first column
in Tables 6.3 through 6.8 present the results of the analyses using only those cases where the
judges were split.  The logical extension of the judicial politicization theory would be that
the effect of judicial attitudes in highly politicized courts (such as the high courts of the U.S.
and Australia) should be even more pronounced when only nonunanimous cases are used in
the analyses.  The theoretical justification for this expectation is that unanimous cases often
do not present legal issues that are highly contentious or disputed.  Nonunanimous cases by
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Table 6.3
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and Combined Unanimous
and Nonunanimous Cases:  United States Supreme Court 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology -1.940*** -1.254***
(0.49) (0.28)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent 0.0457 -0.0610
(0.13) (0.08)
Lower Court Invalidation 0.0804 -0.106
(0.20) (0.17)
Control Variables
State Law  0.455 0.803***
(0.30) (0.26)
SG Supports Invalidation -0.0303 0.155**
(0.099) (0.073)
Saliency of Case 0.00368 -0.00589**
(0.004) (0.0027)
Government is Party 0.878*** 0.429**
(0.12) (0.18)
Party Resource Disparity -0.0239 0.0454
(0.035) (0.29)
Criminal Case -0.711** -0.395*
(0.28) (0.24)
Civil Rights Case 0.550***   0.529***
(0.14) (0.11)
Speech or Religion Case 0.353**   1.032***
(0.17) (0.11)
Due Process Case -0.0291 0.177
(0.12) (0.12)
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Table 6.3, Continued
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and Combined Unanimous
and Nonunanimous Cases:  United States Supreme Court 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Economic Case -0.284  0.260
(0.40) (0.25)
Federalism Case 0.185 0.847***
(0.38) (0.28)
Constant -0.729*** -1.234***
(0.25) (0.18)
Predicted probability of activism: .406 .426
Observations: 953 1343
Number of groups: 12 12
p < .0000 .0000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.4
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and
Combined Unanimous and Nonunanimous Cases:  United States Supreme Court 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology  -.47  -.31
(0.11) (0.07)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent  .01  -.01
(0.03) (0.02)
Lower Court Invalidation  .02 -.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Control Variables
State Law  .11 .19
(0.07) (0.06)
SG Supports Invalidation -.01 .04
(0.02) (0.02)
Saliency of Case  .00  -.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Government is Party .22 .11
(0.03) (0.04)
Party Resource Disparity -.01   .01
(0.01) (0.01)
Criminal Case -.16 -.09
(0.05) (0.05)
Civil Rights Case .14 .13
(0.03) (0.03)
Speech or Religion Case .09  .25
(0.04) (0.03)
Due Process Case -.01  .04
(0.03) (0.03)
172
Table 6.4, Continued
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and
Combined Unanimous and Nonunanimous Cases:  United States Supreme Court 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Economic Case -.07   .06
(0.1) (0.06)
Federalism Case .05 .21
(0.1) (0.06)
Significant variables in bold
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.5
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and Combined Unanimous
and Nonunanimous Cases:  High Court of Australia 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology -1.387** -0.761**
(0.62) (0.39)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent -0.265 1.419***
(1.19) (0.45)
Lower Court Invalidation -1.661* -1.370***
(1.00) (0.39)
Control Variables
State  Law 0.165 -1.367***
(1.14) (0.25)
SG Supports Invalidation 0.384 0.504***
(0.50) (0.16)
Saliency of Case -0.306** -0.0276
(0.15) (0.034)
Government is Party 1.319*** -0.460***
(0.44) (0.12)
Party Resource Disparity -0.115 -0.206***
(0.1) (0.043)
Criminal Case -1.772*** 0.834***
(0.65) (0.26)
Civil Rights Case -0.304   1.129***
(0.46) (0.32)
Speech or Religion Case -0.795   0.738**
(0.69) (0.34)
Due Process Case -0.170 -0.393
(0.69) (0.47)
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Table 6.5, Continued
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and Combined Unanimous
and Nonunanimous Cases:  High Court of Australia 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Economic Case 0.226 0.461**
(0.67) (0.20)
Federalism Case -1.076 1.041***
(0.81) (0.31)
Constant 0.568 0.963***
(0.53) (0.32)
Predicted probability of activism: .458 .381
Observations: 210 419
Number of groups: 12 12
p < .0000 .0000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.6
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and
Combined Unanimous and Nonunanimous Cases: High Court of Australia 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology  -.34  -.18
(0.16) (0.09)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent  -.06   .34
(0.29) (0.1)
Lower Court Invalidation  -.33  -.27
(0.14) (0.06)
Control Variables
State Law .04 -.30
(0.28) (0.05)
SG Supports Invalidation  .10  .12
(0.13) (0.04)
Saliency of Case  -.08 -.01
(0.04) (0.01)
Government is Party .32 -.11
(0.1) (0.03)
Party Resource Disparity  -.03  -.05
(0.02) (0.01)
Criminal Case -.36  .20
(0.09) (0.06)
Civil Rights Case -.07  .27
(0.11) (0.07)
Speech or Religion Case -.19  .18
(0.14) (0.08)
Due Process Case -.04  -.09
(0.17) (0.10)
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Table 6.6, Continued
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and
Combined Unanimous and Nonunanimous Cases: High Court of Australia 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Economic Case  .06   .11
(0.17) (0.05)
Federalism Case -.25  .25
(0.16) (0.07)
Significant variables in bold
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.7
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and Combined Unanimous
and Nonunanimous Cases: Supreme Court of Canada 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology -0.230 -0.567*
(0.53) (0.31)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent -0.138 -0.173***
(0.16) (0.042)
Lower Court Invalidation 0.0856 0.145**
(0.084) (0.057)
Control Variables
Province Law 0.0373 0.252**
(0.19) (0.11)
AG Supports Invalidation 0.0834 -0.0833
(0.18) (0.11)
Saliency of Case -0.00863 0.00438
(0.013) (0.011)
Government is Party 0.487* 0.231*
(0.25) (0.12)
Party Resource Disparity 0.0558 0.261***
(0.041) (0.029)
Criminal Case -0.255 -0.903***
(0.25) (0.13)
Civil Rights Case 0.0898   0.553***
(0.25) (0.16)
Speech or Religion Case -0.438**  -0.0662
(0.19) (0.11)
Due Process Case -0.381 -1.454***
(0.4) (0.25)
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Table 6.7, Continued
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and Combined Unanimous
and Nonunanimous Cases: Supreme Court of Canada 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Economic Case -0.702*  -0.133**
(0.42) (0.057)
Federalism Case 0.0667 0.345
(0.74) (0.50)
Constant -0.521 -1.909***
(0.34) (0.16)
Predicted probability of activism: .448 .337
Observations: 566 1306
Number of groups: 14 14
p < .0000 .0000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.8
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and
Combined Unanimous and Nonunanimous Cases: Supreme Court of Canada 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Attitudinal Variable
Judicial Ideology  -.06  -.13
(0.13) (0.07)
Legal Variables
Lower Court Dissent  -.03  -.04
(0.04) (0.01)
Lower Court Invalidation  .02  .03
(0.02) (0.01)
Control Variables
Province Law .01 .06
(0.05) (0.02)
AG Supports Invalidation  .02 -.02
(0.04) (0.03)
Saliency of Case  -.00   .00
(0.00) (0.00)
Government is Party .12  .05
(0.06) (0.03)
Party Resource Disparity  .01   .06
(0.01) (0.01)
Criminal Case -.06  -.19
(0.06) (0.02)
Civil Rights Case .02 .13
(0.06) (0.04)
Speech or Religion Case -.11  -.01
(0.05) (0.03)
Due Process Case -.09  -.32
(0.09) (0.05)
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Table 6.8, Continued
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Comparing Nonunanimous Cases and
Combined Unanimous and Nonunanimous Cases: Supreme Court of Canada 1990-1999
Nonunanimous Combined Unanimous
Cases and Nonunanimous Cases
Economic Case -.16   -.03
(0.09) (0.01)
Federalism Case .02 .08
(0.19) (0.12)
Significant variables in bold
Standard errors in parentheses
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definition are a result of dissensus, and therefore the influence of judicial ideology should
be more apparent in a highly politicized court, where judicial attitudes are more likely to be
critical. 
Comparing the Results in the Full and Reduced Databases for the U.S. Supreme Court
The expectation that, in the reduced database containing nonunanimous cases only,
judicial attitudes will have greater influence on the dependent variable is clearly evident at
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Judicial ideology remains highly significant in both the full and
reduced databases; however, the difference in the marginal effect (shown in Table 6.4) is
striking.  In the combined database, the marginal effect of judicial attitudes is -.31 (or -31%)
with a standard error of .07; when only nonunanimous cases are included in the analysis, the
marginal effect increases to -.47 (or -47%) with a standard error of .11.  Put another way, for
nonunanimous cases, the influence of judicial ideology in the decision to nullify a law can
account for nearly half of the variance, controlling for all other factors.  Thus, the results of
the analysis using only nonunanimous cases at the American high court provides strong
support for the judicial politicization theory.  
The influence of the legal variables (presence of a lower court split and lower court
invalidation of the challenged law) did not differ when only nonunanimous cases were
analyzed–both variables failed to reach statistical significance in both the reduced and full
models.  Again, this result is logically consistent with the judicial politicization thesis, as the
influence of jurisprudential factors is expected to be less substantial in highly politicized high
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courts.  
Interestingly, the data in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that several of the control variables
in the American case did change in significance when only nonunanimous cases were
analyzed.  Most dramatically, cases involving a federalism issue did not reach statistically
significant levels when only nonunanimous cases are used to estimate the model.  For the full
database, the marginal effect for federalism cases had been fairly high (.21, s.e. of .06), but
decreases to .05 (s.e.: .1) when the reduced data set is utilized.  This result is puzzling,
because federalism issues have comprised some of the most contentious cases in the
Rehnquist Court (Keck 2004).  Thus, it would be expected that this variable’s estimated
marginal effect size would increase when the reduced database is used.  
 These (previously significant) independent variables also failed to reach significance
levels when the reduced database was used:  presence of a challenged state or local law;
support by the Solicitor General for nullification; and saliency of the case.  Of these,
state/local law had the most sizable change.  Using the full database, the marginal effect for
this variable had been .19 (s.e.: .06); when only nonunanimous cases are used, the variable
fails to reach significance and the marginal effect lowers to .11 (s.e.:  .07).  Again, it is
difficult to explain why the presence of a state or local law would not achieve statistically
significant levels when only nonunanimous cases are used.  State laws provided some of the
most controversial legal issues in the 1990s in the U.S., thus it would be expected that this
variable would have a fairly large marginal effect for nonunanimous case analysis.  
The marginal effect for the variable representing Solicitor General support for
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invalidation reduced to -.01 (s.e.: .02) in the reduced model from .04 (s.e.: .02), and the
marginal effect for case saliency did not change at all, although its significance level did
shift.  
Although the influence of some independent control variables did change when the
reduced database was used for the analysis for the U.S. high court, the jurisprudential and
attitudinal variables did not vary in such a way so as to cast doubt on the primary conclusions
of the judicial politicization theory.  Indeed, the influence of judicial ideology increased in
the reduced model, providing greater support for the theory.  In the sections below, the
results for the reduced and full databases are compared for the high courts of Australia and
Canada. 
Comparing the Results in the Full and Reduced Databases for the High Court of Australia
Comparing the full and reduced databases for the Australian High Court reveals that,
like the U.S. Supreme Court, the influence of judicial attitudes substantially increases when
only nonunanimous cases are used in the analysis.  The variable remains significant at the
95% level, but the marginal effect of judicial ideology increases from -.18 or -18% (s.e.: .09)
to -.34 or -34% (s.e.: .16).  In other words, the influence of judicial ideology on the decision
whether or not to strike a law nearly doubles in nonunanimous cases.  This increase is
consistent with the judicial politicization theory, which holds that the effect of judicial
attitudes should be more influential in nonunanimous cases, which typically present divisive
legal issues.  
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Examining the jurisprudential variables in the full and reduced databases shows a
substantial shift for the variable indicating the presence of a lower court dissenting vote.
This variable, which is highly significant in the full database, fails to reach statistical
significance in the reduced database, and the sign of the coefficient goes from positive to
negative.  Furthermore, the marginal effect of the variable changes from .34 (s.e.: .1) to -.06
(s.e.: .29).  The judicial politicization thesis predicts that, in less politicized high courts, the
presence of a lower court dissent should increase the likelihood of a vote to invalidate a law.
In the full database for the Australia court, this prediction is borne out.  However, when only
nonunanimous cases are included in the analysis, the data do not support the theoretical
expectation.  This result may suggest that jurisprudential effects are more likely to be
observed in unanimous cases.  This expectation is discussed in more detail below.  
Many of the control variables also displayed appreciable changes when the reduced
database was utilized.  The largest change involved the variable indicating whether a state
or local law was challenged.  This variable was highly significant when the full database was
used; however, it failed to reach significance levels when only nonunanimous cases were
analyzed.  Similarly, the previously significant variables for Solicitor General support for
nullification and party resource disparity also failed to reach significant levels.  However, of
these three variables, the state/local law variable exhibited the largest shift in marginal effect:
for the full database, the variable possessed an estimated marginal effect of -.30 (s.e.: .05)
but only a marginal effect of .04 (s.e.: .28) for the reduced database.  Thus, not only did the
state/local case variable exhibit a large change in marginal effect, but the sign of the
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coefficient also changed.  These changes seem to indicate that, in less contentious unanimous
cases, the High Court justices are far less likely to strike down state laws.  However, when
deciding the more controversial nonunanimous cases, the judges lose their deference to state
legislators and are more willing to nullify state and local laws. 
The variable noting whether the national government is a party also displayed a large
increase in estimated marginal effect (although the variable remains significant for both
databases).  When the full database is used, the marginal effect for this variable is -.11 (s.e.:
.03).  But, when only nonunanimous cases are used, the marginal effect size increases to .32
or 32% (s.e.: .1).  Again, this seems to indicate that, in less controversial unanimous cases,
the justices are less likely to strike down a statute when the government is a litigant.
However, in more controversial nonunanimous cases, the judges lose their reticence about
invalidating a law when the federal government is a party.  
Finally, there was a substantial change in the control variables that denote the legal
issue under consideration.  Four issue variables (civil rights, speech or religion, economic,
federalism) displayed a loss of statistical significance in the reduced database, and the
criminal case variable exhibited a change in the sign of the coefficient and a large shift in the
marginal effect.  The changes in the legal issue variables suggests that there is a different
dynamic in judicial decision-making when unanimous and nonunanimous cases are
adjudicated at the High Court.  
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Comparing the Results in the Full and Reduced Databases for the Supreme Court of Canada
The results for the full and reduced databases for the Canadian high court differed
substantially, suggesting that judicial decision-making at a less politicized high court may
vary depending upon the type of case being decided by the court.  The variable measuring
judicial ideology was significant at the 90% level with a marginal effect of -.13 or -13% (s.e.:
.07) when unanimous and nonunanimous cases are combined.  However, the variable fails
to reach statistical significance and the marginal effect drops to -.06 or -6% (s.e.: .13) when
only unanimous cases are analyzed.  This result reinforces the conclusion that judicial
attitudes are less influential in judicial decision-making in less politicized high courts. 
The two legal variables (lower court dissent and lower court nullification), both
significant in the full database, are not significant when the reduced database is used.
However, the marginal effect for each variable declines only slightly when only
nonunanimous cases are analyzed.  Also, the variable denoting whether a provincial or local
law is being challenged also loses significance, as does the party resource disparity variable.
In addition, the marginal effect for the variable indicating a governmental litigant increases
from .05 (s.e.: .03) to .12 (s.e.: .06).  
Finally, nearly all of the dummy variables representing the issue area of the case
significantly varied when the reduced database was used to estimate the model.  The
(previously significant) variables indicating a criminal case, civil rights case, or due process
case all failed to reach statistically significant levels when nonunanimous cases are used.
However, the variable indicating a speech or religion case gained significance, and had a
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marginal effect size of -.11 (s.e.: .05).  Also, the variable for an economic case was slightly
less significant in the reduced database, but the estimated marginal effect increased to -.16
(s.e.: .09). 
Overall, the results for the Supreme Court of Canada when only nonunanimous cases
are used underscore the differences in judicial decision-making between a highly politicized
court and a less politicized one.  The results of the reduced database analysis both support
and undermine the judicial politicization thesis advanced in this project.  The influence of
judicial attitudes in nonunanimous cases is far less than in the U.S. and Australian high
courts, as predicted; paradoxically, the legal variables also lose significance in the reduced
database.  
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Table 6.9
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Unanimous Cases Only, Pooled Model:  1990-1999
Interacted Legal Variables
US*Lower Court Dissent 0.536**
(0.24)
Canada*Lower Court Dissent -0.168
(0.11)
Australia*Lower Court Dissent 2.365***
(0.88)
US*Lower Court Invalidation -0.944***
(0.12)
Canada*Lower Court Invalidation 0.0234
(0.076)
Australia*Lower Court Invalidation -0.388*
(0.24)
Pooled Control Variables
State/Province Law 0.432
(0.36)
SG/AG Supports Invalidation 0.701**
(0.28)
Saliency of Case 0.000616
(0.014)
Government is Party -0.0821
(0.34)
Party Resource Disparity 0.177
(0.21)
Criminal Case -0.549
(0.48)
Civil Rights Case 1.140***
(0.18)
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Table 6.9, Continued
Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Unanimous Cases Only, Pooled Model:  1990-1999
Speech or Religion Case 1.241**
(0.5)
Due Process Case -2.041
(1.87)
Economic Case  0.0279
(0.11)
Federalism Case 1.668***
(0.042)
Constant -1.600
(0.99)
Predicted probability of activism: .307
Observations: 174
Number of groups: 3
p < .276
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
Unit of analysis is the case, not individual judge vote
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Table 6.10
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Unanimous Cases Only, Pooled Model:  1990-
1999
Interacted Legal Variables
US*Lower Court Dissent 0.12
(0.05)
Canada*Lower Court Dissent -0.04
(0.03)
Australia*Lower Court Dissent 0.52
(0.15)
US*Lower Court Invalidation -0.17
(0.04)
Canada*Lower Court Invalidation 0.00
(0.02)
Australia*Lower Court Invalidation -0.08
(0.05)
Pooled Control Variables
State/Province Law 0.09
(0.09)
SG/AG Supports Invalidation 0.15
(0.07)
Saliency of Case 0.00
(0.00)
Government is Party -0.02
(0.07)
Party Resource Disparity 0.04
(0.05)
Criminal Case -0.11
(0.09)
Civil Rights Case 0.27
(0.03)
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Table 6.10, Continued
Marginal Effects, Support for Vote to Invalidate Law, Unanimous Cases Only, Pooled Model:  1990-
1999
Speech or Religion Case 0.29
(0.13)
Due Process Case -0.43
(0.35)
Economic Case  0.01
(0.02)
Federalism Case 0.39
(0.01)
Significant variables in bold
Standard errors in parentheses 
Unit of analysis is the case, not individual judge vote
 Because the unit of analysis is the court case, it was necessary to pool each country’s cases in42
order to gain a large enough sample to analyze.  To discern the influence of the law in each supreme  court,
a dummy variable for each high court was created and then interaction variables were created for each court
and each of the two legal variables.
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Examining the Influence of the Law in Unanimous Cases
In this section, the influence of the legal variables is analyzed for each high court by
using unanimous cases only.  By analyzing unanimous cases exclusively, the influence of the
law on the decision-making process in comparative perspective may be examined in greater
detail.  However, the full model–incorporating both judicial ideology and legal
variables–cannot be tested using only unanimous cases.  Because the dependent variable–the
vote to strike or uphold a statute–does not vary in a unanimous case, individual-judge-level
variables cannot be used, because the unit of analysis for unanimous cases is the individual
court case, not the individual judge vote.  Therefore, judicial attitudes are not used in this
analysis:  only case-level independent variables are included in the model for unanimous
cases.   42
While it is common to empirically analyze exclusively nonunanimous cases, it is
quite  rare to analyze judicial decision-making using only unanimous cases.  Indeed, only a
handful of scholars have examined judicial decision-making by analyzing unanimous cases
exclusively (see, e.g., Kaminski and Shaffer 2005; Nicoll 2006).  The justification usually
provided for excluding unanimous decisions is that some court cases are so overwhelmingly
slanted to a particular result that there is nothing to be gained by analyzing these unanimous
decisions.  I submit that this rationale is not always correct, because a case that is accepted
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by a high court possessing discretionary jurisdiction (as do each of the courts in this study)
almost certainly is contestable on various levels.  It is highly likely that a particular case that
truly is not subject to multiple outcomes would be screened out at a lower court level and fail
to be accepted by the high court.  Thus, there is a theoretical justification to study judicial
decision-making in unanimous cases. 
There are several objectives and expectations for the analyses below.  By examining
a variant of the model using unanimous cases only, the influence of the legal model in each
high court may be better observed.  The theory propounded in this project holds that less
politicized courts (such as the Canadian high court) are more likely to be influenced by legal
and jurisprudential variables.  However, legal factors also play a role (albeit smaller) in
highly politicized courts.  Unanimous cases may indicate that no significant ideological clash
is present between the factions of the high court, as evidenced by the complete consensus on
the decision on the merits.  If indeed legal factors play a role in highly politicized courts, then
the effect of these legal variables should be better detected by analyzing judicial decision-
making in unanimous cases.  Stated another way, if the legal model plays a role at the United
States Supreme Court, the most highly politicized court in this project, then that influence
should be observed in the analysis of unanimous decisions. 
Results of the Unanimous Case Analysis
The results of the pooled unanimous case analysis suggest that, even in highly
politicized supreme courts, legal factors retain significant importance in judicial decision-
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making under certain circumstances.  Indeed, the results in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 provide some
support for the proposition that Kritzer, Pickerill, and Richards (1998) proffered:  that the
legal model remains influential at the U.S. Supreme Court in certain cases.  
The two interacted legal variables were both significant for the U.S. Supreme Court,
although only lower court dissent is in the expected direction.  The fact of a lower court
dissent is moderately significant and has an estimated marginal effect size of .12 or 12%
(s.e.: .05).  The presence of a lower court invalidation is highly significant and has an
estimated marginal effect of -.17 or -17% (s.e.: .04).  It is important to reiterate that neither
of the legal variables were significant in either the full or reduced database analyses above;
it is only in the unanimous case database that these variables achieve significance and
influence judicial decision-making.  Thus, the implication of these results is that
jurisprudential factors are apparently relevant in judicial decision-making in unanimous
cases, which presumably present less controversial issues than those court cases triggering
dissensus.  
Turning to the data for Australia, the presence of a lower court dissent is highly
significant and has a very large marginal effect size of .52 or 52% (s.e.: .15), indicating that
the high court judges are significantly influenced by the presence of lower court legal
dissensus.  The fact that the lower court struck down the challenged law is significant at the
90% level, and is again in the opposite direction than predicted.  Here, the estimated effect
size is-.08 or -8% (s.e.: .05).  Thus, just as in the American case, judicial decision-making
in unanimous cases indicates that legal model has an appreciable effect upon the judges in
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certain circumstances.
Analyzing the data for unanimous cases in Canada shows that a very different
dynamic is at work as compared with the high courts of the United States and Australia.  In
the full database, the legal variables were highly significant for the Canadian high court
judges.  However, disaggregating the nonunanimous and unanimous cases completely
reduces the significance of both of the legal variables.  These puzzling results are difficult
to interpret.  The best explanation may be that, as a relatively nonpoliticized court, case-
based legal and jurisprudential factors that are not specified in the model are strongly
influencing judicial decision-making.  Thus, a more highly specified model containing
additional fact-based variables may yield more definitive results.  
Overall, the results for unanimous case analysis in the pooled analysis yields
suggestive evidence that, even in a highly politicized high court, the law can influence
judicial decision-making in certain cases.  For the U.S. Supreme Court, the two variables
measuring the influence of the law were not significant when either the full (unanimous and
nonunanimous cases combined) database or reduced (nonunanimous cases only) were used,
but these variables were highly significant and had a sizable effect size when only unanimous
cases were analyzed.  Thus, these findings confirm previous research suggesting that both
the attitudinal and legal model are relevant at the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Conclusion
The strongest finding from this study as a whole is that attitudinal voting is present
 Additionally, the Smyth (2005) article varied from the present study in that Smyth sought to43
explain dissent rates, not decisions on the merits.
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in the high courts of the United States, Australia, and Canada.  Furthermore, recall that the
analyses herein utilized all judicial review cases from 1990 to 1999–there was no attempt to
delete certain cases based upon the issue of the case nor were unanimous cases deleted from
the analyses.  In other words, rather than just examine the effect of attitudinal voting in, say,
civil rights cases, this study combined cases from a variety of issue areas and included both
nonunanimous and unanimous cases in the analysis.  Thus, the fact that attitudinal voting was
found to be present in each court despite the rigorous analytical conditions is a significant
finding.  
Although the presence of attitudinal voting has been well documented at the U.S.
Supreme Court, other scholars have found that attitudinal voting is only likely to be observed
in certain issue areas, such as civil liberties cases (Epstein and Mershon 1996) and in
nonunanimous cases.  So, the strong presence of ideological voting at the U.S. Supreme
Court in a variety of issue areas and in combined unanimous and nonunanimous cases is a
significant addition to the literature regarding the American high court.
The finding of attitudinal voting at the High Court of Australia is the first result of
this kind.  To date, there has been only one attempt to measure attitudinal voting at the High
Court (Smyth 2005),  and that study used political party as a proxy for judicial preferences,43
rather than develop a set of judicial attitudes in the manner of the Segal and Cover standard
(1989).  The present study is the first to introduce original judicial ideology scores, test those
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scores, and observe that ideological voting plays a significant role at the High Court of
Australia in judicial review cases.  
This study is also the first to test attitudinal voting in exclusively judicial review
cases at the Supreme Court of Canada.  There have been several previous studies that tested
the attitudinal model in specific types of cases at the Canadian high court:  Ostberg and
Wetstein (2004b)  found that there is a strong tendency towards ideological voting in equality
cases,  Ostberg and Wetstein (2004) found strong attitudinal voting in economic cases, and
Songer and Johnson (2002) and Ostberg et al. (2002) found a significant likelihood for
judges to vote their attitudes in nonunanimous cases.  In contrast, this study finds a
significantly weaker influence for attitudinal voting at the Canadian Supreme Court when
all cases–varying issue areas and unanimous and nonunanimous results–are examined.  So,
the results from this study indicate that the conventional wisdom on attitudinal voting at the
Canadian high court may have to be somewhat revised.  Based on the results herein, the
judges at the Canadian Supreme Court do not appear to be as driven by ideology as the high
court judges from Australia or the United States, at least in judicial review cases. 
The comparative analyses of attitudinal voting for judges at the supreme courts in this
study reveals that ideology plays the largest role at the U.S. high court, with an estimated
marginal effect size of -31%, followed by the Australian supreme court, with an effect size
of -18%, and then the Canadian high court, with an estimated effect size of -13%.  Taken by
themselves, the Canadian and Australian results are surprising, because most comparative
courts researchers would likely have predicted that the Supreme Court of Canada would be
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most similar to the American high court.  However, these results strongly support the central
contention of the judicial politicization thesis, which posits that the greater the politicization
of the court, the more likely those judges will tend to vote ideologically.  Thus, the core
element of the theory proposed in this study is strongly supported by the data from the high
courts of the U.S., Canada and Australia.  Further research into additional high courts in
established democracies will reveal whether the theory can be extended even further.  As it
stands, the judicial politicization thesis has hopefully extended our knowledge of judicial
decision-making in comparative context.  This project  is one of the first attempts to provide
both theoretical and empirical analysis of the questions as yet ignored by comparative courts
researchers: does attitudinal voting vary between high courts of different countries, and if so,
why?  Certainly, more research should follow, but it is hoped that the foundation for a
general theory of judicial decision-making across nations has been laid. 
The second element of the judicial politicization theory–that legal factors will tend
to be more influential for judges in less politicized courts–received mixed support.  As
predicted, the legal variables were not significant at the U.S. high court but did reach
significant levels in the Canadian and Australian cases.  However, the lower court dissent
variable was in the opposite direction than expected in Canada, and the lower court
invalidation variable in Australia was in the opposite direction than predicted.  Thus, full
confirmation of the second component of the judicial politicization theory awaits further
research.  It appears that the legal model is influential in the less politicized high courts in
this study; however, it may be that the model is under-specified and requires further fact-
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based legal variables to be developed and operationalized.  So, the research in this
dissertation has hopefully indicated a direction for future scholars to explore.  
Finally, the control variables included in the model provide a number of interesting
insights into comparative judicial decision-making and suggest additional avenues for further
research.  The data show that the influence of the national Solicitor General or Attorney
General in judicial review cases was not significant at the high court of Canada.  These
results are somewhat surprising in light of the extensive research indicating the influence of
the Solicitor General in the United States.  Similarly, the fact that the litigant resource
differential variable was significant only in the high courts of Canada and Australia (and in
opposite directions for those courts) is surprising in light of the body of research exploring
Galanter’s (1974) thesis regarding the likelihood of repeat players to prevail in litigation.
Case salience was only significant at the U.S. court, indicating that the influence of amici
may not be as important outside of the American context.  Also, the variable indicating
whether the national government was a litigant was significant at each high court, but the
coefficient was in a negative direction (as expected) only at the Australian supreme court.
As noted above, it would be expected that judges acting strategically would be less likely to
invalidate a law when the national government is a party; it is surprising that only Australian
high court judges were influenced in this manner. Finally, it is interesting that, among all of
the case issues areas included in the model, only civil rights cases were highly significant and
in the same direction across all three courts.  Apparently, only this issue unifies high court
judges across systems. 
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In summary, the results for the full model herein can be viewed with confidence
because of the rigorous design of the model.  All cases issues were included in each court’s
analysis, as well as nonunanimous and unanimous case decisions.  In other words, the
judicial politicization thesis was tested cross-nationally in the most stringent conditions
possible, and the results have strongly supported the primary element of the theory and
partially supported the secondary contention.  The limitations of the theory and the
possibility of alternative explanations for the data are explored in the Conclusion.  
However, the analysis is extended in the second section of this chapter by analyzing
the data for each high court by nonunanimous and unanimous cases.  As expected, when only
nonunanimous decisions on the merits are included in the analysis, the marginal effect size
for attitudinal voting significantly increases for the U.S. and Australian high courts.
Puzzlingly, at the Canadian high court, the effect size for the attitudinal variable does not
increase and loses significance when only nonunanimous cases are analyzed. 
Analyzing the reduced model (using the court case as the unit of analysis) in each of
the high courts using only unanimous cases reveals that, for the U.S. and Australian high
court judges, the legal variables reach significant levels in these courts, suggesting that the
law remains highly relevant in judicial decision-making in certain circumstances in these
courts.  Thus, the results for the analyses of these legal variables illustrate the principle that,
even in highly politicized supreme courts, legal factors can retain significant importance in
judicial decision-making for some issues and in some cases.  This analysis reinforces the
views of those scholars who have argued that the law is an important factor in judicial
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decision-making, and that judicial attitudes and preferences are not always determinative.
To be sure, there is more to this story, as the data for the Supreme Court of Canada
reveal the exact opposite effect for legal variables when only unanimous cases are analyzed.
This suggests that judicial behavior in less politicized courts may be governed by a different
dynamic; therefore, further research is called for to untangle the combined effect of legal and
ideological variables in less politicized high courts.  
In conclusion, the results in this chapter have presented striking (and sometimes
surprising) evidence supporting the judicial politicization theory.  The implications of the
theory are explored in greater detail in the Conclusion. 
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Chapter Seven:  Conclusion
This concluding chapter will provide a brief overview of the project, including a
review of the theory and findings of this dissertation.  Next, the limitations of the project are
discussed, as well as avenues for future research.  Finally, the relevance and broader
implications of this research are considered.  
Summary of the Project
In the last decade, scholarly interest in comparative judicial systems has dramatically
increased.  A number of single-country studies have appeared, but cross-national empirical
judicial research remains rare.  This dissertation has sought to partially remedy that
deficiency by analyzing two important and related concepts cross-nationally:  judicial
decision-making and judicial activism.  A new general theory of cross-national judicial
decision-making in established democracies–the judicial politicization thesis--was introduced
and tested in newly collected data from the supreme courts of the United States, Canada, and
Australia. 
In Chapter Three, the existing research on judicial decision-making and judicial
activism was extensively reviewed, with the aim of identifying the questions yet to be
answered.  To briefly review, the prevalent theory of judicial decision-making is the
attitudinal model, which posits that high court judges make decisions in cases based upon
their own ideological preferences.  The attitudinal model can be contrasted with the opposing
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theory, the legal model, which holds that judges are most influenced by legal doctrine and
precedent in judicial decision-making.  The attitudinal and legal models have been
extensively tested in the United States, and several recent studies have also tested the
attitudinal model in Canada in certain types of cases.  However, there has been no study
which measures the effects of the attitudinal and legal models cross-nationally, and across
a wide variety of case issue areas.  Furthermore, there has been virtually no theoretical work
conducted on the question of why the attitudinal and legal models may vary in different
nations’ highest courts.  Finally, there has been no research analyzing judicial decision-
making in unanimous cases in comparative context. 
The theoretical framework introduced in this study–the judicial politicization theory--
posits that judges at a highly politicized high court in an established democracy are more
likely to decide cases according to ideological/attitudinal factors, and will correspondingly
be more likely to engage in judicial activism and strike down acts of the legislature.
Conversely, judges at a high court that is less politicized will be more likely to decide cases
based upon legal factors, and will be less likely to invalidate laws enacted by the political
branch.  In other words, the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making will predominate
in politicized judiciaries, while the legal model will be more likely to prevail in less
politicized courts. 
Based on this theory, six testable hypotheses, listed below, were proposed.  Each
hypothesis was confirmed, with the exception of Hypotheses Five and Six, which were only
partially confirmed. 
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1H :  The rate of judicial activism will tend to be greater in highly politicized judicial
systems.  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court will be more likely to invalidate laws than the high
courts of Canada or Australia.
2H : Judges on a highly politicized high court will be more likely to strike down
ideologically incongruent laws.  Thus, conservative judges on the U.S. Supreme Court will
be more likely to invalidate liberal laws while liberal judges will be more likely to nullify
conservative laws, but judges at the high courts of Canada and Australia will be less likely
to nullify incongruent statutes. 
3H . Judges on a highly politicized high court will be more likely to vote in federalism
cases according to ideological factors.  Thus, conservative judges on the U.S. Supreme Court
will be more likely to invalidate federal laws while liberal judges will be more likely to
nullify state laws.  Because judges at the high courts of Canada and Australia are less likely
to vote according to attitudinal factors, conservative judges will not tend to vote to strike
down federal laws and liberal judges will not tend to vote to invalidate state/province laws.
4H . Attitudinal voting in judicial review cases is likely to be more significant in
politicized judicial systems.  Thus, high court judges in the U.S. are more likely to vote
according to attitudinal preferences in judicial review cases than are Canadian or
Australian judges.
5H . In less politicized high courts, the presence of a lower court dissent will increase
the likelihood of a vote for the invalidation of a law.  In highly politicized high courts, the
presence of a lower court dissent will not result in a greater tendency to vote for the
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nullification of a statute.
6H . In less politicized high courts, the fact that the lower court struck down the
challenged law will increase the likelihood of a vote for the invalidation of the law.  In highly
politicized high courts, the fact that the lower court invalidated the challenged law will not
result in a greater tendency to vote to strike the law.
Assessing Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective
The first finding of this project is that, as predicted, judges at the U.S. Supreme Court
in the 1990s were more likely to engage in judicial activism than were judges at the high
courts of Canada or Australia. From a descriptive level alone, this is a significant result,
because there has not been any comparative examination of these three courts and their
respective rates of judicial activism.  We now know that the U.S. Supreme Court is by far
the most activist court of the three courts in this study.  Intriguingly, when measured on a
percentage basis, the high courts of Canada and Australia have very nearly the same activism
rate.  Related to this, the trend rate for judicial activism, measured in percentage, shows that
the High Court of Australia experienced a steep increase in activism in the early 1990s, but
then the activism rate declined.  This result comports with the analysis of Pierce (2006).  
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada had a fairly even rate of activism early in the
decade, but then experienced an increase near the end of the decade.  The U.S. Supreme
Court experienced some fluctuations in the activism rate throughout the decade, but overall
the rate of judicial activism increased.  
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Examining judicial activism at the level of the individual judge reveals that American
high court justices were more likely to strike down ideologically incongruent statutes.  That
is, at the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1990s (which is, again, the most politicized court in this
study), the conservative judges were more likely to strike down liberal laws, and liberal
judges were more likely to strike down laws that are conservative in direction.  However, the
pattern was not fully replicated at the Supreme Court of Canada (the least politicized high
court):  the liberal justices were indeed more likely to strike down conservative laws, but the
conservative judges were not more likely to invalidate liberal laws.  At the High Court of
Australia (a moderately politicized court), the American pattern was observed, but it was not
as pronounced.  Thus, the most conservative Australian justices were more likely to nullify
liberal laws, while the more liberal judges (with several exceptions) were generally more
likely to strike down conservative laws.  
Thus, both Hypothesis One and Hypothesis Two are confirmed, and the results
provide strong support for the judicial politicization theory.  The judges at the highly
politicized U.S. Supreme Court were more likely to engage in judicial activism in the 1990s
than were judges at the high courts of Canada or Australia; additionally, American supreme
court justices were more likely to nullify ideologically incongruent statutes. 
Turning to judicial activism and federalism, the results in Chapter Five showed that,
as predicted by the judicial politicization theory, the judges at the U.S. Supreme Court were
much more likely to exhibit voting patterns that are consistent with their attitudes and
ideology: in the 1990s, conservative judges were more likely to strike down national laws
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and liberal justices were more likely to nullify state and local laws.  Thus, this research
confirmed the results in the recent study by Solberg and Lindquist (2006).  
However, the judges at the far less politicized high courts of Canada and Australia
did not exhibit the same ideological voting tendencies.  The scatterplots for the Canadian and
Australian high courts indicated relatively flat slopes and r-squared statistics that were quite
low.  Indeed, the slope for invalidation of federal laws in Canada was in the opposite
direction that would be expected by a conventional understanding of judicial politics.  That
is, at the Canadian Supreme Court, the likelihood of invalidating national laws increases
with judicial liberalism, which is the reverse of the pattern at the American high court.  This
suggests that non-ideological factors are influential at the supreme courts of Canada and
Australia.  Thus, Hypothesis Three was confirmed. 
Assessing Judicial Decision-Making in Comparative Perspective
In Chapter Six, generalized estimating equation models and multivariate logistic
regression analyses were used to examine judicial decision-making at each high court.
Specifically, both attitudinal and jurisprudential variables were used to analyze judicial
behavior.  
As predicted by Hypothesis Four, the effect of judicial attitudes/ideology on judicial
decision-making was found to be most significant at the U.S. Supreme Court, less significant
at the Australian High Court, and least influential at the Canadian Supreme Court in the
1990s.  The results for the U.S. Supreme Court confirm a large body of research (see, e.g.,
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Segal and Spaeth 2002) asserting that American high court justices make their decisions on
the merits of cases primarily based upon their policy preferences, and not the applicable legal
precedents.  However, this study does extend this line of research in one way:  this is one of
the first studies to aggregate all types of cases used in the analysis, rather than just use one
type of case, such as civil rights cases.  Also, both unanimous and nonunanimous cases were
aggregated, providing further confirmation of the attitudinal model.  
In the Canadian and Australian cases, the findings in this dissertation show that
attitudinal voting exists at these high courts, although judicial ideology is less significant in
both of these courts than in the U.S. Supreme Court.  These findings thus provide
confirmation of the recent studies conducted by Ostberg and Wetstein (1998, 1999, 2004,
2004b, 2005) and Ostberg et al. (2004).  For the Australian High Court, this is the first study
to test attitudinal decision-making based upon external ideology measures, and thus it is a
significant finding to discover that attitudinal judicial voting in this high court, which has
been asserted by many legal scholars to be completely dominated by legalist decision-
making.  
Turning to the analysis of jurisprudential variables, the results were striking, though
mixed.  That is, the results obtained for the analysis of the legal model were not always as
predicted by the judicial politicization theory.  As predicted, the legal variables were not
significant at the U.S. Supreme Court, but did reach significant levels in the Canadian and
Australian cases.  However, the lower court dissent variable was in the opposite direction
than expected in Canada, and the lower court invalidation variable in Australia was in the
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opposite direction than predicted.  Thus, full confirmation of Hypotheses Five and Six awaits
further research.  It does appear that the legal model is somewhat influential in the less
politicized high courts–Canada and Australia--in this study; however, it may be that the
model is under-specified and requires further legal variables to be developed and
operationalized. 
However, the legal model was tested in a second way by disaggregating the
unanimous cases for each court, pooling the data, and then estimating a reduced version of
the model using the court case as the unit of analysis.  The legal variables did reach
significant levels in the high courts of the U.S. and Australia (albeit in the opposite direction
than predicted in two instances), indicating that the law remains relevant in judicial decision-
making in unanimous cases.  While these results are tentative and await replication, they do
support the research conducted by  scholars (see, e.g., Kritzer and Richards 2005) who assert
that the law does indeed play a role in judicial decision-making in certain circumstances.
Thus, this analysis of both the attitudinal and legal models in cross-national
perspective has supplied intriguing results that both confirm and challenge the conventional
wisdom regarding judicial decision-making.  Additionally, a new theoretical framework has
been proposed to explain the variations in judicial behavior between courts of differing
nations.  The results of the testing of the theory comport with some of the conjectures
regarding selection systems raised by Miller (1998).  While the judicial politicization thesis
must await substantial additional testing before it can be fully accepted, it does provide a
suggestive blueprint for future research. 
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Limitations of this Study
This study is the first to examine the attitudinal and legal models and judicial
decision-making cross-nationally; therefore, as with any new area of social scientific
research, the findings in this project should be viewed cautiously until additional researchers
can replicate and verify the results.  In this section, the specific limitations of this dissertation
are noted and discussed, and areas for further research are suggested.  
The first potential limitation of this study is the possibility that the results are time-
bound.  This project selected the time period of 1990 to 1999 for each of the high courts
studied.  As noted in Chapter Two, the rationale for this choice is that each of the supreme
courts under consideration in this study experienced significant changes in the 1980s and
1990s that warranted an in-depth analysis.  However, the possibility exists that the results in
this dissertation are time-bound, and significantly different results could be obtained if a
different, earlier time period was selected for analysis.   The possibility of results that are
time-bound is always a limitation in most social scientific research, of course.  However, the
response to this potential limitation is that this analysis was meant to be a study of fairly
current trends in judicial decision-making at the high courts of the U.S., Australia and
Canada.  Indeed, analysis of an earlier time period would not be feasible, because of
significant changes that occurred in these high courts (e.g., the adoption of the Charter in
Canada).  The only realistic possibility would be to analyze judicial decision-making in these
courts in the period from 2000 to 2006.  While it is possible that the dynamics of judicial
decision-making may have changed significantly in the last seven years, it appears unlikely.
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However, this would present an intriguing research question, and the replication of this study
in the time period of 2000 to 2006 would be a very promising area for future research.  
The second limitation on this project is the fact that only two legal variables (lower
court dissent and lower court invalidation) were included in the model used to analyze
judicial decision-making.  Because this study examined cases across multiple case issue
areas, specific fact-bound legal variables could not be incorporated into the model.  For
example, Kritzer, Pickerill and Richards (1998) examined only search-and-seizure cases and
freedom-of-speech cases, so the authors were able to include a number of independent
variables that measured whether certain factual elements were present in each case in their
data set.  There is no question that this approach allows for greater precision in testing the
influence of fact-bound legal variables, but the tradeoff is generalizability is reduced, because
only one or two areas of the law can be incorporated into the model and analyzed.  This
project aggregated and analyzed cases from multiple issue areas, so as to provide the most
rigorous test of the theory and also increase reliability and generalizability.  However, it is
clear that replication of this study–but using only one issue area and incorporating case-
specific variables–would increase the specificity of the legal model analysis. 
The final limitation on this research is the question of generalizability.  This study
analyzed three high courts, and it is certainly possible that empirical analysis of judicial
decision-making at the high courts of other modern democracies–say, France or
Germany–could yield very different results.  So, it may be that the judicial politicization
thesis is not generalizable to other countries’ high courts.  The possibility that different
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results might be obtained in other cases and the potential lack of generalizability is always
a limitation in comparative research.  While it is hoped that this theory proposed in this
project is generalizable to other high courts, even if it is not, the findings herein still
hopefully shed some light on judicial decision-making in the U.S., Canada, and Australia.
Additional research testing the theory in other high courts will answer the issue of
generalizability.  More specifically, future research replicating this study in emerging as well
as established democracies would be invaluable in assessing the generalizability and
robustness of the theory.  
Relevance and Implications of this Project
This results of this project are relevant for both policymakers and scholars of
comparative politics and law.  For scholars of public law, this project has served to further
understand the judicial decision-making process in cross-national perspective.  Although
judicial decision-making has been extensively researched in the American case, only a
handful of empirical studies have been conducted in Canada and Australia.  At the very least,
we now know that judicial attitudes and ideology are significant at the high courts of Canada
and Australia, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court.  We also know that jurisprudential factors
play a role in judicial behavior in these courts, as well.   In addition, the judicial politicization
theory proposed in this dissertation provides a starting point to answer the question that has
not yet been addressed by comparative courts scholars:  why does the attitudinal and legal
model vary between high courts?  Finally, this project has hopefully served to dispel some
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misconceptions about judicial activism in each of these countries.  For example, Miller
(1998) has argued that there is a lack of judicial activism in Canada.  Although the Canadian
Supreme Court is certainly much less activist than the U.S. Supreme Court, the analysis in
Chapter Four demonstrates that significant levels of judicial activism exist at the Canadian
high court.  Thus, this project has provided a first step towards a more comprehensive
scholarly understanding of the judicial process in comparative perspective.  
However, a fuller account of the judicial process should be relevant to policymakers
as well as scholars.  It is clear that the influence of high courts throughout the world
increased dramatically in the latter half of the twentieth century.  Indeed, it has been noted
that there has been a “global expansion of judicial power” (Tate and Vallinder 1995) as
supreme courts have expanded their role beyond simple dispute resolution to the creation of
public policy.  Especially in Europe, constitutional courts possessing the power of abstract
judicial review have recently transformed the political landscape.  In some polities,
legislators and executives must anticipate the rulings of constitutional courts and frequently
alter their policies in advance of adoption to avoid having a law invalidated by the court
(Tate and Vallinder 1995).  There is a consensus, then, that many high courts have become
increasingly activist; indeed, in many countries, the nature of democratic governance has
been altered as increasingly politicized judges assume new policymaking roles (Haynie and
Tate 1998, 10).  Thus, judicial activism has played a fundamental role in the “quiet
revolution” of modern democratic politics (Weiler 1994).  So, a more comprehensive account
of the dynamics of judicial decision-making and judicial activism in modern democracies can
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help provide a better understanding of the ongoing process of judicialization across the
globe. 
Having noted the relevance of this study, it is appropriate to consider some of the
implications of the findings herein.  First, the findings of this project raise important
questions about the judicial appointment process in Canada and Australia, and to a lesser
degree, the United States.  To be sure, I have argued in this project that, contrary to the
conventional scholarly wisdom, the method of judicial appointment is not the dominant
variable in the judicial decision-making process.  Rather, I have contended that the informal
norm of the judicial selection culture is the most important influence in judicial politicization
and judicial behavior.  However, I did note in Chapter Two that formal selection systems in
Canada and Australia have the potential to become significant if the informal selection norms
should change.  Thus, this study does raise significant questions about whether Canada,
Australia (and possibly the United States) may wish to alter their judicial selection systems.
To review, Canada and Australia entrust the executive with virtually total control
over the appointment of judges to their high courts, whereas the appointment system in the
U.S. mandates a collaborative process between the president and Senate.  Because this study
has demonstrated that high court justices in Canada, Australia, and the United States are each
motivated, to a greater or lesser degree, by political ideologies and attitudinal preferences,
the myth (still heavily propounded in Canada and Australia) that judges only consider legal
factors when deciding cases should be finally discarded.  Thus, the acknowledgment that the
legal model is not wholly dominant and that political and ideological preferences play a large
 Of course, I acknowledge that certain commentators, of various political stripes, would assert44
that this has already happened in Australia, and perhaps, Canada.  This is certainly arguable, but my
qualitative review of these high courts’ jurisprudence in the last decade does not support that contention.
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role in the judicial process suggests that Canada and Australia, especially, may want to limit
the power of the prime minister in judicial appointments.  It appears that, especially in
Canada, ideology has played less of a role in the selection and appointment of high court
judges; however, there is certainly no guarantee that this phenomenon will continue.  That
is, it is conceivable that, when a future high court vacancy should occur, a highly strategic
prime minister in Canada or Australia could select a less qualified, but politically extremist
judge.   Because there are no effective checks in the appointment system in Canada or44
Australia, there would be no method for the political opposition to prevent this from
happening. 
As has been noted by various commentators (Kritzer 2006; see generally Malleson
and Russell 2006), it is impossible to completely remove politics from the judicial
appointment process; however, it is certainly feasible to design a system that reduces political
factors and balances accountability, merit, and independence.  For example, greater
transparency can serve to reduce overtly political considerations in the appointment process.
The lack of transparency in the Canadian appointment process has not gone unnoticed by
Canadian critics (Canadian Bar Association 2004; Johnson 2004; McCormick 2000b; Ziegel
1999, 2003) and indeed, there have been some minor changes in the process.  In 2004, Prime
Minister Martin created a parliamentary committee to screen supreme court nominees and
provide a report to Parliament (Morton 2006).  However, members of the opposition party
216
objected to the changes, and the process was refined in 2005 by adding additional members
to the committee.  However, it appears that these changes are largely cosmetic, as  the
committee acts only in an advisory capacity and the prime minister retains full control over
the choice of the nominee. 
One possibility for increasing the transparency of the appointment process in Canada
and Australia would be the establishment of formal confirmation hearings, similar to the
process in the United States.  Some Canadian commentators (see, e.g., Ratushny 2002) have
strenuously objected to this, arguing that these hearings would lead to a much greater degree
of politicization in the judicial selection process.  On the other hand, Ziegel (1999, 10) argues
that  parliamentary confirmation procedures and/or a nominating system are urgently needed,
because without the “restraining force” that such procedures would provide, “appointees
would be selected on the basis of their . . .  political and social philosophies.”  
There are, of course, a plethora of judicial selection systems used in various countries
as well as in the American states (see Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2002; Malleson and
Russell 2006 for a general discussion of selection systems).  Some of the possibilities are:
a merit plan (this involves a screening committee which selects a number of candidates,
followed by selection of the appointee by the executive), selection of judges by the
legislature; judicial elections (either partisan or nonpartisan); divided executive-legislative
appointment (the American federal system); and the current system used in Canada and
Australia, exclusive executive appointment.  Again, an exhaustive examination of these
alternatives is beyond the scope of this project, but the central point remains:  placing near-
 It is worth noting that the Canadian and Australian high courts differ significantly in one45
dimension: gender diversity.  The High Court of Australia has had only one woman in the history of the
Court, while the current Canadian Supreme Court is probably the most diverse in the world in terms of
female representation.  As of this writing, the Court is led by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, and three
women serve as associate justices: Marie Deschamps, Rosalie Abella, and Louise Charron.
 Of course, some would assert that we already have a supermajority system in place: the46
filibuster, which requires 60 votes to end. There is some question as to whether the minority party in the
Senate could successfully filibuster a Supreme Court or lower federal court nominee. In 2003, the question
was raised, and Republicans threatened to invoke the “nuclear option” and eliminate the filibuster on
judicial nominees.  This was avoided by a last-minute political compromise, and the possibility of judicial
filibusters remains an open question.
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total authority to appoint high court judges in the executive may not be optimal.  The
Canadian and Australian judicial appointment systems appear to be something of an
anachronism in the twenty-first century.   All commentators agree that an equitable judicial45
appointment system increases public confidence in the high court and increases the court’s
legitimacy.  In light of the findings of this dissertation, all possibilities for reform of the
appointment process in Canada and Australia should be considered.  
The focus on Australia and Canada above does not imply that the American system
of high court selection is optimally designed or without problems.  Indeed, there is a vast
literature which examines the judicial nomination and confirmation process and outlines
some of the difficulties with the system (see, e.g., Abraham 1999; Comiskey 2004; Epstein
and Segal 2005; Gerhardt 2000; Goldman 1997; Silverstein 1994; Yalof 1999).  One
suggestion for reform of the American judicial selection system is to require, by
constitutional amendment, a supermajority vote (say, a two-thirds vote) in the Senate for
confirmation of high court judges (Ackerman 1998; Gerhardt 2000).   The rationale for the46
proposal is that a supermajority vote would require presidents to confer with the political
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opposition on the candidate selection, and also require a president to choose a more
moderate, well-qualified, consensus candidate (Carter 1994).  While it seems highly unlikely
that such a reform will be instituted at this time, the idea is thought-provoking, and worthy
of serious consideration. 
Yet another class of potential reforms in the American judicial system involves the
removal of life tenure for federal judges so as to increase accountability and reduce political
influence (see generally Gerhardt 2000). This reform, which would require a constitutional
amendment, seems especially problematic, because of the ingrained tradition of judicial life
tenure and also because its elimination could reduce judicial independence.  A variant of this
idea, which might present less of a constitutional difficulty, would be for Congress to create
a series of financial incentives (or penalties) for the justices to retire once they reach a certain
age (Resnik 2005). 
Beyond reform of judicial appointment systems, there is a second major implication
resulting from the findings of this study.  This study has shown that judicial activism exists
at the high courts of Canada and Australia, as well as at the U.S. Supreme Court.  As
discussed in Chapter Three, many commentators consider judicial activism to be
undemocratic, “counter-majoritarian,” and deleterious to the proper functioning of a polity.
If these charges are true, then one implication of this project is that serious consideration
should be given to methods of limiting the effects of judicial activism.  One way of
accomplishing this is through what Tushnet (2003c) terms “weak-form” judicial review.
Weak-form judicial review allows for the legislature and/or executive to respond when the
 The notwithstanding clause presumably also allows for a legislature to override a particular47
judicial interpretation of a statute, not just a judicial invalidation of a law.
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high court invalidates a statute.  
One variant of weak-form judicial review already exists in Canada: the
“notwithstanding” clause, section 33, of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which allows
for legislative override of the Court.  The notwithstanding clause allows either a provincial
legislature or the national Parliament by majority vote to override, for a period no longer than
five years, any provision contained in sections 2, and 7 through 15 of the Charter (Flemming
2002; Goldsworthy 2003; Roach 2001; Tushnet 2003c).  Essentially, the notwithstanding
clause allows a Canadian legislature to reenact a statute that has been nullified by the Court
based upon the law’s inconsistency with the Charter.   However, Parliament and provincial47
legislatures have been exceptionally reluctant to utilize section 33, and it has been termed a
“paper tiger” (Leeson 2000, 20).  
The notwithstanding clause has been described as a “uniquely Canadian compromise”
between the strong-form judicial review system used in the United States and the English
parliamentary supremacy model (Goldsworthy 2003, 452).  Roach (2001) makes a persuasive
argument that the notwithstanding clause alleviates any constitutional or democratic concerns
about judicial activism, because section 33 acts as a check and a balance on the Supreme
Court.  The notwithstanding clause thus serves to foster a dialogue between legislators and
the Court, which further strengthens the democratic process (Hogg and Bushell 1997). 
Weak form judicial review exists in various permutations in other political systems
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as well.  For example, the British Human Rights Act (1998), taking effect on October 2,
2000, incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR) into United Kingdom law, so that ECHR rights were enforceable in UK courts.  The
Human Rights Act required that all public authorities in the United Kingdom must adhere
to the norms established by the ECHR, unless an Act of Parliament dictates otherwise.  If an
Act of Parliament is deemed by a judge to conflict with the ECHR, then the judge may issue
a “declaration of incompatibility.”  The incompatible legislation continues to apply, but it is
expected that the Parliament will amend the law to bring it into conformity (Tushnet 2003c;
Weiden 2006).  
The British Human Rights Act and the Canadian notwithstanding clause are just two
examples of weak-form judicial review, a practice that is asserted to ameliorate the purported
undemocratic nature of strong-form judicial review.  Indeed, some commentators have
argued that the weak form judicial review could also be optimal in other political systems
(Roach 2001; see also Goldsworthy 2003).  Given that the findings of this study have
demonstrated that high court judges in Canada (as well as Australia and the U.S.) are
influenced by ideological factors in judicial decision-making and that judicial activism is a
very real phenomenon in these courts, then it follows that a reexamination of the seldom-
used notwithstanding clause may be in order in Canada.  Indeed, the advent of weak-form
judicial review, accomplished through constitutional or statutory means, may be a desirable
method for both emerging and established democracies to balance judicial autonomy with
judicial accountability.  
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This dissertation has sought to provide empirical data on the little-studied concepts
of judicial decision-making and judicial activism in cross-national context.  If these findings
contribute in any small way to a better understanding of the judicial process in comparative
perspective or considerations of judicial reform, the project will have accomplished its task.
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